IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE FILED
AUGUST 1997 SESSION
September 30, 1997
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE )
) NO. 03C01-9609-CR-00353
Appellee, )
) ROANE COUNTY CRIMINAL
v. )
) Hon. E. Eugene Eblen, Judge
WILLIAM PERRY THOMPSON )
) (Post-Conviction Relief)
Appellant. )
FOR THE APPELLANT FOR THE APPELLEE
Joe H. Walker Charles W. Burson
Public Defender Attorney General & Reporter
P.O. Box 334
Harriman, TN. 37748 Peter M. Coughlan
Assistant Attorney General
Walter B. Johnson, II Criminal Justice Division
Assistant Public Defender 450 James Robertson Parkway
P.O. Box 334 Nashville, TN. 37243
Harriman, TN. 37748
Charles E. Hawk
District Attorney General
P.O. Box 703
Kingston, TN. 37763
OPINION FILED:___________________
AFFIRMED PURSUANT TO RULE 20
WILLIAM M. BARKER,
JUDGE
OPINION
The appellant, William Perry Thompson, appeals the Roane County Criminal
Court’s dismissal, without a hearing, of his petition for post-conviction relief. We affirm
the trial court.
On October 23, 1995, the appellant was convicted and sentenced as a Range
II offender in the Roane County Criminal Court for theft over ten thousand ($10,000)
dollars. The trial court sentenced the appellant to six years imprisonment. No appeal
was taken from that conviction and sentence.
On March 6, 1996, the appellant filed a post-conviction petition alleging that his
1995 sentence was improperly enhanced by his prior convictions. He alleges that his
prior convictions were unconstitutional because his guilty pleas in those cases were
not made knowingly and voluntarily. Those prior convictions date back to 1989 and
include the following: (1) On March 17, 1989, the appellant pled guilty and was
sentenced by the Roane County Criminal Court on two counts of grand larceny and
one count of concealing stolen property valued over two hundred ($200) dollars; (2)
On December 14, 1989, the appellant pled guilty and was later sentenced by the
Roane County Criminal Court on one count of grand larceny, third degree burglary,
and false pretenses over two hundred ($200) dollars; and (3) In 1990, the appellant
pled guilty and was sentenced by the Knox County Criminal Court on one charge of
second degree burglary and a separate charge of burglary.
The appellant has never challenged any of the above convictions or sentences
until his 1996 post-conviction petition. The trial court dismissed the petition as being
time barred by the three-year statute of limitations. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102
(repealed 1995).
The appellant’s only issue on appeal is that the trial court erred in dismissing
his post-conviction petition without a hearing. The appellant relies on Burford v. State,
845 S.W.2d 204 (Tenn. 1992) to assert that a hearing was required to determine if the
three-year statute of limitations properly applied to his petition. His reliance on Burford
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is misplaced. The rule from Burford, as now codified in Tennessee Code Annotated
section 40-30-202 (b)(3), applies in cases where petitioners challenge the validity of
their sentence as enhanced by prior convictions that have subsequently been
overturned. In those cases, our supreme court has held that strict application of the
three-year statute of limitations in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-102
would result in a violation of the petitioner’s rights to due process. See Burford, 845
S.W.2d at 208-209.
In the appellant’s case, however, his prior convictions in 1989 and 1990 have
never been reviewed or overturned. The appellant is essentially requesting this Court
to review the validity of his prior convictions almost eight years after he entered guilty
pleas in those cases. Any post-conviction challenge pertaining to the 1989 and 1990
convictions is clearly time barred by the three-year statute of limitations. See Tenn.
Code Ann. § 40-30-102 (repealed 1995). Absent a review and finding that his prior
convictions are invalid, the appellant’s present challenge to his 1995 sentence is
without merit.
The appellant waited until 1996 to raise any challenge concerning his
convictions in 1989 and 1990. Consequently, any present review of those prior
convictions is time-barred. Under the mandate set forth in Tennessee Code
Annotated section 40-30-206(b), the trial court properly dismissed the appellant’s
petition.
Pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
______________________________
WILLIAM M. BARKER, JUDGE
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CONCUR:
_______________________________
GARY R. WADE, JUDGE
_______________________________
PAUL G. SUMMERS, JUDGE
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