IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN SECTION AT NASHVILLE
_____________________________________________________________________________
JENNIFER O. WILSON, Davidson Circuit No. 96D-1850
C.A. No. 01A01-9704-CV-00152
Plaintiff,
v. Hon. Muriel Robinson, Judge
LARRY ARNOLD WILSON,
Defendant.
FILED
March 20, 1998
JOHN E. HERBISON, Nashville, Attorney for Plaintiff.
Cecil W. Crowson
EARL J. PORTER, JR., Nashville, Attorney for Defendant. Appellate Court Clerk
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Opinion Filed:
____________________________________________________________________________
TOMLIN, Sr. J.
Jennifer O. Wilson (“plaintiff”) filed suit for divorce against Larry A. Wilson (“defendant”)
in the Circuit Court of Davidson County. During the course of this litigation, certain restraining
orders were issued by the court. Thereafter, defendant filed a petition against plaintiff for
contempt. The petition failed to specify whether civil or criminal sanctions were being sought.
Plaintiff filed a counterclaim for contempt against defendant.
Plaintiff filed a motion to disqualify private counsel from prosecuting the petition for
criminal contempt, noting that it was the same counsel who was representing defendant in the
divorce proceedings. The trial court denied the motion to disqualify, granted defendant permission
to seek an interlocutory appeal of that ruling and stayed proceedings on the pending contempt
petitions of both plaintiff and defendant.
The defendant subsequently filed another petition for contempt, upon which a show cause
order was issued. Plaintiff once again filed a motion to disqualify private counsel from
prosecuting the criminal contempt action. The trial court denied this motion and entered an order
granting a Rule 10 T.R.A.P. extraordinary appeal. This court thereafter entered an order granting
a Rule 9 T.R.A.P. interlocutory appeal relative to the trial court’s initial order denying plaintiff’s
motion to disqualify private counsel and shortly thereafter granted a Rule 10 T.R.A.P.
extraordinary appeal from the trial court’s denial of the plaintiff’s second motion to disqualify
private counsel. The Rule 10 appeal was by order consolidated with the previously granted Rule
9 appeal.
The sole issue in this consolidated appeal is whether or not a lawyer representing one party
in a civil proceeding may be appointed and serve as the prosecutor of a petition for criminal
contempt against the other party, based upon conduct arising out of the civil proceeding. For the
reasons hereinafter stated, we hold that such an appointment of an “interested” special prosecutor
in a criminal contempt proceeding is contrary to the ethical standards required of lawyers in the
practice of law, as well as the high ethical standard required of the judicial process and is thereby
prohibited. Other than the procedural facts as set out above, the underlying facts in this case
pertaining to the divorce and the conduct of the parties are really not material to the consideration
of this issue. Our scope of review is de novo with no presumption of correctness. City of
Tullahoma v. Bedford County, 938 S.W.2d 408, 412 (Tenn. 1997).
The propriety of using private lawyers to prosecute criminal contempt cases has not been
addressed as yet by our supreme court. However, it has been addressed in part recently by the
Middle Section of this court in a case styled Woodside v. Woodside, No. 01-A-01-9503-PB00121,
1995 WL 623077 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 1995), perm. app. denied, concurring in results only,
Jan. 8, 1996. In addition, the use of private attorneys as special prosecutors to assist the District
Attorney General in the prosecution of criminal defendants has been addressed twice in recent
years by our brothers on the Court of Criminal Appeals. The first of these two cases is State v.
Bennett, 798 S.W.2d 783 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990), followed by State v. Eldridge, 951 S.W.2d 775
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). These three Tennessee cases, along with the well-written analytical
opinion from the U.S. Supreme Court styled Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A.,
481 U.S. 787, 107 S.Ct. 2124, 95 L.Ed.2d 740 (1987), provide us with compelling persuasive
authority why this court in this case should hold that henceforth private attorneys who represent
a party that is a beneficiary of a court order may not be appointed as special prosecutor in a
contempt action alleging a violation of that order.
We believe that it will be helpful to examine the two distinct approaches that characterize
the way that various state and federal courts have analyzed and evaluated the issue of interested
prosecutors. While the approaches are different, the results reached in each approach and some
of the rationale utilized therein are influential in deciding the case here under consideration. We
have chosen to call them (1) the due process approach and (2) the ethical approach.
