IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN SECTION AT JACKSON
________________________________________________
PERRY HART and wife REBA HART,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
Chester Chancery No. 8721
Vs. C.A. No. 02A01-9602-CH-0036
TOMMY CASEY,
Defendant-Appellee,
JO ALICE CASEY, FIRST NATIONAL
FILED
BANK OF JACKSON, EMC MORTGAGE Dec. 23, 1996
COMPANY AND WESTERN UNITED
ASSURANCE COMPANY, Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate Court Clerk
Defendants.
___________________________________________________________________________
FROM THE CHESTER COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
THE HONORABLE JOE C. MORRIS, CHANCELLOR
Ricky L. Wood of Parsons
For Plaintiffs-Appellants
J. Alan Rheney and Jonathan O. Steen
Spragins, Barnett, Cobb & Butler of Jackson
For Defendant-Appellee
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Opinion filed:
W. FRANK CRAWFORD,
PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S.
CONCUR:
DAVID R. FARMER, JUDGE
HERSCHEL P. FRANKS, JUDGE
This appeal involves a “land sale - purchase agreement” between Perry Hart and wife,
Reba Hart (Buyers) and Tommy Casey (Seller).1 Buyers appeal from the judgment of the trial
court finding that the “land sale - purchase agreement” between the parties had been terminated
and ordering that Seller was the owner of the property.
Buyers’ complaint, filed October 12, 1994, alleges that by virtue of a “land sale-purchase
agreement” attached as an exhibit to the complaint, they purchased a tract of real estate as
described from defendant, Tommy D. Casey. Buyers’ aver that the property was encumbered
by a deed of trust executed by Seller to Jackson National Bank and subsequently assigned to
EMC Mortgage Corporation and later assigned to Western United Life Insurance Company. The
complaint avers that Buyers spent approximately $15,000.00 for extensive repairs and
remodeling which were completed in 1992. They aver that on July 27,1994, they received a
letter from Seller that the 1993 property taxes had not been paid and that the July rent owed
under the contract was past due. At that time, Seller invoked a late charge of $84.00. Buyers
allege that on July 21, 1994, they tendered to Seller three checks in the total amount of $602.00
to pay for the 1993 taxes, July rent, and the late charge, and further aver that when they received
their bank statement on July 26, 1994, they discovered that the three checks had been returned
for insufficient funds. Buyers allege that they asked the Seller, through his secretary, to
redeposit the checks, and that they were told that the checks would be redeposited. Buyers
heard nothing from Seller until they received a letter from Seller’s lawyer on or about August
11, 1994, informing them that Seller was taking possession of the property because Buyers had
failed to pay the 1993 property taxes and had defaulted in making the monthly rental payments.
The complaint further avers that Buyers tendered their August rent check to Seller which
was refused by letter of August 17th from Seller’s attorney. They allege that they made all
monthly payments required under their contract except for the July and August 1994 payments
which were tendered to Seller but were refused. Buyers allege that after their rental payments
were refused, they notified Seller that they wished to prepay the balance due under the contract
1
The complaint also names as defendants Tommy Casey’s wife, Jo Alice Casey, First
National Bank of Jackson, EMC Mortgage, and Western United Assurance Company, but no
relief was sought as to these defendants. The judgment disposes of all issues for which relief
is sought, and these additional parties are not involved in this appeal.
2
as provided therein, but that Seller refused this request and advised Buyers that he had taken
possession of the property pursuant to the terms of the contract, and that the contract was
terminated.
The complaint alleges that a course of dealings had been established between the parties
for late payments, and that Buyers were allowed to cure defects on previous occasions, and that
they relied upon this course of conduct. Buyers aver that they had spent a great deal of money
on the property, that the property is worth approximately $60,000.00 to $65,000.00, and that a
forfeiture would be a gross injustice and would cause them immediate and irreparable harm. The
complaint prays for a temporary restraining order to restrain Seller from taking possession of
Buyers’ property pending a hearing on the merits, and that Buyers be awarded possession and
Seller be found in breach of the contract. Buyers also seek damages, both compensatory and
punitive.
