COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Elder, Bray and Fitzpatrick
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
DANVILLE SCHOOL BOARD, ET AL.
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 2168-95-2 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER
MARCH 26, 1996
THELMA H. CHILTON
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
Gregory T. Casker (Daniel, Vaughan, Medley &
Smitherman, P.C., on brief), for appellants.
Gary W. Kendall (Michie, Hamlett, Lowry,
Rasmussen & Tweel, P.C., on brief), for
appellee.
The Danville School Board (employer) appeals from the
Workers' Compensation Commission's (commission) award of benefits
to Thelma H. Chilton (claimant) for a change in condition related
to a compensable injury by accident. Employer contends that
(1) claimant's claim for temporary partial disability benefits
was statutorily time-barred, and (2) claimant's evidence did not
establish the requisite causal connection between her partial
disability and her compensable injury. Disagreeing with
employer, we affirm the commission's decision.
I.
FACTS
Claimant, who was employed by employer as a part time
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
cafeteria worker, sustained a compensable back injury on
November 13, 1991, while lifting a twenty-five pound box.
Employer accepted the injury as compensable, and awards were
entered for various periods of temporary total disability.
Claimant last received disability compensation on October 7,
1992.
After suffering her back injury, claimant consulted numerous
physicians in an attempt to treat her lower back pain.
Orthopaedic surgeon Dr. Alton F. Gross first treated claimant in
November of 1991 and diagnosed a lumbosacral strain.
Neurosurgeon Dr. John A. Jane examined claimant beginning on
September 2, 1992, concluded that "there is absolutely nothing
wrong" with claimant, and released her to "full activity."
On November 15, 1993, Dr. H. C. Eschenroeder, Jr. examined
claimant and advised her that she probably suffered from a
residual soft tissue problem in her lower back. Dr. William J.
Richardson examined claimant on February 7, 1994, noted
degenerative disc disease at L4-5 and L5-S1 discs, but did not
recommend surgery. Dr. Eschenroeder again examined claimant on
May 2, 1994, and suggested claimant rely on a TENS unit and
nonsteroids for pain relief. Dr. Eschenroeder concluded that
claimant would continue to suffer from partial, chronic
disability. In a letter dated October 31, 1994, Dr. Eschenroeder
stated that he could not determine the etiology of claimant's
symptoms "and would be inclined to defer to the physicians who
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saw her at the time of her injury."
Unsatisfied with Dr. Eschenroeder's treatment, claimant
sought an opinion from Dr. Steven M. Fiore, who noted claimant's
workplace injury and her treatment course since that time. After
a discogram performed on October 31, 1994 again showed
degenerative process at L3-4, L4-5, and L5-S1 discs, Dr. Fiore
recommended sedentary work and physical therapy. Dr.
Eschenroeder, on July 7, 1994, and again on September 12, 1994,
opined that claimant's back pain limited her to "sedentary work
activities."
Claimant testified at the deputy commissioner's hearing that
she suffered from back pain since the accident and both before
and after her chiropractic treatment, and that the pain continued
to the present day.
Claimant filed a change in condition claim on August 29,
1994, seeking temporary total benefits and other appropriate
benefits, and on December 9, 1994, seeking resumption of
temporary partial disability benefits from September 1, 1994 and
continuing, plus payment of bills related to Dr. Fiore's
treatment. The deputy commissioner found that claimant timely
filed her application but denied her claim because she did not
causally relate her original injury to the 1994 disability. The
full commission reversed and awarded benefits, concluding that
claimant met her burden of causality. Employer now appeals to
this Court.
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II.
APPLICATION NOT TIME-BARRED
Code § 65.2-708 states that a review based upon a change in
condition shall not "be made after twenty-four months from the
last day for which compensation was paid, pursuant to an award
under this title." In this case, both parties agree that
claimant had until October 7, 1994 to file her application. On
August 29, 1994, while on summer break from her job as a
cafeteria worker, claimant filed with the commission an
application seeking temporary total benefits and "such other
benefits as may be appropriate." Claimant filed this application
based upon her physician's opinion that she could perform only
sedentary duties upon her return to work on September 1, 1994.
