IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
JANUARY 1998 SESSION
FILED
January 30, 1998
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
RICHARD LEE YOUNG, ) Appellate C ourt Clerk
) NO. 02C01-9703-CR-00130
Appellant, )
) SHELBY COUNTY
VS. )
) HON. CAROLYN WADE
) BLACKETT, JUDGE
)
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
)
Appellee. ) (Post-Conviction)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
RICHARD LEE YOUNG, pro se JOHN KNOX WALKUP
Register Number 101867 Attorney General and Reporter
Cold Creek Correctional Facility
P.O. Box 1000 SARAH M. BRANCH
Henning, TN 38041-1000 Assistant Attorney General
Cordell Hull Building, 2nd Floor
425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
WILLIAM L. GIBBONS
District Attorney General
RHEA CLIFT
Assistant District Attorney General
201 Poplar Avenue, Suite 301
Memphis, TN 38103-1947
OPINION FILED:
AFFIRMED
JOE G. RILEY,
JUDGE
OPINION
The petitioner, Richard Lee Young, appeals the order of the Criminal
Court of Shelby County dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief.
Petitioner alleged that his indictment for first degree murder was void for failure
to state the appropriate mens rea. The trial court dismissed the petition without
an evidentiary hearing finding the petition was barred by the statute of limitations.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
I.
In November 1983, the petitioner pled guilty to first degree murder,
aggravated kidnapping and two (2) counts of robbery with a deadly weapon. He
received an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus ten (10) years. On
December 11, 1996, petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging
his indictment for first degree murder was fatally defective and, therefore, his
conviction was void. The trial court dismissed the petition holding it was barred
by the statute of limitations. Petitioner now appeals the dismissal of his petition
for post-conviction relief.
II.
This case is controlled by the new Post-Conviction Procedure Act, Tenn.
Code Ann. § 40-30-201 et seq., as the petition for relief was filed after May 10,
1995.
Prior to the adoption of the recent Post-Conviction Procedure Act, such
petitions had to be filed within three (3) years of the date of the final action of the
highest state appellate court to which an appeal was taken. Tenn. Code Ann. §
40-30-102 (repealed by 1995 Tenn. Pub. Act 207 § 1). The statute of limitations
normally begins to run on the date of a guilty plea when an appeal is waived.
Warren v. State, 833 S.W.2d 101, 102 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). Petitioner's
guilty plea was entered in November 1983. However, as a result of this Court's
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decision in Abston v. State, 749 S.W.2d 487, 488 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988), the
statute for the petitioner began to run July 1, 1986, and expired July 1, 1989.
Consequently, the petition for post-conviction relief is barred by the statute of
limitations. The limitations period was not revived by the new Post-Conviction
Procedure Act. See Carter v. State, ___S.W.2d___ (Tenn. 1997).
III.
Furthermore, this petitioner has filed a previous petition for post-conviction
relief. The Post-Conviction Procedure Act contemplates the filing of only one
petition for post-conviction relief. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202(c). A petitioner
may file to re-open the petition under limited circumstances. Tenn. Code Ann. §
40-30-217(a). However, petitioner alleges none of the recognized grounds to
justify such a motion.
IV.
Finally, we address petitioner's allegation that the indictment was void for
failing to allege the proper mens rea. The indictment alleged that petitioner "did
unlawfully, feloniously, wilfully, deliberately, maliciously and premeditatedly"
murder the victim. The indictment is sufficient. See Hill v. State, ___S.W.2d___
(Tenn. 1997).
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
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__________________________
JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
CONCUR:
______________________________
JOE B. JONES, PRESIDING JUDGE
______________________________
PAUL G. SUMMERS, JUDGE
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State v. Richard Young
Combined Opinion