IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
FILED
AT KNOXVILLE July 30, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
JUNE 1999 SESSION Appellate C ourt
Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, * C.C.A. # 03C01-9807-CR-00227
Appellee, * Knox County
VS. * Honorable Richard Baumgartner, Judge
STEVEN WILLARD SELF, * (Reckless Endangerment, Intentional
Killing of an Animal)
Appellant. *
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
MARK E. STEPHENS PAUL G. SUMMERS
District Public Defender Attorney General & Reporter
1209 Euclid Avenue
Knoxville, TN 37921 CLINTON J. MORGAN
Assistant Attorney General
425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
RANDALL EUGENE NICHOLS
District Attorney General
TRACI SCUDDER
Special Assistant Attorney General
MARSHA SELECMAN
Assistant District Attorney General
P.O. Box 1468
Knoxville, TN 37901
OPINION FILED: _______________
AFFIRMED
JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS,
Judge
OPINION
Following a bench trial, the defendant, Stephen Willard Self, was
convicted of misdemeanor reckless endangerment and intentionally killing an
animal valued at less that $500. The defendant appeals, arguing that the
evidence at trial was insufficient to support conviction of either offense. We
AFFIRM the judgment of the trial court.
BACKGROUND
The factual basis of the defendant’s convictions was his shooting a dog
owned by Patricia Ann Crouch. Ms. Crouch testified that her son let the family’s
pet Mastiff out of her home and that, despite her searching, she was unable to
locate it. Later that night, Ms. Crouch heard the dog bark in front of her home.
She testified that she opened the front door and stepped onto the front porch to
get the dog, which was standing in her front yard about fifteen to twenty feet
away. While she stood there, she heard a shot from across the street and saw
the dog fall; the dog died a few minutes thereafter.
Ms. Crouch called 911, and Officers Douglas Ray Stiles and Lee Shaw
responded. Officer Stiles testified that he questioned the defendant, who lived
directly across the street from Ms. Crouch, and that he initially denied any
knowledge of the shooting. On further questioning, the defendant admitted
shooting the dog. However, his version of events differed significantly from the
testimony of Ms. Crouch.
According to the defendant, on the night of the shooting his wife and child
were returning to the defendant’s home when the dog trapped them on the
defendant’s porch, barking and growling at them. The defendant stated that, in
response to his wife’s screams, he grabbed his gun and ran out outside. He
testified he shot the dog only after it lunged at his wife and child. According to
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the defendant, after being shot the dog ran across the street and died where
investigators found it on Ms. Crouch’s property. Because investigators found the
dog’s blood only on Ms. Crouch’s property, where she said it had been shot, the
defendant produced expert testimony that bullet wounds do not necessarily
cause immediate external bleeding in dogs and that a dog can run some
distance after being shot without leaving a blood trail.
ANALYSIS
The defendant asserts that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support
his convictions. When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence,
this Court must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); State v. Duncan, 698 S.W.2d 63, 67 (Tenn.
1985); Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e). The appellee is entitled to the strongest
legitimate view of the evidence and to all reasonable inferences that may be
drawn therefrom. See State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978).
The credibility of witnesses, the weight of their testimony, and the
reconciliation of conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted exclusively to the
trier of fact. See State v. Sheffield, 676 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tenn. 1984); State v.
Gentry, 881 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). A verdict for the state
accredits the testimony of the state’s witnesses and resolves all conflicts in favor
of the state. See State v. Williams, 657 S.W.2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983).
Moreover, a guilty verdict removes the presumption of innocence enjoyed by
defendants at trial and replaces it with a presumption of guilt. See State v.
Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973). Thus, an appellant challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence carries the burden of illustrating to this Court why the
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evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. See State v. Freeman, 943
S.W.2d 25, 29 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).
Regarding his conviction for the intentional killing of an animal, the
defendant argues that his evidence to the contrary precludes the trial court’s
finding beyond a reasonable doubt that he shot the dog while it was in its
owner’s yard. This argument is without merit. As the trier of fact, the trial court
was entitled to discredit the defendant’s testimony and credit that of the state’s
witnesses. The testimony of Ms. Crouch, if credited, was sufficient to establish
each element of the offense. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-205.
As for his reckless endangerment conviction, the defendant argues that
even on the trial court’s finding that he shot the dog while it was in Ms. Crouch’s
yard and within fifteen to twenty feet of where Ms. Crouch stood, his single shot
did not create “an imminent risk of death or serious bodily injury” to Ms. Crouch.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-103. In support of his position, the defendant cites
State v. Fox, 947 S.W.2d 865 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996), and State v. Culbertson,
No. 03C01-9412-CR-00449 (Tenn. Crim. App. filed Aug. 30, 1995, at Knoxville).
The defendant in Fox fired a gun in the air or up into a tree and the defendant in
Culbertson shot into the ceiling of a house. In each case, a panel of this Court
found that the defendant was not guilty of reckless endangerment. Unlike the
present case, however, there was no proof in either Fox or Culbertson of any
potential victim in the vicinity of the defendants’ shots who would have been
subject to imminent risk of death or serious bodily injury. In the present case, the
defendant shot, at night and from across the street, into Ms. Crouch’s yard while
she stood only fifteen to twenty feet from his target. On these facts, we have no
pause in agreeing with the trial judge that the defendant’s conduct created “an
imminent risk of death or serious bodily injury” to Ms. Crouch.
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CONCLUSION
We find no error and AFFIRM the judgment of the trial court.
_____________________________
JOHN EVERETT W ILLIAMS, Judge
CONCUR:
____________________________
JOHN H. PEAY, Judge
_____________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, Judge
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