COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Koontz, Bray and Senior Judge Hodges
PERDUE FARMS, INC.
v. Record No. 2202-94-3 MEMORANDUM OPINION *
PER CURIAM
LINDA KAY MARTIN MAY 9, 1995
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS'
COMPENSATION COMMISSION
(Thomas G. Bell, Jr.; Timberlake, Smith, Thomas &
Moses, on brief), for appellant.
(James B. Feinman, on brief), for appellee.
The sole issue on this appeal is whether the Workers'
Compensation Commission erred in finding that Linda Kay Martin's
bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome qualifies as a compensable
occupational "disease" under Code § 65.2-400. Upon reviewing the
record and the briefs of the parties we conclude that this appeal
is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the
commission's decision. Rule 5A:27.
The facts are not in dispute. Claimant worked for Perdue
Farms, Inc. (employer) since June 1990 as a sanitation worker.
Her duties included using a high pressure water gun approximately
five and one-half hours per day. To operate the gun, she was
required to use the fingers of one hand to maintain the trigger
in a depressed position. Claimant first operated the gun with
her right hand, but switched to her left hand after developing
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
pain and numbness on the right side. Ultimately, she developed
symptoms in both hands.
Because her symptoms persisted even after she received
treatment from the plant nurse, claimant was referred to Dr.
G. Edward Chappell, Jr., an orthopedic surgeon. On October 19,
1992, Dr. Chappell informed claimant that nerve conduction
studies revealed that she suffered from bilateral carpal tunnel
syndrome. On February 11, 1993, Dr. Chappell opined that
claimant's "documented carpal tunnel syndrome is an occupational
disease and I believe that she needs surgery to obtain relief
from her symptoms." Claimant underwent release surgery on her
left hand. In a May 2, 1994 letter to claimant's attorney, Dr.
Chappell opined that claimant's carpal tunnel syndrome arose out
of her employment. He also stated that "[claimant's] carpal
tunnel syndrome is a disease caused by her employment at Perdue--
specifically on the poultry line."
The full commission found that claimant's carpal tunnel
syndrome met the test set forth in Merillat Industries, Inc. v.
Parks, 246 Va. 429, 436 S.E.2d 600 (1993). The commission stated
that "Dr. Chappell, the treating orthopedic surgeon, identified
[claimant's] condition as a disease in reports to both the
carrier and claimant's counsel. We have consistently held that a
disease caused by repetitive motion or trauma is compensable as
an occupational disease when supported, as here, by the medical
record."
2
In Merillat, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the
Workers' Compensation Act "requires that the condition for which
compensation is sought as an occupational disease must first
qualify as a disease." 246 Va. at 432, 436 S.E.2d at 601. This
Court defined "disease" as
any deviation from or interruption of the
normal structure or function of any part,
organ, system (or combination thereof) of the
body that is manifested by a characteristic
set of symptoms and signs and whose etiology,
pathology, and prognosis may be known or
unknown.
Piedmont Mfg. Co. v. East, 17 Va. App. 499, 503, 438 S.E.2d 769,
772 (1993). "[T]he word 'disease' has a well-established
meaning, and . . . no significant disparity exists among the
definitions of that term promulgated by various authorities."
Commonwealth, Dep't of State Police v. Haga, 18 Va. App. 162,
165, 442 S.E.2d 424, 426 (1994).
"Upon appellate review, the findings of fact made by the
Workers' Compensation Commission will be upheld when supported by
credible evidence." Id. at 166, 442 S.E.2d at 426. Sufficient
credible evidence supports the commission's finding that
claimant's condition was compensable as an occupational disease.
Dr. Chappell referred to carpal tunnel syndrome specifically as
a "disease," and his diagnosis satisfies the definition of
disease enunciated in Piedmont, 17 Va. App. at 503, 438 S.E.2d at
772. The mere fact that claimant's condition resulted from
repetitive motion in her employment is not dispositive.
3
Accordingly, the commission's decision is affirmed.
Affirmed.
4