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Following the due process approach, a court would hold that the appointment of a private
attorney as special prosecutor in a criminal proceeding who has an interest in a case other than the
interest of justice, would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and/or the Law of the Land Clause in Article I, section 8 of the
Tennessee Constitution. This approach would assert that the appointment of a private prosecutor
in a criminal proceeding arising out of a civil proceeding where the appointed attorney also
represented one of the civil litigants is a per se violation of the due process rights of the criminal
defendant.
A pivotal case in this approach is State v. Bennett, 798 S.W.2d 783 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1990). The Bennett court held that T.C.A. § 8-7-401 (Supp. 1997), the Tennessee statute
authorizing the appointment of special prosecutors, did not violate either the United States
Constitution or the Tennessee Constitution. While upholding the constitutionality of the statute,
the Bennett court went further and examined the action of the special prosecutors to determine
whether their actions as such resulted in the deprivation of a constitutional right of the defendant.
Among the four areas the court looked at, it noted two areas of conduct that are relevant to the case
at bar: first, the special prosecutors therein did not represent the family of the victim in a civil case
arising out of the occurrence which gave rise to criminal prosecution and second, the proceeding
in Bennett was not a contempt proceeding which arose out of a civil prosecution. So although
neither scenario occurred in Bennett, the court expressed in dicta that either of these two scenarios
would have been a violation of due process.
The case of State v. Eldridge, 951 S.W.2d 775 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997), wherein the
pivotal facts are quite similar to the facts of the case at bar, involved a criminal prosecution rather
than a contempt proceeding arising out of a civil case. The defendant in Eldridge had been
indicted for attempted second degree murder. As permitted by the aforementioned statute, the
victim’s private attorneys had been employed as special prosecutors. Some seven months prior
to the criminal trial, these same private attorneys filed a civil suit on behalf of the victim against
defendant, seeking $1,000,000 in compensatory damages and $2,000,000 in punitive damages, for
injuries arising from the same incident being prosecuted in the criminal case. With the exception
of the rebuttal argument, which was made by the Assistant District Attorney General, the special
prosecutors handled the entire prosecution.
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In an excellent opinion, Judge Joe Riley reviewed among other things how Tennessee and
other jurisdictions handled private prosecutions of criminal matters. The court acknowledged the
forceful impact of the analysis of the conflicts inherent in the use of special prosecutors as set forth
in Young v. United States, supra. The court reviewed the ethical dilemmas which arose out of
those conflicts of interest and considered the due process implications as well. While
acknowledging Bennett and its holding on the due process issue, the Eldridge court noted that an
analysis of the activities of the special prosecutors in its case therein revealed a due process
violation had occurred, distinguishing Eldridge from Bennett. The Eldridge court concluded that
defendant’s rights under both the U.S. and Tennessee Constitutions had been violated. The
desirability of following the due process approach grows stronger as the potential punishment for
the crime being prosecuted by the interested special prosecutor grows more severe. The need for
constitutional safeguards such as the right to a jury trial, etc., increases in proportion to the
jeopardy being placed upon the rights of a criminal defendant. Therefore, when a criminal offense
carries potentially severe punishment, it is clear that the due process approach would be the more
logical to follow. Accordingly, both Eldridge and Bennett involved the prosecution of a much
more serious charge than that of criminal contempt in a civil proceeding.
However, the utilization of the due process approach in criminal contempt proceedings is
less desirable in the light of the quasi-criminal status of contempt in this state. See State v.
Sammons, 656 S.W.2d 862, 867 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982). The Sammons court distinguished this
state’s criminal contempt offense from the “serious contempt” referred to by the United States
Supreme Court in Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 197, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 1479, 20 L.Ed.2d 522, 526
(1968). In the federal system, the punishment for criminal contempt is left to the discretion of the
trial judge, who can levy fines and order incarceration for well over one year. 18 U.S.C. §
401(3)(1966). Given the potential severity of the punishment for criminal contempt in the federal
system, it is clear that the safeguards of the due process approach should apply.
