I N THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN SECTI ON FILED
October 1, 1996
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
SUSAN RENEE W GHT W LLI AM
RI I SON, ) C/ A NO. 03A01- 9602- DR- 00073
)
Pl a i nt i f f - Appe l l a nt , ) BLOUNT GENERAL SESSI ONS
)
v. ) HON. W LLI AM R. BREW
I ER, J R. ,
) J UDGE
J OHN HOUSTON W LLI AMI SON, )
) MODI FI ED AND
De f e nda nt - Appe l l e e . ) REMANDED
PERRY P. PAI NE, J R. , PAI NE, GARRETT & BRAY, M r yvi l l e , f or
a
Pl a i nt i f f - Appe l l a nt .
J ERRY G. CUNNI NGHAM KI ZER & BLACK, M r yvi l l e , f or De f e nda n t -
, a
Ap p e l l e e .
O P I N I O N
Fr a nks . J .
I n t hi s di vor c e a c t i on t he Tr i a l Cour t a wa r de d ?t o
e a c h p a r t y a n a bs ol ut e di vor c e f r om t he ot he r on t he gr ounds
o f i n a ppr opr i a t e ma r i t a l c onduc t . ? The Cour t a wa r de d t he
c u s t o d y of t he pa r t i e s ’ t wo mi nor c hi l dr e n t o t he mot he r ,
o r d e r e d t he f a t he r t o pa y c hi l d s uppor t ba s e d upon t he
g u i de l i ne s , a nd i n d i vi di ng t he pa r t i e s ’ ma r i t a l e s t a t e
c o n c l ude d t ha t t he i r home wa s a gi f t f r om t he hus ba nd’ s
p a r e n t s t o hi m a l one , a nd t he r e f or e s e pa r a t e pr ope r t y. Fr o m
t hi s l a t t e r d e t e r mi na t i on, t h e wi f e ha s a ppe a l e d.
The Tr i a l Cour t f ound:
The p a r t i e s , a t t he t i me of t he i r ma r r i a ge , l i v e d i n
a r e s i de nc e t i t l e d t o t he De f e nda nt ’ s f a t he r . The
pa r t i e s pa i d no r e nt a nd no pr ope r t y t a xe s on t he
r e s i de nc e t hr oughout t he i r ma r r i a ge . Appr oxi ma t e l y
t wo ( 2) ye a r s a go t he De f e nda nt ’ s f a t he r c a us e d t h e
r e s i de nc e t o be t i t l e d t o t he pa r t i e s . . . I t i s
t he p l a i nt i f f ’ s c ont e nt i on t ha t t he r e s i de nc e wa s a
gi f t t o bot h t he pa r t i e s a nd t he r e f or e a n e qui t a b l e
di vi s i on of t he r e s i de nc e s houl d be a n e qua l one .
I t i s t he De f e nda nt ’ s c ont e nt i on t ha t t he r e s i de nc e
wa s a gi f t onl y t o t he De f e nda nt a nd t ha t t he
Pl a i nt i f f i s not e nt i t l e d t o a ny s ha r e of t he
r e s i de nc e . The Cour t f i nds t ha t t he pr oof on t hi s
i s s ue pr e ponde r a t e s i n f a vor of t he De f e nda nt .
W c onc l ude t he e vi de nc e pr e ponde r a t e s a ga i ns t t h i s
e
f i nd i ng o f f a c t . T. R. A. P. Rul e 13( d) .
The hus ba nd’ s pa r e nt s , by wa r r a nt y de e d, de e de d t h e
p r o p e r t y t o t he hus ba nd a nd wi f e a s t e na nt s by t he e nt i r e t y ,
t h e d e e d r e c i t i ng t he s t a nda r d c ons i de r a t i on of $1. 00 a nd
o t h e r good a nd va l ua bl e c ons i de r a t i on. The hus ba nd’ s f a t he r
t e s t i f i e d t ha t h e pl a c e d t he wi f e ’ s na me on t he de e d ?a s a
ma t t e r of c onve ni e nc e ?, e xpl a i ni ng t he pur pos e wa s t o e na bl e
t h e p a r t i e s t o bor r ow mone y a nd f or i ns ur a nc e pur pos e s , a nd
f u r t h e r e xpl a i ne d t ha t he di dn’ t wa nt he r t o ha ve a ny of t he
p r o p e r t y be c a us e of ?t he wa y s he done , t he l i f e s he l i ve d?,
wh i c h he s a i d h e be c a me a wa r e of a f t e r he de e de d t he pr ope r t y .
The r e c or d e s t a bl i s he s t ha t whi l e t he pa r t i e s di d
n o t p a y a ny moni e s f or t he pr ope r t y or pa y t a xe s , t he y ha ve
e x p e n d e d moni e s i mpr ovi ng t he pr ope r t y. T. C. A. §36- 4- 121
d e f i n e s ?ma r i t a l pr ope r t y? a s ?a l l r e a l a nd pe r s ona l pr ope r t y ,
b o t h t a ngi bl e a nd i nt a ngi bl e , a c qui r e d by e i t he r or bot h
2
s p o u s e s dur i ng t he c our s e of t he ma r r i a ge . . . ? ( 1) ( A) .
