IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED
JULY 1997 SESSION
September 30, 1997
Cecil W. Crowson
Appellate Court Clerk
JAMES H. TURNER, )
) C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9608-CC-00365
Appellant, )
) HICKMAN COUNTY
VS. )
) HON. CORNELIA A. CLARK,
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) JUDGE
)
Appellee. ) (Habeas Corpus)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
JAMES H. TURNER, pro se JOHN KNOX WALKUP
TCIP ANNEX, #99071 Attorney General & Reporter
Route 1
Only, TN 37140 LISA A. NAYLOR
Attorney for the State
450 James Robertson Pkwy.
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
JOSEPH D. BAUGH
District Attorney General
RONALD L. DAVIS
Asst. District Attorney General
P. O. Box 937
Franklin, TN 37065-0937
OPINION FILED:____________________
AFFIRMED
JOHN H. PEAY,
Judge
OPINION
The petitioner, an inmate with the Department of Correction, received three
concurrent forty-five year sentences for two convictions of aggravated kidnapping and
one conviction of accessory before the fact to murder in the second degree. By petition
for a writ of habeas corpus, he challenges his restraint alleging that it is “illegal and void
on the face of the records.” His petition was dismissed without a hearing by the court
below.
In this appeal as of right, the petitioner contends that the trial court erred
in dismissing his petition without an evidentiary hearing. After consideration of the record
in this cause, we find the petitioner’s complaint to be without merit and, therefore, affirm
the trial court’s action.
The lengthy history of this case was fully summarized in a previous appeal
to this Court. See State v. James Howard Turner, No. 01C01-9404-CR-00122, Davidson
County (Tenn. Crim. App. filed September 20, 1995, at Nashville). Suffice it to say that
the petitioner has had at least two prior appeals in this Court along with a habeas corpus
proceeding in the federal system that went to the United States Supreme Court.
In this case, the petitioner alleges that his restraint is illegal and void
because the trial court lacked jurisdiction, because he was convicted of charges based
on an indictment that was dismissed, and other grounds relying on evidentiary issues.
The dismissal of the petition by the trial judge, without a hearing, found that all matters
raised by the petitioner had been previously litigated and had been “corrected or
resolved.” The trial judge’s order concluded that the petitioner had made no showing that
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he is being illegally restrained.
In Passarella v. State, 891 S.W.2d 619 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994), this Court
outlined the circumstances under which habeas corpus relief is available:
It is a well-established principle of law that the remedy of
habeas corpus is limited in scope as well as relief. In criminal cases,
the remedy is limited to cases where the judgment is void or the term
of imprisonment has expired . . . if the court rendering a judgment
has jurisdiction of the person, the subject-matter, and has the
authority to make the challenged judgment, the judgment is voidable,
not void; and the judgment may not be collaterally attacked in a suit
for habeas corpus relief.
Passarella, 891 S.W.2d at 626-27.
The complaints made by the petitioner are not ones that would render the
trial court judgment void but, rather, voidable. Tennessee courts have consistently
construed the scope of review by habeas corpus very strictly. Luttrell v. State, 644
S.W.2d 408, 409 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982). Pursuant to this narrow scope, this Court, in
Willie Edward Thornton v. Fred Raney, Warden, No. 02C01-9302-CC-00025, Lauderdale
County (Tenn. Crim. App. filed January 26, 1994, at Jackson), held that erroneous jury
instructions meet none of the requirements for habeas corpus relief. The Court further
stated that “the only method of collaterally attacking the judgment because of
constitutional deprivations occasioned by erroneous instructions is by petition for post-
conviction relief.”
The petitioner has alleged no facts that would cause his convictions to be
void or to show that the term of his imprisonment has expired. He merely seeks to have
this Court reconsider the evidence and/or weigh the credibility of witnesses. The mere
conclusory allegation that his convictions are void, without valid support or basis, is
insufficient for habeas corpus relief.
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We affirm the trial court’s dismissal, without a hearing, of the petition in this
case.
______________________________
JOHN H. PEAY, Judge
CONCUR:
______________________________
WILLIAM M. BARKER, Judge
______________________________
JERRY L. SMITH, Judge
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