The Sammons court noted that, contrary to the safeguards in the federal system, a
defendant in a criminal contempt action in this state is not afforded a jury trial. Sammons, 656
S.W.2d at 867. Furthermore, a criminal contempt proceeding is not even considered a criminal
prosecution. Id. Because of its minor nature, criminal contempt in Tennessee has a statutory
maximum fine of fifty ($50) dollars and ten (10) days imprisonment which may be ordered in
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circumstances other than nonpayment of child support. T.C.A. § 29-9-103 (Supp. 1997). It could
well be contended that the punishment for criminal contempt in this state has not been considered
of such significance or severity so as to warrant the safeguards inherent in the due process
approach. To invoke either the U.S. or State Constitution in settling this issue strikes with more
hammer than needed to drive the nail. The due process approach presents inherent complications
which are better avoided if a firm path around them may be found. We think it unwise and
unnecessary to enter this quagmire, and adopt a course equally sound and effective.
In our opinion, the adoption of the ethical approach places our decision on firm legal
grounds. The ethical approach involves our consideration of the ethical standards that guide the
conduct of both practicing attorneys and judges. Utilizing this approach, our Code of Professional
Responsibility serves as a beginning point for prohibiting the appointment of interested special
prosecutors. The aforementioned case of Woodside v. Woodside, No. 01-A-01-9503-PB00121,
1995 WL 623077 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 1995), perm. app. denied, concurring in results only,
Jan. 8, 1996, is the only case emanating from the civil side that has dealt with this issue. In a post-
divorce proceeding to increase and enforce child support, the trial court appointed the attorney for
wife as special prosecutor to prosecute a criminal contempt action against husband, resulting in
the court finding husband guilty of willful contempt, awarding wife a judgment for arrears in child
support and committing husband to the county workhouse for six months.
The sole issue presented by husband on appeal to the middle section of this court was
whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing an interested special prosecutor to
prosecute the criminal contempt proceeding, contending that it was in violation of the principle
set forth in Young v. United States, supra. The Woodside court quoted extensively from Young.
The court concluded that it did not consider Young to be binding upon the courts of Tennessee,
declaring that it would not be followed. The judgment of the lower court was affirmed, but not
in the usual sense. In a thorough and well-reasoned concurring opinion, Judge William C.
Koch, Jr. concurred in the result of the majority opinion, but only for the reason that the appellant
waived his right to raise the issue before the appellate court by failing to timely make a demand
for another prosecutor in the trial court. Judge Koch also voiced the opinion that the majority
opinion reflected an “unduly narrow view of our responsibility and is inconsistent with our other
decisions.” In an illuminating overview of Young, Koch noted that the majority in Young rested
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its decision on the American Bar Association’s Model Code of Professional Responsibility (1969,
revised 1980). He further noted that the Tennessee Supreme Court had adopted the very same
code, and that it currently governs the conduct of all attorneys in this state. See Tenn.S.Ct.R. 8.
In Woodside, Judge Koch outlined the relative responsibility of the courts of this state, and
more explicitly the appellate courts, in exercising supervisory power over the trial courts. He
stated:
The Tennessee State Supreme Court was exercising its inherent judicial power
when it promulgated the Tenn.S.Ct.R. 8 in 1981. The Code of Professional
Conduct in Tenn.S.Ct.R. 8 provides the bench and bar with a guide to a lawyer’s
obligations to his or her client under various circumstances. The Code’s
disciplinary rules are mandatory, and the ethical considerations are aspirational and
represent the objectives toward which every lawyer should strive. Tenn.S.Ct.R. 8,
Preliminary Statement.
Even though the Tennessee Supreme Court has the exclusive prerogative to
promulgate rules governing the practice of law, all the courts have the power and
duty to apply these rules in appropriate circumstances. The intermediate appellate
courts have frequently based their decisions on the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, this court has relied on portions of Tenn.S.Ct.R. 8 to
resolve disputes....
Id. at **7 (Citations omitted).
Judge Koch concluded that inasmuch as Mr. Woodside and his lawyer were aware from
the outset of the trial that the former Mrs. Woodside’s lawyer would be prosecuting the criminal
contempt charges against him, and raised no objection about this arrangement until the trial was
finished and the judgment rendered, that Mr. Woodside had waived his right to take issue with the
use of the former Mrs. Woodside’s lawyer to prosecute the criminal contempt case against him.
While affirming the results of the trial court, Judge Koch concluded that rather than turn judicial
backs to the rationale in Young he would leave the question of the propriety of using lawyers for
interested parties to prosecute criminal contempt cases for another day. We are of the opinion that
that day has come.