The trial court issued a temporary restraining order restraining Seller from taking
possession of the property, or from in any manner disposing of or encumbering the property, or
from interfering in any manner with the possession of Buyers.2
Seller’s answer to the complaint admits that Buyers were in default under the contract
and admits that Seller terminated the contract. Seller alleges that he operated under the terms
of the contract, and he denies that Buyers are entitled to any of the relief sought. By way of
counter-claim, Seller alleges that Buyers were habitually late in their payments and other
obligations and allowed the insurance on the property to lapse, and that they were warned
concerning breaches on numerous occasions. Seller avers that when the three checks given in
payment of the delinquent sums heretofore set out were returned for insufficient funds, he
declared the contract in default, and that Buyers had no further rights under the contract. The
counter-complaint seeks a declaration that Buyers were in default under the agreement and that
their rights and interest in the real estate be declared null and void. Seller also seeks damages
2
The record does not indicate any further action concerning the temporary restraining
order, nor any effort seeking a temporary injunction pending the hearing of the case. The
proof in the record indicates that the property has remained vacant, and apparently neither
party has attempted to occupy or otherwise take possession of the property. The restraining
order expired fifteen days after its issuance on October 12, 1994. Tenn.R.Civ.P. 65.03 (5).
3
occasioned by Buyers’ breach of the agreement.
The land sale-purchase agreement provides that Buyers purchased the property for
$31,000.00, with the sum of $6,000.00 paid at the time of execution of the contract. The balance
of the purchase price of $25,000.00 was to be paid in 225 equal monthly installments at a rate
of interest that could be changed by the Seller as provided in the agreement. The contract
provides that when the entire indebtedness is paid, Seller is to prepare and deliver a warranty
deed conveying fee simple title to the Buyers free and clear of all encumbrances except for
current taxes. The provisions of the contract pertinent to the issues before us are as follows:
1. As above recited, the purchase price for the above-described
real estate is the sum of Thirty-One Thousand Dollars
($31,000.00). The sum of Six Thousand Dollars ($6,000.00), is
paid on said purchase price at the time of the execution of this
contract. The balance of said purchase price in the sum of
Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars ($25,000.00), will bear interest
from and after date at the rate of 12% per annum, to be amortized
and paid by 225 equal, monthly installments of $280.00 each,
these installments being due and payable successively on the 1st
day of each consecutive month, beginning November 1, 1989.
Anything above to the contrary notwithstanding, it is understood
and agreed by and between the Buyers and the Seller that the rate
of interest of 12% to be charged and paid as aforesaid on said
future advances shall be for a period of six (6) months from this
date and at the end of such six month period, the Seller shall
review the rate of interest charged and shall increase the rate of
interest, decrease the rate of interest, or allow the same to remain
as it is, and shall continue such semi-annual review until the
entire amount of principal and interest due hereunder shall be
paid in full. Buyers are granted the right to prepay the entire
unpaid balance or any part thereof prior to maturity, in which
event the amount thus paid will first be applied to the payment of
accrued interest and the remainder thereof will be applied to and
in reduction of the principal.
2. In the event of a default in the payment of any of the above-
mentioned installments as the same mature from time to time,
then the entire unpaid balance may, thereupon, be declared due
and payable forthwith, at the option of the Seller. A failure to
exercise such option from time to time will not constitute a
waiver of the right to exercise the same in the event of future and
additional defaults.
3. In the event any installment payment remains unpaid for as
long as fifteen (15) days after its due date, and the Seller does not
declare the entire indebtedness due and payable forthwith as
provided in paragraph 2, then there shall be a late charge of five
per cent (5%) of such payment in default.
