State v. Heflin

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE FILED
JULY SESSION, 1999 October 22, 1999

Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate Court Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9809-CC-00380
)
Appellee, )
) COFFEE COUNTY
V. )
)
) HON. GERALD L. EWELL, SR.
JOHN THOMAS HEFLIN, )
)
Appe llant. ) (FIRST D EGRE E MU RDER )

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:

CAMPBELL SMOOT PAUL G. SUMMERS
District Public Defender Attorney General & Reporter

RACH EL E. W ILLIS KIM R. HELPER
Assistant Public Defender Assistant Attorney General
605 East Carroll Street 2nd Floor, Cordell Hull Building
P.O. Box 260 425 Fifth Avenue North
Tullahoma, TN 37388 Nashville, TN 37243

C. MICHAEL LAYNE
District Attorn ey Ge neral

KEN NET H SH ELTO N, JR.
Assistant District Attorney General
P.O. Box 147
Manchester, TN 37355

OPINION FILED ________________________

AFFIRMED

THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
 OPINION

On January 13, 1997, the Coffee C ounty Gran d Jury indicted Defendant John

Thomas Heflin for first degree m urder. After a jury trial on March 9–11, 1998,

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and was sentenced to life in prison.

Defendant challenges his conviction, raising the following issues:

1) whether the trial court erred when it allowed the State to introduce the
statement of a co-conspirator into evidence; and

2) whether Defendant’s conviction is invalid because it was based on the
uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.

After a revie w of the re cord, we affirm the ju dgme nt of the trial co urt.

I. FACTS

Richard Danie l Clark te stified th at in O ctobe r of 199 6, he w as living in the

same reside nce a s his mother, Ta niese W ilson, his step-father, Al W ilson, a nd his

step-brother, Christopher W ilson. Clark testified that his mother and Al Wilson

began living together in August of 1996 and they married on September 28, 1996.

Clark testified that his mother dated Defendant for a number of years before

she met Mr. Wilson. Although Ms. Wilson and Defendant stopped dating each other

at some point, they began seeing each other again in August of 1996. From August

to October of 1996, Defendant spent the night with Ms. Wilson whenever Mr. Wilson

was working out of town.

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 Clark testified that on October 21, 1996, his mother approached him and

stated that som ething ba d was g oing to ha ppen to Mr. W ilson. Ms. W ilson then

asked Clark to k ill Mr. Wilso n, but C lark did not respond. A few days later, Ms.

Wilson repeated he r request that Clark kill Mr. Wilson. Ms. Wilson stated that

“they’d find a plac e to do it” and she also stated that if Mr. Wilson’s death appeared

to be an accident, the insurance policy would yield twice as much money. Ms.

Wilson explained that after Mr. Wilson was killed, she would claim that he had “been

robbed by Mexica ns.” Ms. W ilson also to ld Clark th at when they obtained the

insurance proceeds, she would be ab le to bu y a new hous e and Clark would be ab le

to buy a new truck. Clark then agreed to kill Mr. Wilson.

Clark testified that on October 26, 1996, Ms. Wils on wo ke him up an d ask ed

him to pick up De fendant. Clark took Ms. Wilson’s Beretta and drove to Def enda nt’s

residence, but Defendant told him to leave and come ba ck later. Clark returned at

appro ximate ly 1:00 p.m. and Defendant got in the Beretta. Clark and Defendant

then spent the rest of the afternoon and evening traveling between several different

locations where they drank beer and smoked marijuana. While Clark and Defendant

were at an esta blishme nt nam ed Ro n’s Mark et at appr oximate ly 12:00 a .m.,

Defendant told Clark that they needed to travel to Norma ndy. Clark u nders tood th is

comment to mean that they were going to kill Mr. Wilson

Clark testified that he and D efendant the n drove to a store by the Normandy

Dam. While they were waiting in the parkin g lot, De fenda nt gave Clark a .22 s emi-

automatic and stated that Clark was going to need the gun. Clark and Defendant

then waited in the p arking lot until they saw Ms. Wils on an d Mr. W ilson d rive by in

a silver Thunderbird. Clark and Defendant then drove to an area near the dam

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where they sa w the T hund erbird . Clark p arked next to th e Th unde rbird and Clark

and Defendant got out of the Be retta. Wh en he got ou t of the car, Clark saw tha t Mr.

Wilson was lying on a blanket. Clark then shot Mr. Wilson in the head two times.

Clark testified that after he shot Mr. Wilson, Ms. Wilson and Defendant began

arguing and Ms. Wilson stated that they “had to make it look real.” Defendant then

ripped Ms. W ilson’s shirt a nd Clark and D efenda nt bega n arguin g abou t who was

going to hit Ms. W ilson in the h ead. Clark eventually gave the gun to Defendant and

began walking to the Beretta. Clark then heard what sounded like a “thump on a

melon” and when he turned around, he saw that Ms. Wilson was unconscious. Clark

and Defenda nt then took M r. Wilson’s jew elry and they s ubsequently threw the

jewelry in a field and threw the gun off a bridge. Clark and Defendant then went to

the W ilsons’ resid ence w here the y spent th e night.