A closer and more thorough examination of Young without question provides the
justification for this court’s ruling. The basic facts in Young are not too dissimilar from the facts
in the case under consideration. The suit in Young was brought by two defendants, who in
settling a suit against them agreed to the entry of a permanent injunction prohibiting them from
infringing certain trademarks of a leather goods manufacturer. Subsequently, the manufacturer’s
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attorneys submitted an affidavit as a result of which the district court found probable cause that
these earlier defendants could be in violation of the injunction. The court granted the request of
manufacturer’s attorneys for their appointment as special counsel to represent the Government in
the investigation and prosecution of a criminal contempt action against these two parties. The
court of appeals affirmed, rejecting the contention that the appointment of manufacturer’s attorneys
as special counsel violated their right to be prosecuted by an impartial prosecutor. The supreme
court reversed, with the majority opinion basing the reversal on that court’s authority to supervise
the operation of the courts in the federal system, relying upon the provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, as promulgated by the American Bar Association, which had been
adopted in 1982.
Because of the relevance of the analysis by the Young majority, we quote at length from
the majority opinion:
...contempt power “has been uniformly held to be necessary to the protection of the
court from insults and oppressions while in the ordinary course of its duties, and
to enable it to enforce its judgments and orders necessary to the due administration
of law and the protection of the rights of suitors.” (emphasis in original) (citation
omitted).
....
While a court has the authority to initiate a prosecution for criminal contempt, its
exercise of that authority must be restrained by the principle that “only <[t]he least
possible power adequate to the end proposed’ should be used in contempt cases.”
United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 319, 95 S.Ct. 1802, 1808, 44 L.Ed.2d 186
(1975) (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat., at 231).
....
This distinctive role of the prosecutor is expressed in Ethical Consideration (EC)
7-13 of Canon 7 of the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Code of
Professional Responsibility (1982): “The responsibility of a public prosecutor
differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to
convict.”
....
Private attorneys appointed to prosecute a criminal contempt action represent the
United States, not the party that is the beneficiary of the court order allegedly
violated. . . . The prosecutor is appointed solely to pursue the public interest in
vindication of the court’s authority. A private attorney appointed to prosecute a
criminal contempt therefore certainly should be as disinterested as a public
prosecutor who undertakes such a prosecution. (footnote omitted).
If a Justice Department attorney pursued a contempt prosecution for violation of
an injunction benefiting any client of that attorney involved in the underlying civil
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litigation, that attorney would be open to a charge of committing a felony under §
208(a). Furthermore, such conduct would violate the ABA ethical provisions,
since the attorney could not discharge the obligation of undivided loyalty to both
clients where both have a direct interest. The Government’s interest is in
dispassionate assessment of the propriety of criminal charges for affronts to the
Judiciary. The private party’s interest is in obtaining the benefits of the court’s
order. While these concerns sometimes may be congruent, sometimes they may
not. A prosecutor may be tempted to bring a tenuously supported prosecution if
such a course promises financial or legal rewards for the private client.
Conversely, a prosecutor may be tempted to abandon a meritorious prosecution if
a settlement providing benefits to the private client is conditioned on a
recommendation against criminal charges.
Regardless of whether the appointment of private counsel in this case resulted in
any prosecutorial impropriety (an issue on which we express no opinion), that
appointment illustrates the potential for private interest to influence the discharge
of public duty. (Emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
....
A prosecutor exercises considerable discretion in matters such as the determination
of which persons should be targets of investigation, what methods of investigation
should be used, what information will be sought as evidence, which persons should
be charged with what offenses, which persons should be utilized as witnesses,
whether to enter into plea bargains and the terms on which they will be established,
and whether any individuals should be granted immunity. These decisions, critical
to the conduct of a prosecution, are all made outside the supervision of the court.
The requirement of a disinterested prosecutor is consistent with our recognition that
prosecutors may not necessarily be held to as stringent a standard of disinterest as
judges. “In an adversary system, [prosecutors] are necessarily permitted to be
zealous in their enforcement of the law,” Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238,
248, 100 S.Ct. 1610, 1616, 64 L.Ed.2d 182 (1980).
....
In a case where a prosecutor represents an interested party, however, the ethics of
the legal profession require that an interest other than the Government’s be taken
into account. Given this inherent conflict in roles, there is no need to speculate
whether the prosecutor will be subject to extraneous influence. (emphasis in
original) (footnote omitted).
....
