IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED
APRIL SESSION, 1999 April 29, 1999
Cecil W. Crowson
COREY ADAMS KENNERLY, ) Appellate Court Clerk
C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9806-CC-00252
)
Appe llant, )
)
) FRANKLIN COUNTY
VS. )
) HON. J. CURTIS SMITH,
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) JUDGE
)
Appellee. ) (Post-Conviction)
ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE
CIRCUIT COURT OF FRANKLIN COUNTY
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
FLOY D DO N DA VIS JOHN KNOX WALKUP
201 Firs t Avenu e, N.W . Attorney General and Reporter
Win cheste r, TN 37 398
KIM R. HELPER
Assistant Attorney General
425 Fifth Avenu e North
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
J. MICHAEL TAYLOR
District Attorney General
STEVEN M. BLOUNT
Assistant District Attorney General
1002 East Main Street
Decherd, TN 37324
OPINION FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED
DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
OPINION
The Defe ndan t, Core y Ada ms K enne rly, app eals th e trial co urt’s denial of
his petition for post-conviction relief. On October 28, 1996, Defendant pleaded
guilty to first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. Pursuant
to the plea agreement, the trial court sen tenced Defen dant to life imprisonment
with the possibility of parole for felony murd er and twenty years fo r espe cially
aggrava ted robb ery, to be se rved con current to his life sente nce.
On January 13, 1997, Defendant filed a pro se petition for post-conviction
relief, which he later amended.1 Following a post-conviction evidentiary hearing,
the trial court denied relief, and Defendant appealed. In this appeal, Defendant
raises three assignm ents of error for review: (1) th e trial co urt failed to com ply
with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d), and as a re sult, his plea was
not entered voluntarily; (2) the trial court erred by overruling his motion to dismiss
his attorneys of record; and (3) he suffered the ineffective assistance of counsel
becau se cou nsel failed to reques t a chang e of venu e.
I.
In his half-page argument to this Court, Defendant alleges that the trial
court “failed to advise him o f certain of his constitutional rights and statutory
rights,” citing to Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), and State v. Mackey,
553 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn. 1977). A thorough review of the plea hearing transcript
revea ls that Defendant’s hearing could perhaps serve as a model for trial judges
1
Although the court had appointed counsel at that time, Defendant filed this amended
petition pro se.
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to follow when accepting guilty pleas. The trial judge in this case placed the
utmost importance on Defendant’s understanding of the proceedings, including
the prote ctions affo rded by th e United States a nd Te nness ee Co nstitutions.
In his brief, Defendant specifies only one right which he contends was not
but should have been given. He states, “The Court failed to advise him that he
had a specific right to a chan ge of ven ue . . . .” Defendant has not cited, nor can
this Court locate, any authority tending to show that the trial court ha s a duty to
inform criminal defendants of a right to chan ge ven ue. Th erefor e, this iss ue is
both waived a nd witho ut merit. We conclude that the trial court properly ensured
the knowing and voluntary nature of Defendant’s plea.
II.
In his second issue, Defendant alleges that the trial court erred by denying
his motion to dismiss his attorne ys of reco rd. How ever, as th e State p oints out,
Defendant has waived this issue by failing to provide any argument in his brief on
appea l to this Cou rt.
III.
Finally, Defendant argues that he suffered the ineffective assistance of
counsel prior to his guilty plea. Gleaning his argument from the statement of
facts contained in his brief, it appears that this issue has tw o pron gs: (1) h is
counsel failed to advise him of his constitutional rights, including the right to plead
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not guilty and procee d to trial; and (2) his coun sel failed to inform him that his
case could have b een mo ved to a location o ther than Fran klin or Grundy C ounty.
It is more than apparent from the transcript of the guilty plea that Defendant
was aware of his constitutional rights, including the right to plead not guilty and
proceed to trial. T herefo re, eve n if his counsel had been deficient in this respe ct,
Defendant could not fulfill his burden to s how he w as prejudiced by the
deficiency. Furthermore, his pretrial counsel testified at the post-conviction
hearing that the decision not to request a change of venue was made after the
issue was fully discussed with Defendant prior to the plea. Defendant testified
at his plea hearing that he ha d no diss atisfaction w ith his pretrial c ounse l.
The trial judge en tered a th orough mem orandu m opin ion den ying pos t-
conviction relief. The ev idence clearly sup ports the trial judge’s find ings. Based
upon a thorough reading of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the law
governing the issue s prese nted for re view, we a ffirm the jud gmen t of the trial
court.
____________________________________
DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
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CONCUR:
___________________________________
JOHN H. PEAY, JUDGE
__________________________________
JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR.
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