IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON FILED
MAY SESSION, 1998 June 11, 1998
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
STATE OF TE NNE SSE E, ) C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9709-CC-00359
)
Appellee, ) FAYETTE COUNTY
)
V. )
) HON. JOHN KERRY BLACKWOOD,
) JUDGE
WILLIE J. WADE, )
) (POS SES SION OF SC HED ULE II
Appe llant. ) DRUG WITH INTENT TO SELL)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
HAROLD D. ARCHIBALD JOHN KNOX WALKUP
Falls Building, Suite 790 Attorney General & Reporter
22 North Front Street
Memphis, TN 38103 ELIZABETH T. RYAN
Assistant Attorney General
2nd Floor, Cordell Hull Building
425 Fifth Avenu e North
Nashville, TN 37243
ELIZABETH T. RICE
District Attorn ey Ge neral
302 Market Street
Somerville, TN 38068
OPINION FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED
THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
OPINION
The Defendant, Willie Wade, appeals as of right his conviction of possession
of coca ine with the inte nt to de liver follow ing a ju ry trial in the Fayette Co unty
Crim inal Court. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I Standard
Offender to twelve (12) years in the Department of Correction and fined him a total
of $20,0 00. In th is app eal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insu fficient to
sustain a guilty verdict beyond a reasona ble doubt. W e affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
On November 29, 1996, Captain Arthur Williamson of the Somerville Police
Department was on routine patrol in Somerville. Captain Williamson was looking for
Defendant to talk to him about a certain matter when about 12:00 p.m. he saw
Defendant stopped at a stop sign in his vehicle. Captain Williamson pulled up
behind Defendant’s vehicle and turned on his sire n and blue lig hts. De fenda nt did
not stop and instead sped up and pulled away from Cap tain William son. How ever,
Defendant soon stopped his car in an apartment complex. Captain Williamson
pulled up next to Defendant and they both got out of their cars. The Captain asked
Defendant “what was the hurry and why he sped away.” Defendant told him that
“he just did n’t want to know what the problem was, he didn’t wan t to go to jail.”
Captain Willia mson then told Defendant that he needed to speak with him, but
Defendant pulled aw ay from Williamson, who had been holding Defendant by the
back of his jacke t, and ran off into the ap artment com plex.
Cap tain Williamson called for back-up and then started running after
Defen dant. Wh en he fina lly caught u p with Defendant, he placed Defendant under
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arrest and frisked him for weapons. As Williamson was escorting Defendant back
to the p atrol ca r, Inves tigator K evin Crawford arrived on the scen e. Crawford then
frisked Defe ndan t again before placin g him in the p atrol car and found a plas tic
bagg ie containing a white powder substance in Defendant’s coat pocket. Craw ford
also seized $337.44 from Defendant. The denominations of the bills were as
follows: nine $ 20 bills, one $ 10 bill, twenty -seve n $5 b ills and twelve $1 bills. Before
Defendant left the scene, his mother arrived, and in response to a question asked
by his mothe r, Defendan t stated, “they got the po wder off of me .”
Kay Sheriff, a forensic scientist with the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation
analyzed the subs tance b rought to the lab by In vestigator Crawfo rd. The white
powder tested positive for cocaine and weigh ed 2.2 gram s. Bas ed on his
undercover work bo th buying and selling drugs, Investigator Crawford testified that
the estimated street value of the substance Defendant had in his possession at the
time of his arrest was approximately $300. He also said that “the $20 denomination
is the normal currency used in the drug trade.” Captain Williamson testified that he
had known De fendan t for most of his life and that he had never known Defendant
to have a ny gainfu l employ ment.
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
When an accused challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, the
standard is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosection, any rational trier o f fact could have fou nd the e ssential e lemen ts of the
crime beyond a reason able do ubt. Jack son v. V irginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (19 79).
This standa rd is applica ble to finding s of guilt pred icated upon direct evidence,
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circumstantial eviden ce or a com binatio n of dire ct and circum stantia l evidence.