Se p a r a t e pr ope r t y i s de f i ne d i n pe r t i ne nt pa r t a s ?pr ope r t y
a c q u i r e d by a s pous e a t a ny t i me by gi f t , be que s t , de vi s e , o r
d e s c e nt ? ( 2) ( D) .
The a c qui s i t i o n of t hi s pr ope r t y wa s by gi f t .
Ho we v e r , t h e g i f t wa s t o ?bot h s pous e s dur i ng t he c our s e of
t h e ma r r i a ge ?. Unl e s s a de e d i s a mbi guous , t he i nt e nt i on of
t h e g r a nt or i s t o be de t e r mi ne d f r om t he f our c or ne r s of hi s
d e e d, Be nne t t v . Langham, 214 Te nn. 674, 383 S. W 2d 16 ( 196 4 ) .
.
Th e r e c or d e s t a bl i s he s n o ba s i s t o c ons t r ue t he de e d a s i t s
c l e a r t e r ms e s t a bl i s h a c onve ya nc e of t he home t o bot h
pa r t i e s . Ta ki ng i nt o a c c ount r e l e va nt c i r c ums t na c e s s e t f or t h
i n T. C. A. §36- 4- 121, C1- 10, we f i nd t ha t a s a ma t t e r of
e q u i t y , t hi s ma r i t a l pr o pe r t y s houl d be e qua l l y di vi de d
b e t we e n t he pa r t i e s . I f t he pa r t i e s c a nnot ot he r wi s e a gr e e ,
t h e p r ope r t y wi l l be s ol d a nd t he pr oc e e ds wi l l be di vi de d
b e t we e n t he pa r t i e s .
W r e ma nd t o t he Tr i a l Cour t t o e nt e r a n or de r
e
mo d i f y i ng t he j udgme nt i n a c c or da nc e wi t h t hi s opi ni on. Th e
c os t s of t he a ppe a l a r e a s s e s s e d t o a ppe l l e e .
________________________
He r s c he l P. Fr a nks , J .
CONCUR:
_ _ _ _ _ __________________ ____
3
Ho u s t o n M Godda r d, P. J .
.
_ _ _ _ _ _ __________________ ___
Ch a r l e s D. Sus a no, J r . , J .
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
SUSAN RENEE WRIGHT WILLIAMSON,) C/A NO. 03A01-9602-DR-00073
) BLOUNT CO. GENERAL SESSIONS
COURT
Plaintiff-Appellant,)
)
)
)
FILED
v. )
) October 1, 1996
)
) Cecil Crowson, Jr.
) Appellate C ourt Clerk
JOHN HOUSTON WILLIAMSON, )
) HONORABLE WILLIAM R. BREWER,
JR.,
Defendant-Appellee. ) JUDGE
CONCURRING OPINION
I agree wholeheartedly with Judge Franks’ opinion.
I concur that the evidence preponderates against the trial
4
court’s determination that the deed in this case “was a gift
only to the [husband].” On the contrary, the evidence clearly
preponderates in favor of a finding that the conveyance was a
gift to both parties. Furthermore, it seems clear to me that
the deeded property is marital property. I believe it is
equitable in this case to divide this property equally. I
write separately to explain why I do not believe this gift is
a “gift” as defined in T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b)(2)(D) but rather
marital property under T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(A).
It seems to me that once it is determined that this
is a joint gift to the parties, one must go further and ask
this question: does this conveyance, being a warranty deed
creating a tenancy by the entirety, represent a gift to each
spouse of an undivided fifty percent interest in real property
and should those interests be considered separate property
under T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b)(2)(D); or should the property
conveyed be treated as marital property under T.C.A. § 36-4-
121(b)(1)(A)?
In this case, we have found that this asset should
be divided equally so the result here would be the same
regardless of how the above question is answered; however, in
some cases, the answer to this question would be critical.
For example, this would be true in those cases where the court
determines that the marital estate should be divided in an
unequal manner.
Turning to the question posed above, it must be
recognized that this conveyance to husband and wife does not
create an undivided fifty percent interest in each party as
would be the case with property held as tenants in common. In
the instant case, the deed creates a tenancy by the entirety,
a joint interest with right of survivorship--an expectancy.
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Generally speaking, this latter concept is at odds with the
general concept of separate property, i.e., property owned
unconditionally by one party. This militates against a
finding that the subject property interests are separate
property.
Since this was a gift, does this fact mandate the
conclusion that the respective interests of the parties are
interests that fall within the ambit of the “gift” section of
the separate property definition at T.C.A. § 36-4-
121(b)(2)(D)? I think not. In fact, I believe a gift made
jointly to a married couple clearly falls without, rather than
within, the definition of separate property set forth at
T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b)(2)(D), i.e., “[p]roperty acquired by a
spouse at any time by gift, bequest, devise or descent.”
(Emphasis added). I believe the sole type of gift referred to
in T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b)(2)(D) is a gift to an individual
spouse. Since the gift in this case is a gift to husband and
wife jointly, I do not find that it falls within the
definition of separate property. Inasmuch as the property
came to the parties through a joint conveyance during their
marriage, I agree with Judge Franks that it is properly
classified as property “acquired by . . . both spouses during
the course of the marriage,” and hence marital property under
T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(A).
__________________________________
Charles D. Susano, Jr., J.
6