Between the private life of the citizen and the public glare of criminal accusation
stands the prosecutor. That state official has the power to employ the full
machinery of the state in scrutinizing any given individual. Even if a defendant is
ultimately acquitted, forced immersion in criminal investigation and adjudication
is a wrenching disruption of everyday life. For this reason, we must have assurance
that those who would wield this power will be guided solely by their sense of
public responsibility for the attainment of justice. A prosecutor of a contempt
action who represents the private beneficiary of the court order allegedly violated
cannot provide such assurance, for such an attorney is required by the very
standards of the profession to serve two masters.
Having established that the same Code of Professional Responsibility relied upon by the
8
Young court governs the practice of law in this state, we are of the opinion that the conflicts of
interest and temptations, as outlined in Young, that are faced by an interested prosecutor, are not
so remote as to believe that they are unlikely to occur in this state if the practice of appointing
interested special prosecutors continues. This case is an appropriate one to render such an opinion,
inasmuch as we approach the issue prospectively, for the defendant in this case has filed not one,
but two petitions seeking to have the interested special prosecutor removed and a disinterested
special prosecutor appointed.
As a further consideration, in dealing with the issue of appointing interested special
prosecutors we should also recognize the existence and effect of judicial canons that govern the
conduct of judges. We perceive that for at least two reasons the judicial canons are relevant to this
issue. First of all, judges must “strive to enhance and maintain confidence in our legal system,”
Tenn.S.Ct.R. 10, Preamble, and secondly, because the appointing judge has the responsibility to
“act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary.” Tenn.S.Ct.R. 10, Canon 2.
At the heart of the issue of whether an interested prosecutor should be appointed is the fact
that all appointments are controlled by the trial judge. Therefore, if public confidence is
undermined by the appointment of a special prosecutor with conflicting interests, the judge is
under an ethical obligation to refrain from making such an appointment. This would be true even
if the judge considered the attorney to be able to properly handle the competing interests. As the
Young court stated, “the appointment of counsel for an interested party to bring the contempt
prosecution in this case at a minimum created opportunities for conflicts to arise, and created at
least the appearance of impropriety.” Young, 481 U.S. at 806, (emphasis in original)1 (footnote
omitted). The appointment of an interested special prosecutor presents the public with the
appearance of impropriety. As such, we deem the appointment as contrary to the appearance of
integrity and impartiality which the judiciary must strive to maintain.
The primary interest served by the appointment of opposing counsel as special prosecutor
is that of judicial economy. Because the other attorney is already familiar with the facts of the case
1
Tennessee has a reported case where the private prosecutor allegedly used the threat of criminal
contempt charges to attempt to coerce a civil settlement. See State v. Eldridge, 951 S.W.2d 775,
783 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).
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and the conduct on which the contempt charge is based, the proceedings do not have to be
suspended until an outside attorney is “brought up to speed” on the case. Again, the language from
Young is helpful:
The potential for misconduct that is created by the appointment of an interested
prosecutor is not outweighed by the fact that counsel for the beneficiary of the
court order may often be most familiar with the allegedly contumacious conduct.
That familiarity may be put to use in assisting a disinterested prosecutor in
pursuing the contempt action, but cannot justify permitting counsel for the private
party to be in control of the prosecution.
Id. at n.17 (emphasis in original).
The interest of judicial economy should not be placed above the interest of judicial integrity.
Other jurisdictions have taken a similar stance against the appointment of interested special
prosecutors for ethical reasons. See Department of Soc. Serv. v. Montero, 758 P.2d 690, 693 (Haw.
Ct. App. 1988), State ex rel. Koppers v. International Union of Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, 298
S.E.2d 827, 830 (W. Va. 1982). We are aware of only two twentieth century cases holding
unequivocally that a private prosecutor who also represents plaintiffs in a civil action arising out
of the same proceeding presents no inherent due process or ethical problems. Hopkins v. State,
429 So.2d 1146, 1154 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983); Marcisz v. Marcisz, 357 N.E.2d 477 (Ill. 1976).
In sum, we hold that counsel for a party that is the beneficiary of a court order may not be
appointed as prosecutor in a criminal contempt action alleging a violation of that order. The
judgment of the trial court below denying plaintiff’s petition to disqualify private counsel is
reversed. This cause is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Costs in this cause on appeal are taxed to
defendant for which execution may issue if necessary.
_________________________________________
TOMLIN, SR. J.
________________________________________
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CRAWFORD, P.J. W.S. (CONCURS)
________________________________________
FARMER, J. (CONCURS)
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