* * *
4
5. The Buyers agree to keep this property insured in both the
names of the Buyers and Seller, as their interests may appear, and
agree to pay the taxes assessed against said real estate for 1990
and thereafter, and will not suffer any of such taxes to become
delinquent at any time.
* * *
7. In the event the Buyers should fail to keep the property
insured, the taxes paid as aforesaid, such may be deemed an event
of default, and if not corrected by the Buyers, within a period of
thirty days after notice by the Seller, the Seller, in addition to any
other rights and remedies which he might have at law or equity,
shall have the right to declare this contract terminated and of no
further force, effect or virtue, in which event the Buyers agree to
surrender up the premises to the Seller without any resort to legal
processes and the Seller will have the right to reoccupy the above
described premises as the lawful owner thereof, as any equity
which Buyers may have in such property will terminate at the
time Seller exercises such rights.
* * *
9. No major alterations may be made to the house or lot without
the express written consent of the Seller.
10. In the event the Buyers should fail to comply with the terms
of this agreement, or in the event the premises are vacated prior
to the expiration of the term of this contract, or should fail to pay
the entire unpaid balance of the purchase price when the same is
required to be paid hereunder, such amounts as Buyers have paid
Seller theretofore may be retained by the Seller as liquidated
damages, and no part thereof shall be refundable to the Buyers.
There are very few factual disputes. By letter dated July 21, 1994, Seller advised Buyers
as follows:
Dear Mrs. Hart:
In reference to your Land Sale-Purchase Agreement dated 10-11-
89 on property located at 244 E. Main St., Henderson, Tn., I’m
hereby enforcing interest review in item No. 1 and also #3
concerning a 5% late charge as of Feb. 1, 1994 due date. The
new interest rate will be 14% with a payment of $309.69
beginning August 1, 1994.
On item no. 3 concerning 15 days past due, which you have been
conscientiously past due since the beginning, I’m only enforcing
past due status for 1994 in the amount of $84.00, which should be
paid immediately. You are currently due for 7-1-94, as of this
date you are 21 days past due and this has been conscientiously
from the beginning. Plus the 1993 taxes also haven’t been paid,
the amount due on this is $238.08. Unless this is caught up to
date and agreement to be enforced I’ll consider the contract Null
and Void and take the property back.
5
I need to hear from you by 8-1-94 as to your decision.
Sincerely,
Tommy D. Casey
In response to this letter, Buyers sent three checks totaling $602.08 as requested in the
letter. They were returned for insufficient funds by Buyers’ bank. Plaintiff, Reba Hart, testified
that when she learned of the returned check, she called Seller’s office and requested that the
checks be redeposited. It was her understanding from her conversation with Seller’s secretary
that the checks would be redeposited. On the other hand, Seller’s secretary, Ms. Webster,
testified that although she talked by telephone to Ms. Hart, she did not tell her that the checks
would be redeposited. Ms. Webster stated that she merely told Ms. Hart that she would relay the
request for redeposit to Seller, Tommy Casey.
Ms. Hart took no further action to cure the default. She testified that she received no
further notice from Seller until she received a letter dated August 11, 1994, which states:
Re: Property located at 244 East Main Street, Henderson, Chester
County, Tennessee
Dear Mrs. Hart:
This letter will serve as notice to you that Mr. Tommy D. Casey
is exercising his right to retake possession of the above referenced
premises which is the subject of a certain Land Sale-Purchase
Contract executed by you and Mr. Casey on October 11, 1989.
Mr. Casey is retaking the property as a result of your default in
the monthly payments and payment of the taxes, as required by
the terms of the contract, evidenced in part by the return for
insufficient funds of your three checks, nos. 1774, 1775 and 1776,
in the aggregate sum of $602.08, copies of which are attached
hereto.
