IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
OCTOBER 1998 SESSION
FILED
October 19, 1998
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
WILLIAM EARL MURPHY, )
) C.C.A. No. 02C01-9712-CC-00473
Appellant, )
) Madison County
v. )
) Honorable Franklin Murchison, Judge
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
) (Post-Conviction)
Appellee. )
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
Marcus M. Reaves John Knox Walkup
313 East Lafayette Attorney General & Reporter
Jackson, TN 38301 425 Fifth Avenue, North
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
Clinton J. Morgan
Assistant Attorney General
425 Fifth Avenue, North
Nashville, TN 37234-0493
James G. Woodall
District Attorney General
225 Martin Luther King Drive
Jackson, TN 38302
Alfred L. Earls
Assistant District Attorney General
225 Martin Luther King Drive
Jackson, TN 38302
OPINION FILED: ______________________________
AFFIRMED
L. T. LAFFERTY, SENIOR JUDGE
OPINION
The appellant, William Earl Murphy, referred herein as the petitioner, appeals as of
right from an order of the Madison County Circuit Court dismissing his pro se petition for
post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. The trial court dismissed the petition
for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted in that the petition did not allege
facts showing the petitioner had been subjected to double jeopardy. After an appropriate
review of the entire record, briefs of all parties, and the appropriate law, the trial court’s
judgment is affirmed.
On February 3, 1994, the Jackson City Court issued an arrest warrant for the
petitioner for the offense of aggravated robbery committed on February 1, 1994 in Madison
County. The petitioner was arrested pursuant to a revocation warrant for violation of parole
of a twelve-year sentence imposed in 1989. In June, 1994, the Madison County Sheriff’s
Department recalled a detainer from the Department of Correction placed against the
petitioner. In August, 1994, the petitioner was indicted by the Madison County grand jury
for the offense of aggravated robbery and in June, 1995 for failure to appear. The
Department of Correction released the petitioner in September, 1994. On January 2, 1996,
the petitioner pled guilty to the included offense of robbery, arising out of the aggravated
robbery charge, and to failure to appear.
The petitioner contends he was twice placed in double jeopardy. He argues the first
occurrence took place when the City Court of Jackson issued an arrest warrant for
aggravated robbery which in turn triggered the Department of Correction to obtain a
warrant for parole violations on the same offense. Thus, the incarceration of the petitioner
was punishment. Second, the petitioner contends he was placed in jeopardy when the
Madison County grand jury indicted him for aggravated robbery. The State moved to
dismiss the petition on the basis the claim of double jeopardy was not a valid ground for
relief. The trial court dismissed the petition on the grounds the petitioner was not placed
in double jeopardy neither by the City Court on the felony warrant as the City Court has no
jurisdiction to try a felony nor by the administrative actions of the Board of Paroles.
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We agree with the trial court’s judgment that the petition does not present a claim
for which relief can be granted. The petitioner was represented by counsel at the time of
the entry of his guilty pleas to the offenses of robbery and failure to appear. Therefore, if
there was a legal question as to the petitioner’s double jeopardy status, the opportunity
was ripe. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that no
person shall “be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. .
. .” The Tennessee Constitution has the same provision. Three fundamental principles
underlie double jeopardy: (1) protection against a second prosecution after an acquittal;
(2) protection against a second prosecution after conviction; and (3) protection against
multiple punishments for the same offense. State v. Lewis, 958 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tenn.
1997).
We hold the petitioner waived any complaints of double jeopardy by not presenting
this issue to the trial court. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-206(g) provides:
A ground for relief is waived if the petitioner personally or
through an attorney failed to present it for determination in any
proceeding before a court of competent jurisdiction in which
the ground could have been presented (exceptions omitted).
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
________________________________________
L. T. LAFFERTY, SENIOR JUDGE
CONCUR:
___________________________________
JOHN H. PEAY, JUDGE
___________________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE
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