State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776, 7 79 (T enn. C rim. A pp. 19 90). O n app eal, the
State is entitle d to the strong est leg itimate view of th e evidence and all inferences
therefrom. State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). Because a
verdict of guilt removes the presumption of innocence and replaces it with a
presumption of guilt, the accused has the burden in this court of illustrating why the
evidence is insufficient to suppo rt the verdict re turned b y the trier of fac t. State v.
Williams, 914 S.W.2d 940, 945 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (citing State v. Tug gle, 639
S.W.2d 913, 91 4 (Ten n. 1982 )); State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973).
Questions conce rning the credibility of the witnesses, the weigh t and valu e to
be given the evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by the evide nce, are
resolved by the trier of fa ct, not this co urt. State v. Pappas, 754 S.W.2d 620, 623
(Tenn. Crim. A pp.), perm. to appeal denied, id. (Tenn. 1987). Nor may this court
reweig h or reevalu ate the ev idence . Cabbage, 571 S.W .2d at 835. A jury verdic t
approved by the trial judg e accre dits the Sta te’s witnesse s and re solves all co nflicts
in favor of the State. Grace, 493 S.W.2d at 476.
Defendant argue s that th e evide nce w as insufficient to convict him of
possession of cocaine with inten t to deliver. Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-
17-417(a)(4) provides that it is an offe nse to “[p]ossess a controlled substan ce with
intent to manufacture, deliver or sell such controlled substance.” The statute also
provides that where the substance is cocaine in an amount equal to or greater than
0.5 grams, the offense is a Class B felony.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417(c )(1).
Defendant was charged with and convicted of the possession of m ore than 0.5
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grams of co caine with the inten t to deliver. The lab rep ort revealed that the actual
amount of cocaine found in Defendant’s possession was 2.2 grams.
Tennessee law allows a jury to infer from the amount of a controlled
substance or substances possessed by an offender, along with other relevant facts
surrounding the arrest, that the controlled substance or substances were possessed
for the purpose of selling or otherwise dispensing the drug. Te nn. Co de Ann . § 39-
17-419. In State v. Larry G. H art, C.C.A. No. 02C01-9406-CC-00111, Hardin C ounty
(Tenn. Crim . App., Jacks on, Ju ne 28 , 1995 ) (no R ule 11 application filed), the
defendant had only one gram of cocaine in his possession, but when that fact was
viewed in light of all the circumstances, this Court found that amount to be sufficient
to sus tain a guilty verdic t. Furthermore, this Court has held that the possession of
a beeper and $239.00 in cash, though not criminal offenses in and of themselves,
when coupled with the possession of 1.1 gram of cocaine, was sufficient evidence
for the jury to conclud e that a de fendan t was gu ilty of posse ssion of c ocaine with the
intent to deliver. See State v. Ron ald Mitc hell, C.C.A. No. 02C01-9702-CC-00070,
Laud erdale County (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Sept. 15, 1997) (Rule 11 application
denied April 27, 1998). In the instant case, the proof in the record establishes that
Defendant had 2.2 grams of cocaine in his possession and that he tried to flee from
the police twice. That 2.2 grams of cocaine was estimated by Investigator Craw ford
to be wo rth abo ut $30 0 in street value. The record also reveals the uncontradicted
testimony of Investigator Crawford that the $20 denomination is the normal currency
used in the drug trade. Defendant had nine $20 bills in his possession at the time
of his arrest. The evidence also shows the large total amount of $337.44 in cash that
Defendant had on his person when he was arrested. Finally, there was Captain
W illiams on’s testimony that he did not know of Defendant ever having any gainful
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emplo ymen t. All of the foregoing facts lend credence to the jury’s verdict, and we
therefore conclude that a rational basis existed for the jury’s conclusion that
Defen dant po ssesse d the coc aine with th e intent to d eliver.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
____________________________________
THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge
CONCUR:
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JOHN H. PEAY, Judge
___________________________________
PAUL G. SUMMERS , Judge
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