IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED
JANUARY 1998 SESSION
June 11, 1998
Cecil W. Crowson
Appellate Court Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
) NO. 01C01-9704-CR-00140
Appellant, )
) DAVIDSON COUNTY
VS. )
) HON. THOMAS H. SHRIVER,
JUAN E. McADAMS, ) JUDGE
)
Appellee. ) (Motion to Suppress)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
JOHN KNOX WALKUP RICHARD McGEE
Attorney General and Reporter 601 Woodland Street
Nashville, TN 37206
ELLEN H. POLLACK
Assistant Attorney General
Cordell Hull Building, 2nd Floor
425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
VICTOR S. JOHNSON, III
District Attorney General
PAMELA S. ANDERSON
Assistant District Attorney General
Washington Square, Suite 500
222 Second Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37201-1649
OPINION FILED:
REVERSED AND REMANDED
JERRY L. SMITH,
JUDGE
OPINION
The State of Tennessee appeals the ruling of the trial court granting the
defendant’s motion to suppress cocaine discovered during a search of his motor
vehicle. The defendant was initially stopped for a traffic violation. Since he does
not contest the validity of that initial stop, the sole issue presented for appeal is
whether the search of the vehicle violated the defendant’s constitutional rights.
We find that it did not; therefore, we reverse and remand the case to the trial
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
SUPPRESSION HEARING
The only testimony at the suppression hearing was given by Officer Brock
Parks. Officer Parks testified on direct examination that he stopped the
defendant for failing to come to a complete halt at a STOP sign. A records
check revealed the defendant’s driver’s license to be revoked. The officer then
“placed [the defendant] under arrest” and put him in the back of the patrol car.
With the defendant secured, Officer Parks conducted a search of the passenger
compartment of the vehicle. This search yielded a brown paper bag containing
approximately thirty (30) grams of cocaine, which was found on the driver’s side
floorboard.
During cross-examination, Officer Parks’ testimony was extremely
confusing as to whether the officer merely intended to issue a citation before the
cocaine was discovered, or whether the defendant had been arrested prior to the
discovery of cocaine. Nevertheless, the officer specifically acknowledged that he
could not allow the defendant to drive away since his license had been revoked.
The trial court appears to have been concerned over the officer’s
apparent practice of searching every vehicle stopped for a traffic offense.
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Apparently concluding that the search was incident to a citation, and not an
arrest, the trial court orally granted the motion to suppress.
The trial court subsequently issued a memorandum opinion finding the
search was conducted upon the officer’s learning “that the defendant had no
driver’s license.” The trial court did not acknowledge in his findings the
uncontroverted testimony that the defendant’s driver’s license had actually been
revoked.
The trial court reached the following conclusions:
(1) The search of the defendant’s vehicle could not be based on
the “Carroll Doctrine” which permits warrantless searches based on
the officer’s belief that the vehicle contained contraband.
(2) The search was not an inventory search since the officer stated
he did not plan to impound the vehicle.
(3) The plain view doctrine could not apply since paper sacks are
common in automobiles, and the cocaine itself was not in plain
view.
(4) This was not a custodial arrest in which a search ordinarily
occurs or is needed. “More importantly, a search incident to arrest
is a [sic] limited to the person and immediate surroundings of the
person arrested.”
We agree with the trial court’s first three (3) conclusions, but disagree with the
last.
CUSTODIAL ARREST
Because the defendant does not challenge the validity of the initial stop,
we will first consider whether there was a custodial arrest and whether the officer
had grounds to make such an arrest.
Generally, officers are to issue citations to drivers committing minor traffic
infractions, rather than continuing to hold them in custody. Tenn. Code Ann. §
40-7-118(b)(1). However, an officer may not issue a citation to a person where
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“there is a reasonable likelihood that the offense would continue . . .” Tenn.
Code Ann. § 40-7-118(c)(2). When Officer Parks discovered the defendant was
driving on a revoked license, it was incumbent upon the officer to prevent the
defendant from continuing to drive his vehicle on a revoked license. A custodial
arrest is appropriate under these circumstances.
Based upon his confusing testimony, it is at least arguable that Officer
Parks believed that he had the option of giving the defendant a misdemeanor
citation and letting him continue driving instead of arresting him. If he had such
a belief, he was in error. Regardless, the officer’s subjective belief is not
controlling. State v. Evetts, 670 S.W.2d 640, 642 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984), see
also, Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806; 116 S.Ct. 1769; 135 L.Ed2 89 and State v.
Vineyard and Cockburn, 958 S.W .2d 730 (TN 1998). (Holding office’s subjective
beliefs or motives irelevant if there is an objectively reasonable basis for arrest.)
We find the defendant had been lawfully arrested prior to the search of his
vehicle.
The validity of the arrest established, we must examine whether the
officer had a right to search the defendant’s vehicle.
SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE
Officer Parks searched the defendant’s vehicle without a warrant, and
warrantless searches are presumed to be unreasonable. Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 576
(1971); State v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293, 295 (Tenn. 1992). The state,
therefore, was required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence in the
suppression hearing that the search and resulting seizure were justified pursuant
to one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. Coolidge, 403
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U.S. at 454-55, 91 S.Ct. at 2032, 29 L.Ed.2d at 576; State v. McClanahan, 806
S.W.2d 219, 220 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991).
When an officer makes a custodial arrest of a motor vehicle operator, the
officer has full authority to search the passenger compartment of the motor
vehicle contemporaneously to the arrest. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,
460, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 2864, 69 L.Ed.2d 768, 775 (1990); Watkins, 827 S.W.2d at
295-96. The “contemporaneous” requirement of the search is not destroyed
when a defendant is placed in a patrol car. United States v. White, 871 F.2d 41,
44 (6th Cir. 1989); Watkins, 827 S.W.2d at 296. When Officer Parks made a
valid custodial arrest of the defendant, he had a right to search the passenger
compartment of the defendant’s vehicle. The cocaine discovered as a result of
this search is admissible.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
_________________________
JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
CONCUR:
_________________________
JOHN H. PEAY, JUDGE
_________________________
DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
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