IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE FILED
OCTOBER SESSION, 1998 February 18, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
GUILLERMO MATIAZ JUAN, ) C.C.A. NO. 03C01-9708-CR-00318
)
Appe llant, )
) HAMILTON COUNTY
V. )
)
) HON. REBECCA J. STERN, JUDGE
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
)
Appellee. ) (POST -CON VICTIO N)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
GUIL LER MO MATIAZ JUAN , pro se JOHN KNOX WALKUP
Southe astern T ennes see Sta te Attorney General & Reporter
Region al Corre ctional Fa cility
Route 4, Box 600 MICH AEL J. F AHEY , II
Pikeville, TN 37367-9243 Assistant Attorney General
2nd Floor, Cordell Hull Building
425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37243
WILL IAM H. C OX, III
District Attorney General
STAN LANZO
Assistant District Attorney General
600 Market Street, Suite 310
Chattanooga, TN 37402
OPINION FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED
THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
OPINION
The Petitioner, Guillermo Matiaz Juan, appeals as of right from the trial
court’s order denying his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner was charged
in the Hamilton C ounty Crimina l Court with first degree premeditated murder, felony
murder, aggravated burglary, and theft. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner
pled guilty to the lesser offense of second degree murder, and the remaining
charges were dis misse d. The plea to second degree murder was taken on October
21, 1991. There was no direct appeal from this plea. Petitioner filed his petition for
post-conviction relief on June 10, 1997. The trial court dismissed the petition on June
25, 1997 on the basis that the petition was barred by the applicable statute of
limitations. W e affirm the judgm ent of the tria l court.
Relying upon Burford v. State, 845 S.W.2d 204 (Tenn. 1992), Petitioner
asserts that his rights to due process were violated by application of the statute of
limitations. Petitioner, in essence, argues that the statute of limitations at Tennessee
Code Annotated section 40-30-102 (Repealed May 1, 1995) is not ap plicab le to him
because he canno t read, write , or speak the E nglish languag e. Specifically,
Petitione r sets forth in his brief:
Since he [Petitioner] cannot speak, read, or write the English language,
his failure to comply with the three-year statute of limitations was
intrinsically beyond his capabilities.
Petitioner also relies upon Wa tkins v. State , 903 S.W.2d 302 (Tenn.
1995). In Watkins, our sup reme c ourt held that application of the statute of
limitations where a petitioner is m entally inco mpete nt during the period the statute
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is running would violate constitutional due pro cess. Id. at 305-06 (citing Burford, 845
S.W .2d at 205, 208 ).
Howeve r, in a factua l situation m ore akin to the case sub judice, our
court in Phillips v. Sta te, 890 S.W.2d 37 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994), held that the
statute of limitatio ns wa s not to lled be caus e the p etitione r was in carce rated in
another state. Specifically, our court stated:
The first issue argued is that the statute of limitations should not be
applied to Defen dant’s po st-convictio n petition. The Defendant argues
that he was in custody in Alabama when the statute ran. He argues
that the sta tute of lim itations shou ld not apply to his petition because he
was not and is not a resident of the state of Tennessee, he had no
access to a law library which contained Tennessee law, he had no
access to an app ointed law yer with knowledge of Tennessee law, and
he was ‘effectively denied assistance of other in mate s kno wledg eable
of the laws’ of Tennessee.
Phillips, 890 S.W .2d at 38 (em phasis add ed).
In an unre lated cas e, State v. Phillips, 904 S.W.2d 123, 124 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1995), our court more recently noted that “a petitioner’s ignorance of the
existence of the statute of limitation, even when alleged to stem from a n attorn ey’s
negligent failure to render advice to the petitioner, does not toll the running of the
statute.” (Citing Raym ond D ean W illis v. State, No. 01C01-9211-CR-00359,
Davidson Coun ty (Tenn . Crim. A pp., Oct. 2 1, 1993 ), perm. app. denied (Tenn.
1994).
It appears the law is well settled that mere ignorance of the law
concerning the statute of limitations , or even th e existenc e of the sta tute of
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limitations, by whatever means (other than menta l incomp etence ), does n ot rise to
the status of being vio lative of con stitutional du e proce ss.
According ly, the judgment of the trial court summa rily dismissing the
petition for post-conviction relief because it was filed outside the statute of limitations
is affirmed.
____________________________________
THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge
CONCUR:
___________________________________
GARY R. WA DE, Presiding Judge
___________________________________
DAVID H. WELLES , Judge
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