IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
APRIL SESSION, 1999
FILED
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) April 15, 1999
) No. 02C01-9807-CC-00229
Appellee ) Cecil Crowson, Jr.
) CARROLL COUNTY Appellate C ourt Clerk
vs. )
) Hon. C. Creed McGinley, Judge
DONALD TALLIE, )
) (Sale of Cocaine less than .5 grams)
Appellant )
For the Appellant: For the Appellee:
Guy T. Wilkinson Michael E. Moore
District Public Defender Attorney General and Reporter
Billy R. Roe, Jr. J. Ross Dyer
Asst. District Public Defender Assistant Attorney General
117 North Forrest Avenue Criminal Justice Division
Camden, TN 38320 425 Fifth Avenue North
2d Floor, Cordell Hull Building
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
G. Robert Radford
District Attorney General
Eleanor Cahill
Asst. District Attorney General
Post Office Box 686
Huntingdon, TN 38344
OPINION FILED:
AFFIRMED
David G. Hayes
Judge
OPINION
The appellant, Donald Tallie,1 was convicted by a jury in the Carroll County
Circuit Court of one count of sale of cocaine less than .5 grams, a Class C felony,
and one count of sale of cocaine greater than .5 grams, a Class B felony. The trial
court imposed concurrent sentences of eight years for the Class C felony and
sixteen years for the Class B felony as a Range II multiple offender. The appellant’s
sole challenge on appeal is the sufficiency of the convicting evidence.
I. BACKGROUND
In conjunction with the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), the Drug Task Force for the 24th Judicial District conducted an undercover
operation by placing a confidential informant in the public housing projects in
McKenzie. Testimony relative to the appellant’s first sale established that on
December 4, 1996, Steve Lee, the director of the Drug Task Force, equipped
Sylvester Island, the confidential informant, with a concealed body transmitter which
permitted conversations to be recorded. At the designated meeting place, Island
was searched by Lee and given $100 to purchase cocaine. Island was
accompanied by his girlfriend, Jaronda Parker, who was not a drug task force agent.
Lee followed Island and Parker to their residence in the housing project in
McKenzie but remained at a distance, unable to view the transaction or see the
appellant. Island testified that he had met the appellant on December 3 at a local
“crack house” where the appellant was “selling dope.” Island stated that the
appellant called himself “Dee.” Island related that the appellant “just showed up” at
his apartment on December 4. Island went out to the appellant’s car and informed
the appellant that he wanted to buy some crack cocaine. The appellant followed
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The appe llant w as als o cha rged in the in dictm ent u nde r the a lias, S teven Tallie .
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Island into his apartment. The appellant then cut the “rock” into a smaller piece,
exchanged the “rock” for $100, and departed. This transaction was recorded.
Island testified that the appellant drove the same car, a black Probe SE with a tag
number 01946-D, that he had seen at the “crack house” the day before. Shortly
thereafter, Island delivered the transmitter, cocaine, and license plate number to
Lee. Forensic analysis determined the substance to be to be .3 grams of cocaine.
The second drug transaction occurred on December 5, 1996. Again, Island
was searched and equipped with a body transmitter to enable Lee to record the
transaction. This transaction also took place at Island’s residence. Previously, the
appellant had given Island his beeper number which Island used to page the
appellant. The appellant responded by coming to Island’s residence. The appellant
entered Island’s apartment, cut off a rock of crack cocaine, exchanged it for $100,
and left. Island stated that, upon this occasion, the appellant provided him with
more cocaine than in the first instance to reward him for not purchasing drugs from
the other local dealers. Island returned to meet with Lee and delivered the
transmitter and the substance purchased which was later determined to be .6 grams
of cocaine. After checking the vehicle’s registration, the black Probe was
determined to be stolen.
Island testified that he had been an informant for approximately eight years
for various federal and state agencies and was paid $100 for each “buy.” At trial,
Island testified that over ten years ago he had been convicted of forgery in Kentucky
and theft in Obion County, Tennessee. Island also testified that he had been
charged with selling a counterfeit controlled substance in 1988. Both of the
recorded transactions were played for the jury. Island identified the appellant as the
person who sold him the cocaine and identified the appellant’s voice on the tape.
The defense presented no proof. The jury returned a guilty verdict on two
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counts of sale of cocaine.
II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In his only issue, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting
evidence to sustain a verdict of two counts of the sale of cocaine. Specifically, the
appellant contends that the only evidence identifying him as the person selling
cocaine was the “uncollaborated [sic] testimony” of Island, a paid informant and
convicted felon. Moreover, the appellant argues that, because he did not testify,
“there was no way for the jury to compare the alleged voice of the defendant on the
tapes to the actual voice of the defendant.” Thus, he contends that “there is no way
to rationally deduce that it was the defendant on those tapes.”
A jury conviction removes the presumption of innocence with which a
defendant is initially cloaked and replaces it with one of guilt, so that on appeal, a
convicted defendant has the burden of demonstrating that the evidence is
insufficient. State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). In determining the
sufficiency of the evidence, this court does not reweigh or reevaluate the evidence.
State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). On appeal, the State is
entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable or
legitimate inferences which may be drawn therefrom. State v. Harris, 839 S.W.2d
54, 75 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 954, 113 S.Ct. 1368 (1993). Viewing
the evidence under these criteria, it is this court’s responsibility to affirm the
conviction if the proof was sufficient for any rational trier of fact to have found the
essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 317, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253,
259 (Tenn. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1086, 115 S.Ct. 743 (1995); Tenn. R. App.
P. 13(e).
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In essence, the appellant challenges the credibility of the State’s witnesses.
A jury verdict accredits the testimony of the State’s witnesses and resolves all
conflicts in favor of the State’s theory. State v. Williams, 657 S.W.2d 405, 410
(Tenn. 1983). The weight and credibility of witnesses’ testimony are exclusively
within the province of the jury as the trier of fact. State v. Locust, 914 S.W.2d 554,
558 (Tenn. Crim. App.), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1995). We conclude that
the evidence was sufficient to support the appellant’s convictions for each sale of
cocaine. Officer Lee monitored each transaction via a transmitter and overheard
each drug transaction. The recordings of both transactions, containing a description
of the appellant and referring to the person “Dee,” were played for the jury. Island
identified the appellant as the person who sold cocaine on both occasions and also
identified his voice on the recording as provided by Tenn. R. Evid. 901(a) and (b)(5).
Accordingly, we find the evidence presented sufficient proof from which a rational
juror could reasonably infer the appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
____________________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, Judge
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CONCUR:
_____________________________________
JOSEPH M. TIPTON, Judge
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L. T. LAFFERTY, Senior Judge
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