IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
FEBRUARY 1998 SESSION
FILED
April 22, 1998
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
) C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9704-CR-00153
Appellee, )
) SHELBY COUNTY
VS. )
) HON. JOHN P. COLTON, JR.
CHARLES E. TAYLOR, ) JUDGE
)
Appellant. ) (Habitual Motor Vehicle Offender)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
A C WHARTON, JR. JOHN KNOX WALKUP
Public Defender Attorney General & Reporter
WALKER GWINN ELIZABETH T. RYAN
Asst. Public Defender Asst. Attorney General
201 Poplar, Suite 201 425 Fifth Ave., North
Memphis, TN 38103 Cordell Hull Bldg., Second Fl.
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
JOHN W. PIEROTTI
District Attorney General
ALANDA HORNE
Asst. District Attorney General
201 Poplar, Suite 301
Memphis, TN 38103
OPINION FILED:____________________
AFFIRMED
JOHN H. PEAY,
Judge
OPINION
The defendant was declared a habitual motor vehicle offender on
December 10, 1996. He now appeals and argues that such a declaration violated the
double jeopardy provisions of the state and federal constitutions. He does not contest
the underlying facts which led him to be declared such an offender.1
The Habitual Motor Vehicle Offenders Act seeks to deny the privilege of
operating a motor vehicle to those who have demonstrated “their indifference to the
safety and welfare of others and their disrespect for the laws of the state.” T.C.A.
§ 55-10-602(2). The defendant was convicted of four driving offenses between January
1991 and June 1995, thus he falls within the statutory definition of a habitual offender.
T.C.A. § 55-10-603(2).
The defendant now argues that his being declared a habitual offender is
violative of the due process clause. He argues that he was convicted of four offenses
and was punished accordingly. He further contends he “has already suffered mandatory
temporary revocation of his drivers license” and is now being punished a second time for
the same conduct.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee has addressed this very issue and has
determined that the revocation of driving privileges under the Habitual Motor Vehicle
Offenders Act does not subject one to double jeopardy. State v. Conley, 639 S.W.2d
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In its b rief, th e Sta te arg ues that th e def end ant fa iled to time ly file his Notic e of A ppe al. Th is
conten tion is in error. A n order w as ente red on D ecem ber 2, 19 96, denying the defe ndant’s m otion to
dism iss th e Sta te’s p etition . How ever , the o rder actu ally dec laring the d efen dan t a ha bitua l mo tor ve hicle
offender was not entered until December 10, 1996. It is from this latter date that the time for filing a
Notice o f Appea l begins. T he defe ndant filed his notice o n Janu ary 9, 1997 . This is within the thirty
days as tim e is com puted un der T.R .A.P. Ru le 21(a).
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435, 437 (Tenn. 1982). The defendant, however, invites this Court to reconsider the
Conley case using the analysis of a more recent United States Supreme Court case,
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989). This Court has previously performed such
an analysis and has concluded that even under the most recent federal cases, a
defendant’s declaration as a habitual motor vehicle offender and subsequent revocation
of his license is not violative of his right against double jeopardy as provided by both the
federal and state constitutions. State v. Jeffery L. Becton, No. 02C01-9611-CR-00431,
Shelby County (Tenn. Crim. App. filed Dec. 3, 1997, at Jackson)(no perm. app. filed);
State v. Milton Spears, Jr., No. 02C01-9606-CR-00197, Shelby County (Tenn. Crim. App.
filed July 10, 1997)(no perm. app. filed); State v. Randy A. McClure and Teddy G.
Ownby, No. 03C01-9605-CC-00198, Sevier County (Tenn. Crim. App. filed Jan. 29, 1997,
at Knoxville)(no perm. app. filed). The judgment of the court below is affirmed.
______________________________
JOHN H. PEAY, Judge
CONCUR:
______________________________
JOSEPH B. JONES, Judge
______________________________
THOMAS T. WOODALL, Judge
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