IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
JUNE SESSION, 1998 FILED
August 17, 1998
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
CARL ROWNTREE, ) Appe llate Court C lerk
) No. 03C01-9709-CR-00379
Appellant )
) KNOX COUNTY
vs. )
) Hon. RAY L. JENKINS, Judge
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
) (Post-Conviction)
Appellee )
For the Appellant: For the Appellee:
Carl Towntree, Pro Se John Knox Walkup
N.E.C.C. #225115 Attorney General and Reporter
P. O. Box 5000
Mountain City, TN 37683-5000 Ellen H. Pollack
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Justice Division
450 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
Randall E. Nichols
District Attorney General
City-County Building
Knoxville, TN 37902
OPINION FILED:
AFFIRMED
David G. Hayes
Judge
OPINION
The appellant, Carl Rowntree, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s
denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court summarily
dismissed the petition finding the claims alleged were barred by the statute of
limitations.
After review, we affirm.
In April 1993, the appellant pled guilty to second degree murder and
aggravated robbery. Pursuant to these guilty pleas, the trial court imposed
concurrent sentences of forty years incarceration for second degree murder and
twenty years incarceration for aggravated robbery. On April 7, 1997, the appellant
filed a pro se petition seeking post-conviction relief. The appellant’s petition raised
the claims of (1) involuntary guilty plea and (2) ineffective assistance of counsel. On
April 17, 1997, the Knox County Criminal Court summarily dismissed the petition as
being time-barred.
At the time the appellant’s convictions became final, April 1993, the statute of
limitations applicable to post-conviction proceedings was three years. Tenn. Code
Ann. § 40-30-102 (repealed 1995). In 1995, the legislature reduced the statutory
period for filing post-conviction petitions from three years to one year. Tenn. Code
Ann. § 40-30-202(a) (1995 Supp.). As a result, the new Post-Conviction Procedure
Act governs this petition and all petitions filed after May 10, 1995. Because the
previous three-year statute of limitations had not expired at the time the new Act
went into effect, his right to petition for post-conviction relief survived under the new
Act. See Carter v. State, 952 S.W.2d 417, 420 (Tenn. 1997). Therefore, the
appellant had until May 10, 1996, one year from the effective date of the new Act, to
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file for post-conviction relief. Compiler’s Notes, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-201 (1996
Supp.); see also Daniels v. State, No. 03C01-9606-CC-00244 (Tenn. Crim. App. at
Knoxville, Feb. 27, 1997), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. Sept. 29, 1997). Instead,
the appellant filed this petition almost 11 months after the statute had run.
Moreover, the grounds raised in this petition and on appeal do not fall within any of
the exceptions to the statute of limitations set out in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-
202(b)(1), (2), or (3). The statute of limitations on this petition has expired, requiring
a dismissal of the appellant’s petition for post-conviction relief.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
____________________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, Judge
CONCUR:
_________________________________
JOHN H. PEAY, Judge
_________________________________
JOSEPH M. TIPTON, Judge
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