Before the August 11, 1994, letter was received, Buyers had sent the August rental check
which apparently crossed in the mail with Seller’s August 11, 1994 letter. Seller refused to
accept this check and returned the check to Buyers by letter dated August 17, 1994, from Seller’s
attorney. Subsequently, Buyers’ attorney, by letter of August 31, 1994, notified Seller of
Buyers’ wish to prepay the entire indebtedness as provided in the contract. Seller’s attorney
notified Buyers’ attorney that this could not be done since they had no right to prepay because
the contract had been previously terminated. Buyers’ proof established that they were financially
able to pay the indebtedness in full at the time they requested the payoff statement.
6
Ms. Hart testified that at the time suit was filed, the principal balance due Seller was
$22,710.00, and the fair market value of the property was $60,000.00 to $65,000.00. Mr. Casey
testified that the fair market value of the property was $31,000.00.
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing on October 11, 1995, the chancellor took the
case under advisement, and on November 15, 1995, entered judgment, which provides:
This cause came on to be heard upon the 11th day of October,
1995, before the Honorable Joe C. Morris, sitting without the
intervention of a jury, and the Court after hearing all of the
evidence in the case, stipulations of counsel, and after due
consideration thereof, is of the opinion that the evidence does not
preponderate in the favor of the contentions of the Plaintiffs;
The Court is further of the opinion that the land contract entered
into between the parties on October 23, 1989, has been terminated
due to late payments, improvements made without the permission
of the owner, and failure to properly insure; it is therefore
ORDERED that the land contract entered into between the parties
on October 23, 1989, is terminated along with all the Plaintiffs’
rights to the property, legal or equitable, and that the Plaintiffs
take nothing, and this cause be dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Temporary Restraining
Order entered in this cause on the 12th day of October, 1994 is
hereby dissolved and shall have no further force and effect.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant Tommy Casey
is now the owner of the property, which was the subject of the
land contact, free and clear from any claims of the Plaintiffs Perry
Hart and wife, Reba Hart, and that the Counter-Complaint be
dismissed with prejudice.
Buyers have appealed and present two issues for review which, as stated in their brief,
are:
1. Whether the Chancellor erred in finding that the Land Contract
entered into between the parties was terminated due to late
payments, improvements made without permission of the owner,
and failure to properly insure.
2. Whether the Appellants had the right to pre-pay the Contract
at any time, even after default.
We will consider these two issues together. The principle issue to decide is whether
under the terms of the contract, Buyers had a right as of August 31, 1994, to pay off the
indebtedness owed Seller.
The cardinal rule in construing contracts is to ascertain the intent of the parties. West v.
7
Laminite Plastics Mfg. Co., 674 S.W.2d 310 (Tenn. App. 1984). In construing contracts the
words expressing the parties’ intentions should be given the usual, natural, and ordinary
meaning, and in the absence of fraud or mistake a contract must be interpreted and enforced as
written, even though it contains terms which may be thought harsh and unjust. Heyer-Jordan
& Assocs. v. Jordan, 801 S.W.2d 814, 821 (Tenn. App. 1990). A duty devolves upon a court
to enforce a contract in accordance with its plain terms and to consider the entire contract in
determining the meaning of any or all of its parts. Cocke County Bd. of Highway Comm’rs v.
Newport Utilities Bd., 690 S.W.2d 231 (Tenn. 1985).
In their first issue, Buyers assert that the trial court erred in finding that the contract was
terminated due to late payments, improvements made without permission of Seller and failure
to properly insure. Since the trial court heard this case sitting without a jury, we review the case
de novo upon the record with a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact by the trial
court. Unless the evidence preponderates against the findings, we must affirm, absent error of
law. T.R.A.P. 13 (d).
As to the improvements to the property, the contract provision prohibits “major
alterations” without Seller’s permission. The proof is that Buyers made repairs, but there is no
detailed proof in the record as to major alterations. Moreover, the record establishes that Buyers
made the repairs over a period of time in excess of a year, that Seller and his employees had full
knowledge of the repairs and never objected or raised any question concerning same. It also
seems quite clear that repairs to the property worked only to the benefit of Seller. We also note
that Seller did not specify this provision of the contract as a ground for termination. The
evidence preponderates against the chancellor’s finding that a reason for the contract termination
was improvements made to the property.
