IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
DECEMBER 1998 SESSION FILED
STATE OF TENNESSEE, * C.C.A. # 02C01-9805-CR-00140
Appellee, * SHELBY COUNTY
January 13, 1999
VS. * Hon. Bernie W einman, Judge
AARON CARROLL, * (Habitual Motor Vehicle Offender)
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellant. *
Appellate C ourt Clerk
For Appellant: For Appellee:
William C. Gosnell, Attorney John Knox Walkup
217 Exchange Avenue Attorney General and Reporter
Memphis, TN 38105
Elizabeth T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
425 Fifth Avenue North
2d Floor, Cordell Hull Building
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
OPINION FILED:__________________________
AFFIRMED
GARY R. WADE, PRESIDING JUDGE
OPINION
The defendant, Aaron Carroll, was convicted as a habitual motor
vehicle offender. The trial court imposed a Range II sentence of two years for the
Class E felony; the sentence is to be served on weekends over a period of ninety
days. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence and argues that the sentence is excessive. Because the evidence is
adequate to support the conviction and the record of the sentencing hearing is
incomplete, the judgment must be affirmed.
On February 14, 1997, Shelby County Officer Gregory D. Jackson,
while on routine patrol, was almost struck by a car he later determined to be
operated by the defendant. When he stopped the vehicle, the officer observed the
defendant in the driver's seat, the defendant's wife in the passenger's seat, and their
son in the back seat. The officer testified that he never lost sight of the car or
noticed any movement within the car. Afterward, Officer Jackson determined that
the defendant had been declared a habitual motor vehicle offender and barred from
operating an automobile.
At trial, the defendant's wife, Katherine Campbell, testified that she
was actually the driver of the car. She admitted, however, that she did not inform
the officer at the time of arrest that she was the driver. The defendant's son, Cory
Campbell, also claimed that Ms. Campbell was driving.
On appeal, the state is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the
evidence and all reasonable inferences which might be drawn therefrom. State v.
Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). The credibility of the witnesses, the
weight to be given their testimony, and the reconciliation of conflicts in the evidence
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are matters entrusted exclusively to the jury as the trier of fact. Byrge v. State, 575
S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978). A conviction may only be set aside when
the reviewing court finds that the "evidence is insufficient to support the finding by
the trier of fact of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Tenn. R. App. P. 13 (e). A jury
verdict, approved by the trial judge, accredits the testimony of the witnesses for the
state and resolves all conflicts in favor of the theory of the prosecution. State v.
Hatchett, 560 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tenn. 1978).
In our view, the jury had a rational basis for their verdict. They acted
within their prerogative in accrediting the testimony of Officer Jackson and rejecting
that of the defendant's wife and son.
The record does not include a transcript of the sentencing hearing.
The Range II sentence imposed is within the statutory guidelines. See Tenn. Code
Ann. § 55-10-616. The burden is on the defendant to prepare an accurate account
of what transpired in the trial court with regard to the issues on appeal. Tenn. R.
App. P. 24(b). The failure to do so results in a presumption that the trial court
correctly ruled. State v. Bunch, 646 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Tenn. 1983).
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
_________________________________
Gary R. Wade, Presiding Judge
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CONCUR:
__________________________________
Thomas T. W oodall, Judge
__________________________________
John Everett Williams, Judge
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