IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED
MARCH SESSION, 1997 July 11, 1997
Cecil W. Crowson
Appellate Court Clerk
TAFT DOUGLAS, ) C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9605-CR-00182
)
Appellant, ) DAVIDSON COUNTY
)
)
V. ) HON. THOMAS H. SHRIVER,
) JUDGE
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
)
Appellee. ) (POST-CONVICTION)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
HENRY R. ALLISON, III JOHN KNOX WALKUP
Attorney at Law Attorney General & Reporter
500 Church Street
Fifth Floor KAREN M. YACUZZO
Nashville, TN 37219 Assistant Attorney General
450 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
VICTOR S. JOHNSON, III
District Attorney General
WILLIAM RAMSEY REED
Assistant District Attorney General
W ashington Square
222 2nd Avenue N., Suite 500
Nashville, TN 37201-1649
OPINION FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED
THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
OPINION
The Petitioner, Taft Douglas, appeals as of right according to Rule 3 of the
Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Petitioner pled nolo contendere to one
count of aggravated rape and one count of rape. He received a twenty (20) year
sentence for aggravated rape and a ten (10) year sentence for rape, to be served
concurrently. Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief. The trial court dismissed
the petition, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
In post-conviction relief proceedings, the petitioner has the burden of
proving the allegations in his petition by a preponderance of the evidence.
McBee v. State, 655 S.W .2d 191, 195 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983). Furthermore, the
factual findings of the trial court in hearings are conclusive for this court unless
the evidence preponderates against the judgment. State v. Buford, 666 S.W .2d
473, 475 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983).
Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel’s
failure to prepare for trial resulted in the Petitioner being forced to enter a plea.
In reviewing a petitioner’s Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, this Court must determine whether the advice given or services
rendered by counsel are within the range of competence demanded of counsel
in criminal cases, and, if not for counsel’s deficient performance, the result of his
trial would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693
(1984); Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W .2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975). In situations where
there is a guilty plea rather than a trial, this two-part standard is met when the
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petitioner establishes that, but for his counsel’s errors, he would not have pled
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 53
(1985). W e find that this standard also applies to a nolo contendere hearing.
Petitioner testified at the post-conviction hearing that trial counsel was
unprepared for trial and forced him to enter a plea. Petitioner’s trial attorney
testified that he met numerous times with the Petitioner in preparation for trial.
The attorney filed between fifteen (15) to twenty-five (25) motions prior to the trial
date, as well as interviewed witnesses, including the Petitioner’s wife. While
Petitioner failed to cooperate with trial counsel by refusing to give him names of
potential alibi witnesses until the day prior to trial, he stated he was prepared to
offer a defense for Petitioner.
Additionally, Petitioner testified at the plea hearing that he was satisfied
with trial counsel’s services and that he had discussed defenses with him prior
to that time. The advice given and the services rendered by counsel were within
the range of competency demanded by an attorney in a criminal case, and the
representation of Petitioner complied with the requirements set out by the
Supreme Court in Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W .2d 930. Having reviewed the
Appellant’s testimony and that of his trial counsel, we are bound to affirm the trial
court’s decision that trial counsel’s testimony was the accurate account of the
events which transpired. The evidence does not preponderate against the trial
court’s findings. See Black v. State, 794 S.W .2d 752, 755 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1990). This issue has no merit.
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In addition, it appears that Petitioner challenges the voluntariness of his
nolo contendere plea. W hile he failed to raise this issue specifically, we will
address this contention. W hen reviewing the plea, the overriding concern is
whether the plea is knowingly and voluntarily made. W oods v. State, 928 S.W .2d
52, 55 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). From the record, it is apparent that there was
no evidence of threats or undue pressure placed upon the Petitioner. The
transcript of the nolo contendere plea proceedings indicates that the standards
of State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn. 1977), were followed by the trial
judge. In the record, it is acknowledged by Petitioner that he understood the
nature of the charges against him, the plea and sentence, and that he accepted
both knowingly and intelligently. In addition, trial counsel testified that Petitioner
adamantly insisted that he “try to get [Petitioner] a deal.” After hearing that his
wife planned to “burn him at the cross,” Petitioner decided he was going to plead
nolo contendere. This issue is also without merit.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
____________________________________
THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge
CONCUR:
___________________________________
JOSEPH M. TIPTON, Judge
___________________________________
JOE G. RILEY, Judge
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