IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE FILED
FEBRUARY SESS ION, 1998 March 24, 1998
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
ROCKY LEE COKER, ) C.C.A. NO. 03C01-9611-CR-00437
)
Appe llant, )
) HAMILTON COUNTY
V. )
)
) HON. DOUGLAS E. MEYER, JUDGE
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
)
Appellee. ) (POST-C ONVIC TION)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
ROC KY LE E CO KER , pro se JOHN KNOX WALKUP
#1080 69, ST SRC F, Unit 6 Attorney General & Reporter
Route 4, Box 600
Pikeville, TN 37367 MARVIN E. CLEMENTS, JR.
Assistant Attorney General
2nd Floor, Cordell Hull Building
425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37243
WILLIAM COX
District Attorn ey Ge neral
600 Market Street, Suite 310
Chattanooga, TN 37402
OPINION FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED
THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
OPINION
The Petitioner, Rocky Lee Coker, appeals from the order dismissing his pro
se petition for post-conviction relief in the Criminal Court for Hamilton County. The
trial court found that Pe titioner’s grounds for relief have been previously determined
or waived, and that Petitioner did not allege any ground for relief which was created
or arose after his prior p ost-co nviction petition s were heard . In this a ppea l,
Petitioner contends tha t the trial c ourt er red in d ismiss ing his petition on the basis
of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-202(a) and on the trial court’s failure
to allow Pe titioner to am end his p etition or to su bmit pro of. We affirm the judgment
of the trial cou rt.
Petitioner pled guilty to aggravated assault on January 5, 1979 and was
convicted of felonious consp iracy to comm it an illegal act c apable of destroy ing life
or property and felonious possession of explosives in 1981. Petitioner filed a direct
appeal from his 1981 convictions, and both convictions were affirmed. Petitioner
then filed petitions for post-conviction relief on both the 1979 and 1981 convictions
on the basis of an involuntary guilty plea, ineffective assistance of counsel and
prosecutorial misconduct. The trial court denied relief on the 1979 conviction but
granted a new trial on the 1981 convictions. A panel of this court then reversed the
grant of a new trial and affirmed the denial of the post-conviction relief for the 1979
conviction. See Coke r v. State, 911 S.W.2d 357 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1 995). O n Apr il
29, 1996, Petitioner filed a second petition for post-conviction relief, and, following
preliminary review, the trial court dismissed the petition. It is this dismissal that
Petitione r appea ls to our co urt.
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“In post conviction relief proceedings the petitioner has the burden of proving
the allegations in his petition by a preponderance of the evidence .” McBee v. State,
655 S.W.2d 191, 195 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983). Furthermore, the factual findings of
the trial cou rt in hea rings “are conclusive on appeal unless the evidence
preponderates against the judgme nt.” State v. Buford , 666 S.W.2d 473, 475 (Tenn.
Crim. App . 1983).
At the time of Petitioner’s 1979 and 1981 convictions, Tennessee Code
Annotated section 40-30-102 was not yet in effect. After the Post-Conviction Act
came into effect on July 1, 1986, Petitioner had a three (3) year period to file a post-
conviction petition. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102 (repealed 1995). The statute of
limitatio n expired on July 1, 198 9 for both conviction s. See Abston v. State, 749
S.W .2d 487 (Tenn . Crim. A pp. 198 8).
In 1995, the legislature reduced the statutory period for filing post-conviction
petitions from three (3) years to one (1) year. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202(a)
(1997 Repl.). Petitioner claims that under the new provisions of the Post-Conviction
Procedures Act, he has an additional one (1) year period to file his post-conviction
petition. In a recen t case, our supreme court held that the 1995 Post-Conviction
Procedures Act was intended to restrict the time and opportunity to see k post-
conviction relief and was not intended to allow additional time for petitioners whose
claims were alre ady barre d by the p rior statute o f limitations. Carter v. S tate, 952
S.W .2d 417 (Tenn . 1997). T his issue has no merit.
In addition, the trial court dismissed the petition on the grounds that
Petitioner’s grounds for relief had been previously determined or waived. Tenn.
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Code Ann. § 40-30-206(b) an d (g). In add ition to the trial co urt’s determ ination, a
panel of this cou rt has p reviou sly dec ided th at Petitio ner’s plea was knowingly and
volunta rily entered and that there was no prejudice resulting from any deficie ncy in
the perform ance o f Petitioner’s trial co unsel. Coker, 911 S.W.2d at 363-371.
Petitioner has not put forth any evidence which preponderates against the findings
of the trial court or demonstrated any grounds for relief which arose or was created
after his first petition for post-conviction relief was heard. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-
206(g)(1 ). This issu e has n o merit.
After a review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of
the trial cou rt.
____________________________________
THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge
CONCUR:
___________________________________
JERRY L. SMITH, Judge
___________________________________
WILLIAM B. ACREE, JR., Judge
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