IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED
MARCH SESSION , 1999 April 16, 1999
Cecil W. Crowson
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) Appellate Court Clerk
C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9806-CR-00238
)
Appellee, )
)
) SUMNER COUN TY
VS. )
) HON. JANE W. WHEATCRAFT,
MELISSA ROBERTS, ) JUDGE
)
Appe llant. ) (Probation Revocation)
ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE
CRIMINAL COURT OF SUMNER COUNTY
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
DANA L. SCOTT JOHN KNOX WALKUP
Assistant Public Defender Attorney General and Reporter
117 East Main Street
Gallatin, TN 37066 GEORGIA BLYTHE FELNER
Assistant Attorney General
425 Fifth Avenu e North
Nashville, TN 37243
LAWRENCE RAY WHITLEY
District Attorney General
WAYNE HYATT
Assistant District Attorney General
113 East Main Street
Gallatin, TN 37066
OPINION FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED
DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
OPINION
The Defenda nt, Melissa Ro berts, appea ls as of right the trial cou rt’s
revocation of her probation. She was sentenced on November 24, 1997 to four
years at thirty percent for theft of property valued over $50 0 and th eft of prope rty
valued over $1000 . The court permitted her to serve her sentence on probation,
and the conditions of her probation included being employed, paying probation
costs, m aking res titution paym ents, and reporting to her pro bation offic er.
Defend ant’s probation officer, Taz Whitley, reported that Defendant had
violated her probation, and the trial court held a revocation hearing on May 15,
1998. After hearing testimo ny from W hitley and Defen dant, the trial court
revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered her sente nce to be se rved in
confinement. Defendant appeals the decision of the trial court, and we affirm.
Both the granting and denial of probation rest in the sound discretion of the
trial judge. State v. Mitch ell, 810 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Ten n. Crim. App . 1991).
Moreover, the trial judge has the d iscretiona ry authority to revoke probatio n if a
preponderance of the evidence establishes that a defendant violated the
conditions of proba tion. The trial judge m ust, how ever, add uce su fficient
evidence during the probation revocation hearing to perm it an intelligent decision.
Id. The determ ination mad e by the trial court, if made with conscientious
judgm ent, is given the weight of a jury verdict an d entitled to affirman ce. Stamps
v. State, 614 S.W .2d 71, 73 (T enn. Crim. A pp. 1980).
-2-
When a probation revocation is challenged, this Court has a limited scope
of review. Before concluding that a trial judge erred by finding a probation
violation, we must establish that the record c ontains n o subs tantial evide nce to
support the conclusion of the trial judge. State v. Harkins, 811 S.W.2d 79, 82
(Tenn. 1991). If the violation is so supported by the record, the judgment of the
trial court revoking proba tion will not be disturbed o n appeal un less it appears
that the trial cou rt acted arb itrarily or otherw ise abus ed its discre tion. State v.
Williamson, 619 S.W .2d 145, 146 (Tenn. Crim . App. 1981 ).
In this case, we find that the reco rd does contain s ubstan tial evidenc e to
support the trial judge’s determination that Defendant violated the terms and
conditions of her probation. We further find no abuse of discretion in her decision
to revoke Defendant’s probation. Defendant testified she understood that the
conditions of her pro bation were to remain employed, pay probation fees and
court costs, pay restitution, and report to her probation officer. She admitted that
she was not employed; that she had not made any payments toward probation
fees, court costs, or restitution; and that she had failed to report to her probation
officer since December of 1997. Taz Whitley confirmed that the foregoing were
conditions of D efendant’s pro bation and tha t she had inde ed failed to com ply.
Desp ite Defendant’s testimony that she had not obtained employment
because of her child-care commitments , that she h ad not m ade pa ymen ts
because she had n o mone y, and th at she had not reported to her probation
officer because she was ill and afraid; th e trial jud ge rev oked Defe ndan t’s
probatio n, stating,
-3-
[Defen dant] has done absolutely nothing. And at the time she was
sentenced, it was made clear to her I expec ted her to have
employm ent and m ake re stitution to the vic tims. T he m ost sim ple
and elementary thing that any probationer can do is report. I can
understand not havin g mon ey. I can understand some other
problems, but I cannot understand why so meone would not rep ort
in to a prob ation office r.
Having listened to her, just by her demeanor, I have no
reason to believe this defendant is going to ever take probation
seriou sly or ever try and comply w ith the requ iremen ts of a
community-based sentence, so I am going to revoke her probation
and order that she do the time.
W e find that a proba tion violation is well supported by the record—most
notab ly by Defendant’s own testimony. Therefore, the trial cou rt’s decision to
revoke her probation may not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion . We
conc lude th at the re vocatio n in this instan ce wa s within the proper range of the
trial judge’s discretion, rather than an abuse of her discretion.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court revoking
Defendant’s probation is affirmed.
____________________________________
DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
CONCUR:
___________________________________
JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
___________________________________
JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, JUDGE
-4-