IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
SEPTEMBER 1998 SESSION
FILED
October 23, 1998
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
KEITH A. GUY, )
) C.C.A. No. 02C01-9712-CC-00478
Appellant, )
) Madison County
V. )
) Honorable Franklin Murchison, Judge
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
)
Appellee. ) (Post-Conviction)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
C. Michael Robbins John Knox Walkup
Attorney at Law Attorney General & Reporter
46 North Third Street, Suite 719
Memphis, TN 38103 Georgia Blythe Felner
Counsel for the State
George Morton Googe 425 Fifth Avenue North
District Public Defender Nashville, TN 37243-0493
Vanessa D. King James G. (Jerry) Woodall
Assistant Public Defender District Attorney General
227 West Baltimore Street
Jackson, TN 38301 Al Earls and
(at trial) Don Allen
Assistant District Attorneys General
P.O. Box 2825
Jackson, TN 38302
OPINION FILED:____________________
AFFIRMED
PAUL G. SUMMERS,
Judge
OPINION
The petitioner pled guilty to four counts of aggravated robbery, two
counts of attempted aggravated robbery, and four counts of conspiracy to commit
aggravated robbery. He received an effective thirty-year sentence for these crimes
pursuant to his plea bargain. The petitioner took no direct appeal from his convictions
or sentences but filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that his guilty plea was the
result of ineffective assistance of counsel. After hearing the petitioner's testimony, the
hearing court below granted the state's motion to dismiss and denied relief. Upon our
review of the record, we affirm the court’s judgment.
In post-conviction relief proceedings the petitioner has the burden of
proving the allegations in his petition by clear and convincing evidence. T.C.A. § 40-
30-210(f) (1997). Furthermore, the factual findings of the trial court in hearings “are
conclusive on appeal unless the evidence preponderates against the judgment.”
State v. Buford, 666 S.W.2d 473, 475 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983).
In reviewing the petitioner’s Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, this Court must determine whether the advice given or services
rendered by the attorney are within the range of competence demanded of attorneys
in criminal cases. Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975). To prevail on
a claim of ineffective counsel, a petitioner “must show that counsel’s representation
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and that this performance
prejudiced the defense. There must be a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s
error the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 692, 694 (1984); Best v. State, 708 S.W.2d 421,
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422 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985). To satisfy the requirement of prejudice in this case, the
petitioner would have had to demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s errors, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to
trial. See Hill v. Lockart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); Bankston v. State, 815 S.W.2d 213,
215 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991).
The court below found the petitioner's allegations of ineffective
assistance “just vague, indefinite, uncertain.” We agree. The petitioner testified that
his trial counsel “could have give[n] [me] a better job” but admitted that he had
confessed his crimes to the police and that he received the exact sentence to which
he agreed. The petitioner's allegations are without merit. The petitioner has failed to
carry his burden of proving that his lawyer was ineffective.
____________________________________
PAUL G. SUMMERS, Judge
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CONCUR:
_____________________________
DAVID H. WELLES, Judge
_____________________________
JOE G. RILEY, Judge
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