COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Bray, Annunziata and Overton
DONALD LOUIS DAVIDSON
v. Record No. 0662-95-3 MEMORANDUM OPINION *
PER CURIAM
KATHY L. NORMILE DAVIDSON SEPTEMBER 26, 1995
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROANOKE COUNTY
Kenneth E. Trabue, Judge Designate
(Sam Garrison; Richard Lee Lawrence &
Associates, on briefs), for appellant.
(Ellen S. Weinman, on brief), for appellee.
Donald Louis Davidson (husband) appeals the decision of the
circuit court. Husband argues the circuit court erred when it
ruled an agreement signed by husband and Kathy L. Normile
Davidson (wife) was an enforceable property settlement agreement.
Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude
that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily
affirm the decision of the trial court. Rule 5A:27.
Evidence in this matter was heard by the trial court ore
tenus. "Property settlement and support agreements are subject
to the same rules of construction and interpretation applicable
to contracts generally." Fry v. Schwarting, 4 Va. App. 173, 180,
355 S.E.2d 342, 346 (1987). "[O]n appeal if all the evidence
which is necessary to construe a contract was presented to the
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
trial court and is before the reviewing court, the meaning and
effect of the contract is a question of law which can readily be
ascertained by this court." Id.
The trial court ruled that the agreement was unambiguous and
enforceable. We agree. "The fact that the parties attribute to
the same terms variant meanings does not necessarily imply the
existence of ambiguity where there otherwise is none." Smith v.
Smith, 3 Va. App. 510, 513-14, 351 S.E.2d 593, 595 (1986).
"Where there is no ambiguity in the terms of a contract, we must
construe it as written, and we are not at liberty to search for
the meaning of the provisions beyond the pertinent instrument
itself." Id. at 514, 351 S.E.2d at 596.
The terms of a property settlement agreement are presumed to
be independent and, absent evidence to the contrary, will be
construed as such. See Eschner v. Eschner, 146 Va. 417, 422-23,
131 S.E. 800, 802 (1926); Gloth v. Gloth, 154 Va. 511, 549, 153
S.E. 879, 891 (1930); Lindley and Parley, Lindley on Separation
Agreements and Anti-Nuptial Agreements, Vol. 2 § 25.02 at 25-7 to
25-8. A reading of the agreement in this case, confined to its
four corners, fails to support the husband's contention that it
is void under Kelley v. Kelley, 248 Va. 295, 449 S.E.2d 55
(1994). Unlike the agreement in question in Kelley, the parties
here did not attempt to limit the court's "continuing
jurisdiction to change or modify its decree relating to the
maintenance and support of minor children." Id. at 298, 449
2
S.E.2d at 56.
Moreover, the parties have acted in accordance with the
agreement since it was signed in 1991, and husband admitted that
he had received benefits under its terms. "[T]he interpretation
placed upon an agreement by the parties themselves is entitled to
the greatest weight." Id. at 518, 351 S.E.2d at 598.
Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily
affirmed.
Affirmed.
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