COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Baker, Willis and Retired Judge Trabue *
Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
JOE BOOKER WORRELL, III
v. Record No. 2569-93-1 MEMORANDUM OPINION**
BY JUDGE JOSEPH E. BAKER
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA JUNE 6, 1995
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH
Dennis F. McMurran, Judge
C. Gerard Thompson (Jackson & Thompson, P.C.,
on brief), for appellant.
Richard B. Smith, Assistant Attorney General
(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on brief),
for appellee.
Joe Booker Worrell, III (appellant) appeals from his bench
trial conviction by the Circuit Court of the City of Portsmouth
(trial court) for possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute. Appellant contends that the trial court erroneously
denied his motion to suppress evidence of cocaine found by the
police who stopped an automobile pursuant to information given by
an informant. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
The record discloses that at about 4:45 p.m. on April 6,
1992, a "reliable" informant, who had provided information in the
past leading to arrests, called the Portsmouth Police Department
*
Retired Judge Kenneth E. Trabue took part in the
consideration of this case by designation pursuant to Code
§ 17-116.01.
**
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
on an anonymous tip line. The informant gave Sergeant Morrisette
the following information: a tall black man who worked for the
city was going to and from a gray Honda, Virginia license
HQV-704, in the second parking lot on the left entry into the
London Oaks complex, obtaining crack cocaine. The informant
stated further that the cocaine was located in a compartment on
the driver's side door, that the man was with two other black men
named Tony and David, and that the men would be leaving soon.
Morrisette passed this information to Detective Snipes who
proceeded toward the area described by the informant. Morrisette
checked the license number and notified Snipes, who was heading
toward the scene, that the car was registered to a Richard Rogers
who worked for the city.
About fifteen minutes later, following the directions of the
informant, Snipes found a Honda matching the informant's
description at the exact place where the informant said it would
be located. A black male, subsequently identified as appellant,
was driving the car. Another man, later identified as Anthony
Williams, had just gotten into the passenger seat.
Detective Snipes observed the Honda's back-up lights come on
and blocked the vehicle with his squad car because it appeared
that the Honda was starting to leave. Snipes approached
appellant, who was driving the vehicle, and asked for his license
and registration. A review of those items revealed that
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appellant was not the owner of the Honda. 1 Snipes then asked
appellant to step out of the car. When appellant did so, he
tried to shut the door quickly, but Snipes "spotted what could
have been narcotics" inside the door. Snipes then retrieved from
the door what was later confirmed to be crack cocaine. Appellant
was placed under arrest and searched. Cash totaling $604 was
found in appellant's front pants pocket.
On appeal, the burden is upon the appellant to show that the
denial of the motion to suppress constitutes reversible error.
Fore v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1007, 1010, 265 S.E.2d 729, 731,
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1017 (1980). In reviewing a trial court's
ruling on a suppression motion, we consider the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party below, and the
decision will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or
without evidence to support it. Lee v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App.
235, 238, 443 S.E.2d 180, 181 (1994); Commonwealth v. Grimstead,
12 Va. App. 1066, 1067, 407 S.E.2d 47, 48 (1991). Our review of
the evidence includes the testimony appearing in the record of
both the suppression hearing and the trial. Greene v.
Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 606, 608, 440 S.E.2d 138, 139 (1994).
In order for a police officer to lawfully stop the occupants
of an automobile, the officer must have a reasonable articulable
suspicion that a crime has been or is about to be committed.
1
A passenger, however, was named Anthony, a name frequently
shortened to "Tony."
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Quigley v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 28, 32, 414 S.E.2d 851,
853-54 (1992). The level of suspicion required to make an
investigatory stop is less demanding than is required to search
or to arrest a person. Bulatko v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 135,
136-37, 428 S.E.2d 306, 307 (1993). When the record discloses
that information supplied by an informant has been sufficiently
corroborated, reasonable suspicion may have been shown, and it is
not necessary that every detail be corroborated. Id., see also
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 324 (1990).
While a "bright line rule" would be desirable in evaluating
whether an investigative detention is unreasonable, common sense
and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria,
Limonja v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 532, 542, 383 S.E.2d 476, 482
(1989) (en banc), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 905 (1990), and the
"totality of the circumstances--the whole picture" must be
considered. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989).
When the officers stopped the vehicle in which appellant was
seated behind the steering wheel, they had corroborated that the
vehicle was a gray Honda, bearing license plates HQV-704, located
at the precise place the informant said it would be, owned by a
city employee, and its occupants were two black men. The
officers also knew that the informant had in the past proved
reliable. The information given was that the vehicle would soon
be leaving. Upon arrival, the police observed that the vehicle's
back-up lights appeared to indicate that leaving was imminent.
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We hold that the information received by the police was
sufficiently corroborated for the police to continue their
investigation, including the request for the driver to exit the
vehicle.
When appellant opened the driver's side door to exit the
vehicle, he quickly attempted to close the door where, in a
compartment described by the informant, the cocaine was found.
Detective Snipes testified he "spotted" what appeared to be
cocaine as appellant seemed to be keeping it from his view while
closing the door.
The Fourth Amendment does not forbid all searches and
seizures, only those that are unreasonable. See Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960); Verez v. Commonwealth, 230 Va.
405, 410, 337 S.E.2d 749, 752 (1985). Thus, the test here is,
viewing the totality of the circumstances, whether the discovery
was unreasonably made. The reasonableness of a police officer's
response to a given situation is a question of fact for the trial
court and its ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent clear
and manifest error. State v. Fisher, 141 Ariz. 227, 238, 686
P.2d 750, 761 (1984). Here, the discovery was made in plain view
when appellant exited the vehicle at the place where the
informant said the cocaine would be found.
For the reasons stated, we find that the police had
reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity was or had
taken place at the point of appellant's arrest, and that it was
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not constitutionally unreasonable to view the driver's door
compartment where the cocaine was discovered as appellant was
leaving the vehicle. According, we cannot say that the trial
court's evaluation and determination was plainly wrong or without
evidence to support it, and we affirm its judgment.
Affirmed.
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