Christopher Wilso n testified tha t shortly befo re Mr. an d Ms. Wilson w ere

married, Defendant spent the night with Ms. Wilson in her residence. Defendant

continued to spend the night with Ms. Wilson after she married Mr. Wilson.

Christopher Wilson subsequently reported Defendant’s activities to Mr. Wilson, and

Mr. Wilson responded that if he was going to be m istreated, h e would move b ack to

his home state of Michigan.

Klouse Reccord testified that he went to the Wilson residence on the morning

of October 27, 1996. When Reccord arrived at the residence, he saw that

Defendant was pacing back and forth in the living room. Sh ortly thereafter, Recco rd

gave Defenda nt a ride to anothe r location. W hen Rec cord told Defe ndant that Mr.

Wilson had been killed during a camping trip, Defendant stated that “it didn’t sound

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like [Ms. W ilson] to go on a cam ping trip.” Defendant also stated that he had been

with Clark all of the previous night and he had come hom e with Clark.

Terry Holder testified that during the first week of October 1996, he saw Ms.

Wilson and D efend ant tog ether a t Patricia Holde r’s house . At that time, Mr. Holder

questioned Ms. Wilson about her marriage to Mr. Wilson. Ms. Wilson then stated

that she had married Mr. Wilson for the kids and for the insurance money. W hen Mr.

Holder asked how Ms. Wilson would obtain insurance money, Ms. W ilson stated,

“We ’re going to have him killed.” Defendant then told Ms. Wilson, “That way, you

can ge t that log ho use you always w anted.”

Patric ia Holder testified that during the first week of October 1996, Ms. Wilson

and Defendant came to her house. Later that evening, Ms. Wilson stated that she

and Defendant were going to kill Mr. Wilson and us e the insu rance m oney to build

a log hous e. Ms. Holder testified that even though Defendant did not actually say

anything in resp onse to Ms. W ilson’s statement, he smiled and laughed and agreed

with everything Ms. Wilson said.

Josh Brooks testified that on October 22, 19 96, he receive d a tele phon e call

from Ms. Wilson. In response to this call, Brooks obtained a chain and he then

drove to the N orma ndy D am. W hen B rooks arrived , he sa w that M s. W ilson’s

vehicle had become stuck in a culvert. Brooks also noticed th at Defen dant wa s with

Ms. Wils on. Br ooks subs eque ntly attac hed th e cha in to his tru ck an d Ms. W ilson’s

car and he then pulled M s. W ilson’s car o ut of the cu lvert.

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 II. OUT OF COURT STATEMENT

Defendant contends tha t the trial court erred when it allowed Terry H older to

testify that during the first week of October 1996, he heard Ms. Wilson say that she

was going to have Mr. Wilson killed so that she could collect the insuranc e mone y.

Specifically, Defend ant contend s that this evidence was inadm issible hearsay.

Initially, we agree with Defendant that Ms. Wilson’s out of court statement was

hearsay. Rule 80 1(c) of the T ennes see Ru les of Evide nce state s that “‘[h]earsay’

is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or

hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” It is evident

that the Sta te introd uced Ms. W ilson’s statement for the purpose of establishing the

truth of the m atter asse rted. Indeed, after Mr. Holder testified that Ms. Wilson stated

that they we re goin g to ha ve Mr. W ilson killed so that she could receive the

insurance proceeds, the prosecutor repeated this testimony and asked whether that

was what Ms. Wilson had said. When Mr. Holder testified that it was, the prosecutor

asked Mr. Holder to repeat his testimony again and Mr. Holder complied. The

prosecutor then repeated the testimony yet again and asked whether that was what

Ms. Wils on ha d said . It is clear from the amount of emphasis that the prosecutor

placed on Ms. Wilson’s statement that it was introduced for the truth of the matter

asserted. Thus, Ms. Wilson’s statement was hearsay that was inadmissible under

Rule 802 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence unless its admission was provided for

by an exception to the hearsay rule.

