IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
RAY DARRIS THOMPSON, )
) FILED
Claimant/Appellant, ) Claims Commission No. 305139
) February 23, 1998
VS. ) Appeal No. 02A01-9705-BC-00102
) Cecil Crowson, Jr.
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) Appellate C ourt Clerk
)
Respondent/Appellee. )
APPEAL FROM THE TENNESSEE CLAIMS COMMISSION
FOR THE WESTERN SECTION
THE HONORABLE MARTHA BRASFIELD, COMMISSIONER
RAY DARRIS THOMPSON, pro se
Mountain City, Tennessee
JOHN KNOX WALKUP
Attorney General and Reporter
SOHNIA W. HONG
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellee, State of Tennessee
AFFIRMED
ALAN E. HIGHERS, J.
CONCUR:
DAVID R. FARMER, J.
HOLLY KIRBY LILLARD, J.
Ray Darris Thompson appeals a final order of the Claims Commission dismissing
his claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm.
Thompson, a prison inmate, filed this claim against the State of Tennessee after he
was punished by employees and officials of the Tennessee Department of
Correction (DOC) for possessing a deadly weapon. In essence, Thompson’s claim alleged
that DOC employees and officials negligently deprived him of “state law rights” because,
in punishing Thompson, they failed to follow certain DOC policies and procedures.
The State of Tennessee, through its Attorney General, filed a motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. In its motion, the State argued, inter alia, that the Claims Commission lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to determine Thompson’s claim because the claim failed to
allege that DOC employees and officials negligently deprived Thompson of statutorily
granted rights as required by the Tennessee Claims Commission Act. The Commissioner
of Claims agreed and entered an order dismissing Thompson’s claim. This appeal
followed.
The Tennessee Claims Commission Act grants the Claims Commission exclusive
jurisdiction to determine all monetary claims against the State for the “[n]egligent
deprivation of statutory rights.” T.C.A. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(N) (1992). This court previously has
rejected the argument that the term “statutory rights” as used in the Act is broad enough
to include administrative regulations adopted by a state agency. In Daley v. State, 869
S.W.2d 338 (Tenn. App. 1993), we explained:
Our research has unearthed only two cases involving
actions against the state for alleged negligent deprivation of
statutory rights. Both involved alleged deprivation of rights
created by statutes enacted by the legislature. See Bryson v.
State, 793 S.W.2d 252 (Tenn. 1990) and Computer Shoppe,
Inc. v. State, 780 S.W.2d 729 (Tenn. App. 1989).
Under the rule of strict construction adopted by the
appellate courts of this state, we cannot presume that the
legislature, by enacting § 9-8-307(a)(1)(N) intended to waive
the sovereign immunity of the state any more than expressly
stated. If the General Assembly had intended to remove
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sovereign immunity of the state to allow claims for negligent
deprivation of rights created by a state agency regulation, it
could just as well [have] have included the term “regulatory
rights” as it had at one point included the provision
“constitutional rights.”
Daley, 869 S.W.2d at 340. In accordance with Daley, we hold that the Commissioner
properly dismissed Thompson’s claim based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Thompson’s claim alleged no deprivation of “statutory rights” as required by section
9-8-307(a)(1)(N). Instead, his claim alleged only a deprivation of rights arising from DOC’s
policies and procedures.
On appeal, Thompson insists that his claim, as later amended, states a claim under
section 9-8-307(a)(1)(N) because it alleges that DOC employees and officials deprived him
of the “right to be free from unauthorized means of punishment as provided by T.C.A.
§ 41-21-404.” Contrary to Thompson’s contention, however, section 41-21-404 does not
appear to grant inmates a broad statutory right to be free from unauthorized punishment
pursuant to DOC’s policies and procedures. The statute merely provides that “[n]o convict
shall be punished in any other way than is provided in this title, except by the authority of
the commissioner of correction.” T.C.A. § 41-21-404 (1990). On appeal and before the
Claims Commission, Thompson has cited no provision of Title 41 (Correctional Institutions
and Inmates) which was violated when he was punished by DOC employees and officials,
nor has he alleged that his punishment was not authorized by the commissioner of
correction.
We also reject Thompson’s contention that the State was estopped from raising lack
of subject matter jurisdiction before the Claims Commission. Thompson raised this
estoppel argument because, in a related proceeding against individual DOC employees
and officials in the Thirtieth Judicial Circuit, the State moved to dismiss Thompson’s
complaint on the ground that the Claims Commission had exclusive jurisdiction over
monetary claims arising from the negligent deprivation of statutory rights. It is well
established, however, that jurisdiction over the subject matter can be conferred only by the
Tennessee Constitution or the Legislature; subject matter jurisdiction “cannot be conferred
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or enlarged by waiver, consent or estoppel.” Brown v. Brown, 281 S.W.2d 492, 501 (Tenn.
1955); accord Riden v. Snider, 832 S.W.2d 341, 343 (Tenn. App. 1991); Computer
Shoppe, Inc. v. State, 780 S.W.2d 729, 734 (Tenn. App. 1989). Moreover, we do not view
the State’s argument before the circuit court in Shelby County to be a concession that
Thompson’s complaint successfully stated a cause of action pursuant to section
9-8-307(a)(1)(N).
The judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed. Costs on appeal are taxed to
Thompson, for which execution may issue if necessary.
HIGHERS, J.
CONCUR:
FARMER, J.
LILLARD, J.
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Ray Thompson v. State
Combined Opinion