As to the failure to properly insure, we do not find from the record that there is proof that
Buyers allowed any insurance on the property to lapse. Moreover, Seller did not assign this as
an event of default which must be corrected within thirty days. The evidence preponderates
against the finding of the chancellor in this regard.
Concerning the termination for late payment, Seller concedes that as to the delinquent
installment requirement of the contract, Seller is required to either accelerate the balance due
8
under the contract, or to collect a late charge on the past due installment. Seller, by his letter of
July 21, 1994, specifically called for the late charge and thus was not relying on the delinquent
installment as a event of default. If we should consider Seller’s August 11, 1994 letter as a
notice of acceleration, we must also consider it deficient in that it did not inform Buyers of the
amount due for payment of the balance of principal and interest and any other charges.
The contract before us is clear that Buyers are granted the right to prepay in whole or in
part the balance of the indebtedness. It is also clear that in the event Buyers default in the
payment of an installment, Seller has the option to accelerate and declare the entire balance due,
which terminates the contract, or to continue the contract and collect a late charge for the
installments.
Paragraph 7 of the contract provides that the failure of Buyers to keep the property
insured or to pay the taxes due may be deemed events of default. This paragraph specifically
provides additional rights and remedies for these particular events of default. Seller is authorized
to terminate the contract if they notify Buyers of their intent to do so if the defaults set out in
Paragraph 7 are not corrected within a period of thirty days after notice by Seller. The contract
terms give Seller the “right to declare this contract terminated,” if there has been no correction
of the default by Buyers. In the instant case, Seller’s July 21, 1994 letter gave notice to Buyers
that unless taxes were paid along with the past-due installments, Seller was terminating the
contract. Subsequently, by letter of August 11, 1994, Seller, through his lawyer, declared the
contract terminated. The termination notice was issued before thirty days had expired from the
July 21, 1994 letter, and specifies as a ground for termination the delinquent installment
payment. The letters of July 21 and August 11 are somewhat confusing, and in view of the
contract terms, Buyers could reasonably believe that they could pay off the balance of the
indebtedness which they promptly tried to do. The record is clear that Buyers attempted to pay
off the entire indebtedness after learning that Seller had declared the contract in default. In the
absence of a specific time in the contract for paying off the accelerated balance, a reasonable
time should be allowed by implication. See Moore v. Moore, 603 S.W.2d 736 (Tenn. App.
1980).
The proof indicates that the property has a value in excess of the balance due on the
contract, and Buyers have invested considerable sums in the property. While forfeitures are not
9
illegal, they are not favored in the law and are to be strictly construed. Simmons v. Hitt, 546
S.W.2d 587 (Tenn. App. 1976).
Every contract contains an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in performance and
enforcement. TSC Industries, Inc. v. Tomlin, 743 S.W.2d 169 (Tenn. App. 1987). When Seller
determined that the contract should be terminated for nonpayment of installment payments,
Buyers had the right to pay off the balance of the indebtedness and obtain title to the property.
This they were not allowed to do.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the
trial court. The trial court should require Seller to promptly furnish Buyers a pay-off statement
with the balance due of both principal and interest. Since Buyers did not tender a pay-off
amount into court at the time of institution of the suit, Seller should be entitled to all accrued
interest to the date of payment. The trial court should allow Buyers a reasonable time to make
the payment and upon payment require Seller to comply with the terms of the contract
concerning the warranty deed. Costs of the appeal are assessed to the Seller.
_________________________________
W. FRANK CRAWFORD,
PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S.
CONCUR:
_________________________________
DAVID R. FARMER, JUDGE
_________________________________
HERSCHEL P. FRANKS, JUDGE
10
Perry Hart and Reba Hart v. Tommy Casey, Jo Alice Casey - Concurring
Combined Opinion