COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Willis, Fitzpatrick and Overton
Argued at Salem, Virginia
GENE ALLEN DODD
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 0777-95-3 JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK
APRIL 30, 1996
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BATH COUNTY
Duncan M. Byrd, Jr., Judge
Ronald W. Vaught (Parks & Vaught, P.C., on
brief), for appellant.
Monica S. McElyea, Assistant Attorney General
(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
Gene Allen Dodd (appellant) was convicted in a bench trial
of driving after having been adjudicated an habitual offender in
violation of Code § 46.2-357. On appeal, he argues that the
trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement
made to the game warden when no reasonable suspicion supported
the stop of his vehicle. Finding no error, we affirm the trial
court.
On October 25, 1994 at 5:00 p.m., State Game Warden Jerry
Jones (Jones) was patrolling on Sandy Springs Road in Bath
County. It was hunting season for squirrels and bow hunting
season for deer. Sandy Springs Road is a relatively isolated
dirt road in the woods and is frequented by hunters. Jones
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
encountered an old Ford van driven by appellant travelling slowly
in the opposite direction. As the two vehicles approached one
another, appellant, who was wearing a camouflage jacket, pulled
the van over to the side of the road and stopped. Jones asked
him "if he was having any luck," and appellant replied, "No."
While the van was stopped, Jones noticed that the sliding
door on the passenger side was open facing the woods and that
someone was in the back of the van as well as in the passenger
seat. Appellant started to drive away when Jones said, "Wait a
minute, I would like to talk to you." Appellant stopped the van
again, and as Jones got out of his truck, he heard a commotion in
the back of the van. Jones walked around to the passenger side
of the van to talk to the passengers and found a loaded rifle and
a loaded revolver. Jones then asked to see appellant's driver's
license. Appellant told Jones that his driver's license was
revoked because he was an habitual offender. Jones charged
appellant with driving after having been adjudicated an habitual
offender in violation of Code § 46.2-357.
Appellant moved to suppress his inculpatory statement to
Jones, arguing that the stop of the van was not supported by a
reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity. At
the suppression hearing on February 28, 1995, Jones testified
that he stopped the vehicle because he "had a reasonable
suspicion that they were road hunting." The trial court denied
appellant's motion.
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In considering a trial court's ruling on a suppression
motion, we view the evidence in the "light most favorable to
. . . the prevailing party below," the Commonwealth in this
instance, and the decision of the trial court will be disturbed
only if plainly wrong. Commonwealth v. Grimstead, 12 Va. App.
1066, 1067, 407 S.E.2d 47, 48 (1991).
"A police officer may stop the driver or occupants of an
automobile for investigatory purposes if the officer has 'a
reasonable articulable suspicion, based upon objective facts,
that the individual is involved in criminal activity.'" Freeman
v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 658, 660-61, 460 S.E.2d 261, 262
(1995) (quoting Jacques v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 591, 593,
405 S.E.2d 630, 631 (1991)). "'[W]hen a court reviews whether an
officer had reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop,
it must view the totality of the circumstances . . . objectively
through the eyes of a reasonable police officer with the
knowledge, training, and experience of the investigating
officer.'" Wechsler v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 162, 170, 455
S.E.2d 744, 748 (1995) (quoting Murphy v. Commonwealth, 9 Va.
App. 139, 144, 384 S.E.2d 125, 128 (1989)). "If the officer's
suspicion amounts to merely an 'inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion or hunch . . . [rather] than a fair inference in light
of his experience, [it] is simply too slender a reed to support
the seizure' under the fourth and fourteenth amendments." Logan
v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 437, 442, 452 S.E.2d 364, 367 (1994)
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(en banc) (quoting Murphy, 9 Va. App. at 144, 384 S.E.2d at 128).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, the evidence established that, at the time of the
stop, Jones knew that: (1) it was hunting season for squirrels
and bow hunting season for deer; (2) Sandy Springs Road was
frequented by hunters; (3) appellant was wearing a camouflage
jacket; (4) appellant was a hunter because he answered, "No," to
Jones' question about "having any luck"; (5) there were at least
two passengers in the van; and (6) the sliding door on the
passenger side of the van facing the woods was open. These
enumerated circumstances and Jones' experience as a game warden
provided a reasonable suspicion that appellant and his companions
were "road hunting" and adequately supported this investigatory
stop.
Accordingly, the decision of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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