IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
APRIL SESSION, 1999
FILED
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) April 20, 1999
) No. 02C01-9806-CR-00196
Appellee ) Cecil Crowson, Jr.
) SHELBY COUNTY Appellate C ourt Clerk
vs. )
) Hon. Chris Craft, Judge
RAYMOND L. SUGGS, )
) (Driving on a revoked license,
Appellant ) second offense; DUI, third offense)
For the Appellant: For the Appellee:
AC Wharton Paul G. Summers
District Public Defender Attorney General and Reporter
Walker Gwinn Patricia C. Kussmann
Asst. Public Defender Assistant Attorney General
201 Poplar Avenue Criminal Justice Division
Memphis, TN 38103 425 Fifth Avenue North
2d Floor, Cordell Hull Building
(ON APPEAL) Nashville, TN 37243-0493
Tarik B. Sugarmon William L. Gibbons
Asst. Part-Time Public Defender District Attorney General
201 Poplar Avenue, Second Floor
Memphis, TN 38103 Thomas Hoover
Asst. District Attorney General
(AT TRIAL) Criminal Justice Complex, Suite 301
201 Poplar Avenue
Memphis, TN 38103
OPINION FILED:
AFFIRMED
David G. Hayes
Judge
OPINION
The appellant, Raymond L. Suggs, was found guilty by a Shelby County jury of
driving on a revoked license, second offense, and driving under the influence, third
offense. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of five months for driving on a
revoked license and eleven months, twenty nine days, suspended after service of five
months, for driving under the influence. In his sole issue on appeal, the appellant
contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for driving under the
influence, third offense.
After review of the record, we affirm.
Background
On June 29, 1996, Memphis Police Officer Frank Winston was on patrol
traveling westbound on South Parkway. At approximately 10 p.m., he observed a red
Ford Grenada fail to make a complete stop at a traffic sign. The Grenada proceeded
eastbound on South Parkway. Officer Winston followed the vehicle and was able to
effect a traffic stop at the I-240 overpass, approximately one and one-half miles from
the site of the infraction.
As Officer Winston approached the vehicle, he was able to observe two people
in the car. He asked the driver, subsequently identified as the appellant, to exit the
vehicle, at which time Officer Winston observed that the appellant’s eyes were blood
shot. He also noticed that the appellant was swaying, to such extent that Officer
Winston reached for the appellant to prevent him from being hit by oncoming traffic.
When the appellant failed to produce a driver’s license, Winston placed the appellant
in the rear seat of his patrol car. At this point, the appellant became argumentive and
Officer Winston noticed a strong odor of alcohol on the appellant.
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After performing standard identification checks on both the appellant and the
passenger, Winston discovered that the passenger had an outstanding warrant for his
arrest and the appellant’s driver’s license had been revoked. The passenger was also
placed in the patrol car and Winston radioed his partner, Officer Robert Hardy, to
transport the passenger to the Criminal Justice Center.
While in the rear of the patrol car, the appellant began shaking. Officer Winston
believed the appellant was having a seizure and requested an ambulance be sent to
the scene. When the paramedics arrived, they examined the appellant and determined
that he was not having a seizure. Within minutes of their arrival, the appellant
appeared “normal.”
Officer Hardy, who had arrived at the scene shortly before the paramedics,
observed that the appellant had a strong odor of alcohol about him and was very
combative. Because of the appellant’s behavior and appearance, Winston requested
that the Metro DUI van be dispatched to the scene. The appellant remained in the rear
seat of Winston’s patrol car. At some point, the appellant attempted to flee from the
car. Although he attempted to knock Officer Hardy down, Hardy was physically able
to subdue and restrain the appellant.
Shelby County Deputy Sheriff Alvin Dortch, the alcohol and drug technician with
the Metro DUI unit, along with Officer Winston requested that the appellant submit to
a field sobriety test and a blood alcohol content test. Dortch, W inston, and Hardy all
testified at trial that the appellant refused any testing and continually cursed at the
officers. Deputy Dortch confirmed Officer Winston’s and Officer Hardy’s observations
that the appellant smelled strongly of alcohol, was combative with the arresting officers,
had blood shot eyes, swayed upon standing, and had slow muscle reflex response.
Officer Winston arrested the appellant for driving under the influence and transported
him to the jail.
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At trial, proof was introduced that the appellant had pled guilty in 1990 and 1994
to driving under the influence and had pled guilty to driving on a revoked license in
1994. Although the appellant did not testify at the guilt phase of his DUI trial, he did
testify during the penalty phase. The appellant stated
[T]he real truthfulness in that hasn’t prevailed. The truthfulness was that
the police knocked me out. I wasn’t aware of the ambulance. I wasn’t
aware of the DUI wagon. I was handcuffed, knocked out, inside that
police car. And when they was talking about escape, I woke up in shock.
. . . [T]his part of my body came out of the car. They tried to get me on
the escape charges. I didn’t have no idea what was going on, because
I was knocked out.
Based upon this evidence, the jury found the appellant guilty of driving on a
revoked license, second offense, and driving under the influence, third offense.
Analysis
Again, in his sole issue on appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence to sustain his conviction for driving under the influence, third offense.
Specifically, the appellant contends that “he had not been drinking and the police
knocked him out.” He also claims that he was not guilty of one of the two prior driving
under the influence offenses used to enhance his conviction to third offense DUI.
Regarding the evidence necessary to affirm the appellant’s present conviction
for driving under the influence, we conclude that the appellant’s challenge is one of
witness credibility. In essence, the appellant requests that this court trespass upon the
jury’s responsibility to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and reweigh the evidence
introduced at the trial by reassessing the credibility of the arresting officers and the
appellant. It is not the duty of this court to revisit questions of witness credibility on
appeal, that function being within the province of the trier of fact. See generally State
v. Adkins, 786 S.W.2d 642, 646 (Tenn. 1990); State v. Burlison, 868 S.W.2d 713, 718-
19 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993); State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776, 779
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(Tenn.Crim.App.1990). We decline the appellant’s invitation to overturn his conviction
by making a choice different from that of the jury.
Moreover, we conclude that the evidence is more than sufficient to support the
jury’s verdict. The elements of driving under the influence are: (1) driving or being in
physical control of a motor vehicle (2) upon a public thoroughfare while (3) under the
influence of an intoxicant or drug. Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-401 (1996 Supp.). In this
case, the appellant only challenges the finding that he was under the influence of an
intoxicant at the time of his arrest. The jury heard three prosecuting witnesses testify
that the appellant smelled of alcohol, his eyes were blood shot, his speech was slurred,
his reflex responses were slow, and he was violent and combative to the arresting
officers. We conclude that the evidence in the record before us, viewed in the light most
favorable to the State, amply supports the appellant's conviction for driving under the
influence, third offense. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789
(1979); Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e). This issue is without merit.
Finally, the appellant challenges the validity of his 1989 conviction for driving
under the influence contending that he only pled guilty because he was advised by
counsel to do so. Specifically, he contends that “he was not guilty of the 1989 DUI
charge . . . because he had pulled over on the side of the road to sleep and was not
driving.” The appellant’s challenge to the validity of his 1989 conviction amounts to a
collateral attack and is precluded by our supreme court’s holding in McClintock v. State,
732 S.W.2d 268, 272 (Tenn. 1987). This claim is without merit.
For the reasons stated herein, we find no error of law requiring reversal. The
judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
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DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE
CONCUR:
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JOSEPH M. TIPTON, JUDGE
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L. T. LAFFERTY, SENIOR JUDGE
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