IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
APRIL 1997 SESSION
FILED
September 15, 1997
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
ISSAC LYDELL HERRON, ) NO. 02C01-9509-CR-00253
)
Appellant ) SHELBY COUNTY
)
V. ) HON. FRED AXLEY, JUDGE
)
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) (Post-Conviction)
)
Appellee )
)
FOR THE APPELLANT FOR THE APPELLEE
Issac Lydell Herron #102289 John Knox Walkup
Cold Creek Correctional Facility Attorney General and Reporter
P.O. Box 1000 450 James Robertson Parkway
Henning, Tennessee 38041-1000 Nashville, Tennessee 37243-0493
Ellen H. Pollack
Assistant Attorney General
450 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, Tennessee 37243-0493
John W. Pierotti
District Attorney General
201 Poplar Avenue
Memphis, Tennessee 38103-1947
C. Alanda Horne
Assistant District Attorney General
201 Poplar Avenue
Memphis, Tennessee 38103-1947
OPINION FILED:______
AFFIRMED
William M. Barker, Judge
Opinion
The Appellant, Issac Lydell Herron, appeals as of right the Shelby County
Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. In 1984, the
Appellant was convicted of second degree murder and is currently serving a seventy-
two year sentence as a Range II especially aggravated offender in the Tennessee
Department of Correction. This Court affirmed the Appellant’s conviction in 1985 and
no further appeals were taken. See State v. Isaac Lydell Herron, C.C.A. No. 7 (Tenn.
Crim. App., Jackson, Apr. 10, 1985). On September 21, 1995, the Appellant filed a
pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. On
November 15, 1995, without an evidentiary hearing, the trial court dismissed the
petition ruling that it was barred by the statute of limitations.
Pursuant to the now-repealed Post-Conviction Procedure Act, the statute of
limitation applicable to the Appellant’s post-conviction claims was three years.1 Tenn.
Code Ann. § 40-30-102 (repealed 1995). That three-year period began running on
July 1, 1986, the effective date of the statute. The last day on which the Appellant
could have filed such a petition was in July of 1989. See e.g. State v. Mullins, 767
S.W.2d 668, 669 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988); Smith v. State, 757 S.W.2d 683, 685
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1988); State v. Masucci, 754 S.W.2d 90, 91 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1988); Abston v. State, 749 S.W.2d 487, 488 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). The
Appellant’s petition was filed in September of 1995, more than six years after the
statute expired. Consequently, the trial court properly dismissed the Appellant’s
petition.
Any contention by the Appellant that the new Post-Conviction Procedure Act,
effective May 10, 1995, provided him with a one-year window of opportunity within
which to file his post-conviction petition is meritless. Similar attempts to circumvent
the statute of limitations in this manner have been previously rejected by panels of this
1
Prior to the enactment of the 1986 Post-Conviction Procedure Act, no statute of limitations for
post-conviction applications existed.
2
Court. See Roy Barnett v. State, C.C.A. No. 03C01-9512-CV-00394 (Tenn. Crim.
App., Knoxville, Feb. 20, 1997); Stephen Koprowski v. State, C.A.A. No. 03C01-9511-
CC-00365 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Jan. 28, 1997); Johnny L. Butler v. State,
C.C.A. No. 02C01-9509-CR-00289 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Dec. 2, 1996). But
see Arnold Carter v. State, C.C.A. No. 03C01-9509-CC-00270 (Tenn. Crim. App.,
Knoxville, July 11, 1996).
Accordingly, the trial court’s dismissal of the Appellant’s petition for post-
conviction relief is affirmed.
__________________________
WILLIAM M. BARKER, JUDGE
CONCUR:
__________________________
JOSEPH M. TIPTON, JUDGE
__________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE
3