IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN SECTION AT JACKSON
_____________________________________________________________________________
DANIEL B. TAYLOR, Tennessee Claims Commission,
Western Division No. 401443
Claimant/Appellant, C.A. No. 02A01-9508-BC-00229
Hon. Martha Brasfield, Commissioner
v.
STATE OF TENNESSEE, FILED
Defendant/Appellee. July 3, 1996
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
DANIEL B. TAYLOR, Pro Se, Memphis. Appellate C ourt Clerk
CHARLES W. BURSON, Attorney General & Reporter, and MEREDITH DEVAULT,
Senior Counsel, Nashville, Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee.
AFFIRMED
Opinion Filed:
_____________________________________________________________________________
TOMLIN, Sr. J.
Daniel P. Taylor (“claimant”) filed this suit against the State of Tennessee
(?defendant” or “State”) in the Tennessee Claims Commission for damages he
allegedly sustained due to the malpractice of his court-appointed attorney. The
Claims Commission granted defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the
commissioner erred in so doing. We find no error and affirm.
In 1989, the Shelby County Criminal Court appointed Harry U. Scruggs to
represent claimant in a post-conviction relief proceeding. Mr. Scruggs handled
claimant’s suit for approximately four years. In September 1994, Scruggs filed a
motion to withdraw as counsel and have new counsel substituted, which was
granted. This suit followed.
Claimant contends that Scruggs was guilty of legal malpractice, and as a
result negligently deprived him of his statutory and constitutional rights. Defendant
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filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to T.R.C.P. 12.02(1) & (6) on the grounds that the
Claims Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the action,
which was granted.
Article 1 Section 17, of the Tennessee Constitution states in part that “Suits
may be brought against the State in such a manner and in such courts as the
Legislature may by law direct.” Tenn. Const. art. 1, § 17. In addition, T.C.A. § 20-13-
102(a) (1994) states in pertinent part:
No court in the state shall have any power, jurisdiction, or authority to
entertain any suit against the state, or against any officer of the state
acting by authority of the state, with a view to reach the state, its
treasury, funds, or property . . . .
Our legislature has expressly granted to the Tennessee Claims Commission
exclusive jurisdiction to determine all monetary claims against the state, classifying
such claims into various categories. T.C.A. § 9-8-307(a)(1) (Supp. 1995).
Claimant contends that Scruggs, as a court-appointed attorney, was a state
employee, which thereby gave the Claims Commission jurisdiction to entertain his
suit. Claimant relies upon T.C.A. § 8-42-103(b) for this proposition, which reads as
follows:
For the exclusive purpose of this section, “state employee” also
includes attorneys appointed by a court, or other agency authorized
by law to make such appointments, to represent an indigent when a
civil action for damages is commenced against such attorney for any
act or omission in the course of representing such indigent.
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, such attorney
shall not be considered a state employee for any other purpose
including, but not limited to, §§ 9-8-112 and 9-8-307.
T.C.A. § 8-42-103(b) (Supp. 1995) (emphasis added).
Claimant’s interpretation of and reliance upon T.C.A. § 8-42-103(b) is in error.
The crux of Title 8, Chapter 42 of the Code is found in T.C.A. § 8-42-103, entitled
“Defense Counsel for State Employees.” This section states that under certain
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defined conditions, a state employee who is sued in a civil action for damages for
any act or omission in the course of his employment will be provided defense
counsel by the state. T.C.A. § 8-42-103(b) states in simple terms that a court-
appointed attorney assigned to represent an indigent who is thereafter sued by
the indigent for damages arising as a result of this representation is a “state
employee,” and may avail himself of defense counsel provided by the state. As
noted, T.C.A. § 8-42-103(b) specifically provides that such attorney will not be
considered a state employee for any other purpose, including, but not limited to,
T.C.A. § 9-8-307, which delineates the jurisdiction of the Tennessee Claims
Commission.
The order of the commissioner dismissing claimant’s suit is affirmed. Costs in
this cause on appeal are taxed to claimant, for which execution may issue if
necessary.
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TOMLIN, Sr. J.
__________________________________________
FARMER, J. (CONCURS)
__________________________________________
LILLARD, J. (CONCURS)
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