State v. Paul Mason

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON AUGUST SESSION, 1997 FILED PAUL ROBERT MASON, ) September 09, 1997 ) No. 02C01-9611-CC-00404 Appellant ) Cecil Crowson, Jr. ) LAKE COUNTY Appellate C ourt Clerk vs. ) ) Hon. JOE G. RILEY, JR., Judge BILLY COMPTON, WARDEN, ) ) (Writ of Habeas Corpus) Appellee ) For the Appellant: For the Appellee: PAUL ROBERT MASON, Pro Se CHARLES W. BURSON Register Number 108925 Attorney General and Reporter Rt 1, Box 330 Tiptonville, TN 38079-9775 ELIZABETH T. RYAN Assistant Attorney General Criminal Justice Division 450 James Robertson Parkway Nashville, TN 37243-0493 C. PHILLIP BIVENS District Attorney General P. O. Drawer E Dyersburg, TN 38024 OPINION FILED: AFFIRMED PURSUANT TO RULE 20 David G. Hayes Judge OPINION The appellant, Paul Robert Mason, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. On October 14, 1985, the appellant pled guilty to one count of aggravated rape in the Maury County Circuit Court and was sentenced to twenty years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The appellant filed the instant petition on September 20, 1996, alleging that the judgment entered against him is void because the indictment failed to allege the mens rea of the offense charged. The trial court properly dismissed the petition on the basis that "allegations concerning the sufficiency of the indictment are not the proper subject of habeas corpus relief." See Haggard v. State, 475 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971); Brown v. State, 445 S.W.2d 669, 674 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969); Barber v. State, No. 01C01-9408-CR- 00281 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Feb. 23, 1995). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of the petition. Moreover, we find the substance of the appellant's claim to be without merit. The appellant's reliance upon State v. Hill, No. 01C01-9508-CC-00267 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, June 20, 1996), is misplaced. The decision in Hill involves a post-1989 indictment and specifically addresses Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-301(c)(1989) (requirement of a culpable mental state). The appeal now before this court involves a pre 1989 Code indictment. Prior to 1989, the Code did not contain a provision comparable to Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-301(c). Accordingly, the decision in Hill does not control review of the issue before us. On the date of this offense, aggravated rape was defined as the "unlawful sexual penetration of another" accompanied by an enumerated aggravating circumstance, including that "the victim is less than thirteen years old." Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-603(a)(4)(1982). The indictment in the present case charged 2 that the "[appellant] did unlawfully and feloniously, with force and coercion, sexually penetrate . . . a ten year old minor child. . . ." This language was sufficient under the law as it existed at the time. See Campbell v. State, 491 S.W.2d 359, 361 (Tenn. 1973) (an indictment using the words "feloniously" or "unlawfully" is sufficient). This issue is without merit. The trial court's dismissal of the appellant's petition for writ of habeas corpus is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. ____________________________________ DAVID G. HAYES, Judge CONCUR: _____________________________ JERRY L. SMITH, Judge ____________________________ THOMAS T. WOODALL, Judge 3