The S tate contends that Ms. Wilson’s statement was admissible under Rule

803(1.2) of the Tenn essee R ules of Evidenc e. Rule 803(1 .2) provides that “[a]

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statement offered against a party that is . . . a sta temen t by a co-co nspirator of a

party during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy” is not excluded by

the hearsay rule. In order for a statem ent to be adm issible under this rule, (1) the re

must be independent evidence that a conspiracy existed, (2) the statement must

have been m ade during the pendenc y of the conspirac y, and (3) the statement must

have been made in furtherance of the consp iracy. State v. Gaylor, 862 S.W.2d 546,

553 (Ten n. Crim . App. 1 992). W e con clude that the eviden ce wa s suffic ient to

establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant and Ms. Wilson

conspired to kill Mr. Wilson for the insurance proceeds and that the statement was

made during the pende ncy of the consp iracy. See State v. Stamper, 863 S.W.2d

404, 406 (Ten n. 1993) (holding that the approp riate standard of p roof for preliminary

facts required for adm ission of evidence under Ru le 803(1.2)(E) is pro of by a

preponderance of the evidence ). However, we also conclude that the statement was

not made in furtherance of the conspiracy. Ms. Wilson’s statement was m erely a

declaration of her in tent tha t did absolutely nothing to advance or aid the conspiracy

in any way. Indeed, this statement appears to be a part of a casual conversation

rather than an attempt to further the conspiracy. Thus, we agree with Defendant that

the trial court erred when it allowe d Mr. H older to testify ab out M s. W ilson’s

statem ent. See State v. Hutchinson, 898 S.W.2d 161, 170 (Tenn. 1994) (noting that

casual conversations are not made “in furtherance of” the conspiracy unless they

somehow advanc e the ob jectives of the co nspira cy). Ho weve r, we co nclud e that th is

was harm less error.

The record indicates that Defendant did not object when Patricia Holder

testified that Ms. W ilson had stated that she and Defen dant were g oing to kill Mr.

Wilson and use the insurance money to build a log house. Moreover, Defendant has

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not challeng ed the admissibility of this evidence on appeal. Not only was the

testimony of Ms. Holder substantially similar to that of Mr. Holder, it was also

signific antly more damaging to Defendant’s assertions of innocence. Indeed, after

Ms. Holder testified that Ms. Wilson stated that she and Defe ndan t were g oing to kill

Mr. Wilson for the insurance money, Ms. Holder testified that Defendant “agree[ed]

with everything she said.” Ms. Holder’s testimony about Ms. Wilson’s statement was

clearly admissible because the statement was one in which Defendant “ha[d]

manifested an adoption or belief in its truth.” See Tenn . R. Evid. 80 3(1.2)(B ).

Therefore, even though Ms. Wilson’s statement was improperly admitted through the

testimony of Mr. Holder, Defendant was not prejudiced because the same evidence

was prope rly admitted throug h the testimon y of Ms. Holde r.

In short, we conclud e that the trial court erre d when it allowed M r. Holder to

testify about M s. W ilson’s state ment. H oweve r, in light of the fact that Ms. Holder

gave nearly identical testimony about Ms. Wilson’s statement, any error was

harmless. See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b). Defen dant is not en titled to re lief on th is

issue.

III. CORROBORATION OF ACCOMPLICE TESTIMONY

Defendant contends that his con viction is invalid because it was based on the

uncorroborated testimony of his accomplice, Clark.

In Tennessee, it is well-settled that a defendant cannot be convicted on the

uncorroborated testimony of an acco mplice. State v. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d 797, 803

(Tenn . 1994). H oweve r,

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 [t]his corroborative evidence may be direct or entirely circumstantial, and it
need not be ade quate, in a nd of itself, to support a conviction; it is sufficient
to mee t the req uirem ents o f the rule if it fairly and legitim ately tend s to connect
the defendant with the commission of the crime charge d. It is not necessa ry
that the corroboration extend to every part of the accomplice's evidence. The
corroboration need not be conclusive, but it is sufficient if this evidence, of
itself, tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense,
although the evidence is slight and entitled, when standing alone, to but little
conside ration.

Id. In other words, “on ly slight circumstanc es are required to corroborate an

accomplice's testimony.” State v. Griffis, 964 S.W.2d 577, 589 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1997). Whether an accomplice's testimony has been sufficie ntly corroborated is a

question for the jury. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d at 803.

W e conclude that the other evidence in this case is sufficient to establish at

least the “slight circum stance s” nece ssary to co rroborate Clark’s tes timony. F irst,

Brooks saw Defendant and Ms. Wilson together a few days before the murder in the

same area where the m urder was co mmitted. Se cond, Defe ndant told Re ccord that

he had been with Clark all night on October 26, 1996, and he had come back to Ms.

W ilson’s residence with Clark. Third, and mo st significantly, when Ms. W ilson to ld

Ms. Holder that she and Defendant were going to kill Mr. Wilson in order to obta in

the insurance proceeds, Defendant smiled and laughed and agreed with everything

Ms. Wilson said. We conclude that while this evidence was not adequate, in and of

itself, to suppo rt a conviction, the evidence “fairly and legitimately tends to connect

[Defen dant] with the co mm ission of the crime ch arged.” Thus, Clark’s testimony was

sufficiently corroborated. Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

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 Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

____________________________________
THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge

CONCUR:

___________________________________
JERRY L. SMITH, Judge

___________________________________
NORMA McG EE OGLE, Judge

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