On September 1, 1994, employer allowed claimant to return to work
three days a week at a lower hourly wage, performing light
duties. On December 6, 1994, claimant notified the commission
that she returned to work on a limited basis and stated, "[t]o
the extent that [I] have not already asserted a claim for
temporary partial benefits, please accept this letter as a notice
for such a claim."
As the commission correctly recognized, "[t]he submission of
a standardized, uniform award review application, although
preferable and more conducive to the orderly administration and
disposition of [workers'] compensation claims, is not a
prerequisite for compliance with Code § 65.1-99 [current Code
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§ 65.2-708]." Reese v. Wampler Foods, Inc., 222 Va. 249, 255,
278 S.E.2d 870, 873 (1981).
Under commission Rule 13, the application must state the
"change in the condition relied upon." Central Virginia Training
Ctr. v. Martin, 2 Va. App. 188, 192, 342 S.E.2d 652, 654 (1986).
Claimant's August 26, 1994 application letter informed the
commission and employer that she was physically unable to return
to her pre-injury job when school began on September 1, 1994.
Claimant's application letter specifically stated (1) that her
inability to do non-sedentary work was due to back pain from her
original workplace injury, and (2) that Dr. Eschenroeder believed
claimant could not continue to perform the duties of her pre-
injury job. Claimant's notice to employer was meant to give
employer the option of reducing its potential compensation
liability by finding claimant suitable sedentary work, thus
entitling her to temporary partial benefits (i.e., "such other
benefits as may be appropriate"). Employer also had the option
of not offering claimant alternate work duties, thus entitling
her to temporary total benefits.
Furthermore, we reject employer's contention that claimant
should not have filed a claim for benefits until September 1,
1994, the date she was scheduled to return to her job. At all
times relevant to this case, including the school's summer break
before September 1, 1994, claimant was employed by employer and
was entitled to file a disability claim. To hold otherwise would
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bar relief for those employees whose two year statute of
limitations period expires during a summer break from school.
The Workers' Compensation Act "should be liberally construed
in harmony with its humane purpose." Barnett v. D.L. Bromwell,
Inc., 6 Va. App. 30, 34, 366 S.E.2d 271, 272 (1988)(en banc). In
light of this principle and the facts of this case, we agree with
the commission that although the December 6, 1994 letter was the
first to specifically mention a claim for temporary partial
disability benefits, this was a clarification and amendment of
claimant's August 29, 1994 claim. Therefore, we hold that
claimant timely filed her claim based on a change in condition.
III.
CONDITION CAUSALLY RELATED TO ORIGINAL INJURY
On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prevailing party below. R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v.
Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990).
"General principles of [workers'] compensation law provide that
in an application for review of any award on the ground of change
in condition, the burden is on the party alleging such change to
prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence." Great
Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Bateman, 4 Va. App. 459, 464, 359 S.E.2d
98, 101 (1987).
We hold that claimant met her "burden of establishing by a
preponderance of the evidence the existence of a disability which
was the consequence of the injury by accident." Hungerford
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Mechanical Corp. v. Hobson, 11 Va. App. 675, 678, 401 S.E.2d 213,
215 (1991). Claimant demonstrated that her back pain began in
1991, immediately after her workplace injury, and that her pain
continued uninterrupted from that point. "The testimony of a
claimant may [] be considered in determining causation,
especially where the medical testimony is indefinite." Dollar
General Store v. Cridlin, __ Va. App. __, __, __ S.E.2d __, __
(1996).
Furthermore, claimant's physicians related the onset of her
back pain with her workplace injury, and their reports and
records fully related claimant's account of her original injury.
An MRI of claimant's spine, conducted on November 22, 1991, only
nine days after her injury, revealed mild bulging of the L4-5 and
L5-S1 discs, with no herniation. This evidence, in part,
provided the commission with credible evidence that claimant's
injury caused the bulging and pain. While the physicians'
reports may have lacked the desired specificity as to the
etiology of claimant's pain, the commission may make awards even
"when medical evidence on these matters is inconclusive,
indecisive, fragmentary, inconsistent, or even nonexistent." Id.
For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision.
Affirmed.
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