IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
FILED
AT KNOXVILLE July 26, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
MAY 1999 SESSION Appellate C ourt
Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, * C.C.A. # 03C01-9901-CC-00019
Appellee, * Blount County
VS. * Honorable D. Kelly Thomas, Jr., Judge
RICHARD D. REAGAN, * (Probation Revocation)
Appellant. *
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
JULIE A. RICE PAUL G. SUMMERS
Contract Appellate Defender Attorney General & Reporter
P.O. Box 426
Knoxville, TN 37901-0426 ERIK W. DAAB
Assistant Attorney General
RAYMOND MACK GARNER 425 Fifth Avenue North
District Public Defender Nashville, TN 37243-0493
419 High Street
Maryville, TN 37804 MICHAEL L. FLYNN
District Attorney General
EDWARD P. BAILEY, JR.
Assistant District Attorney General
363 Court Street
Maryville, TN 37804-5906
OPINION FILED: _______________
AFFIRMED - RULE 20
JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS,
Judge
OPINION
The defendant, Richard D. Reagan, appeals the revocation of his
probation, arguing that he was physically unable to comply with the terms
thereof. We AFFIRM the judgment of the trial court.
On April 22, 1998, the defendant pleaded guilty to public intoxication, a
third offense of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), violation of the
Habitual Motor Vehicle Offender Act (HMVO), and two counts of aggravated
assault. The trial court sentenced him to ten days for the public intoxication,
eleven months and twenty-nine days for the DUI, one year for the HMVO, and
three years for each aggravated assault. The trial court ordered these sentences
to run consecutively except that the DUI and HMVO sentences were to run
concurrently with each other and consecutively to all other sentences. Thus, the
defendant received an effective sentence of seven years and ten days.1 The trial
court granted immediate intensive probation on all counts.
On June 11, 1998, the trial court executed a probation violation warrant
and the defendant was arrested. At the subsequent hearing, the defendant’s
probation officer testified that the defendant failed to comply with the terms of his
probation on at least three occasions: he failed to meet with his probation officer
as directed April 25, 1998; he failed to report for hospital treatment as his
probation required; and, after he did later report to the hospital, he failed to
report to his probation officer upon being discharged. The proof further showed
that the defendant has severe mental and physical difficulites that may contribute
to his inability to comply with the terms of his probation.
1
In their briefs to this Court, both the state and the defendant calculate an effective
sentence of four years. Although the state does not expound on its calculation, the defendant’s
Statement of the Ca se reveals his misconc eption that the two aggravated assault sentences w ere
to run concurrently with each other and consecutively to the concurrent DUI and HMVO
sentences. The record reveals that the trial judge at the revocation hearing also believed that the
defend ant’s effe ctive sen tence w as four ye ars.
-2-
The trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and ordered that he
serve the remainder of his sentences in the Tennessee Department of
Correction. In doing so, the trial judge observed the defendant’s physical and
mental limitations and expressed hope that the defendant would be admitted to
the Special Needs Unit where he could get the physical, psychiatric, and
emotional treatment he needs.
The defendant does not contest that he violated his probation. He
argues, however, that his mental and physical state precluded his compliance
and that any violations were not willful.
On appeal of probation revocation proceedings, this Court will not disturb
the trial court’s judgment unless the record shows that the trial court abused its
discretion. See State v. Leach, 914 S.W.2d 104, 106 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).
In order to find that the trial court abused its discretion, we must conclude that
the record contains no substantial evidence in support of the trial court’s
conclusion. See id. “Proof of a probation violation need not be established
beyond a reasonable doubt, but is sufficient if it allows the trial judge to make a
conscientious and intelligent judgment.” See State v. Harkins, 811 S.W.2d 79,
82 (1991).
The evidence supports the findings of the trial court, and we find no error
of law mandating reversal. Therefore, pursuant to Rule 20 of the Court of
Criminal Appeals, we AFFIRM the judgment of the trial court.
_____________________________
JOHN EVERETT W ILLIAMS, Judge
-3-
CONCUR:
_______________________________
JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., Judge
_______________________________
ALAN E. GLENN, Judge
-4-