IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
FILED
AT KNOXVILLE June 4, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
APRIL 1999 SESSION Appellate C ourt
Clerk
LEONARD LEBRON ROSS, )
) NO. 03C01-9802-CR-00077
Appellant, )
) HAMILTON COUNTY
VS. )
) HON. STEPHEN M. BEVIL,
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) JUDGE
)
Appellee. ) (Post-Conviction)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
JOHN A. SHOAF III PAUL G. SUMMERS
735 Broad Street, Suite 606 Attorney General and Reporter
Chattanooga, TN 37402-1804
ELLEN H. POLLACK
Assistant Attorney General
Cordell Hull Building, 2nd Floor
425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
WILLIAM H. COX III
District Attorney General
MARK A. HOOTON
Assistant District Attorney General
600 Market Street, Suite 310
Chattanooga, TN 37402
OPINION FILED:
AFFIRMED
JOE G. RILEY,
JUDGE
OPINION
Petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. A
Hamilton County jury found him guilty of burglary, attempted second degree murder,
and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced petitioner to an
effective sentence of thirty-five years. Petitioner now claims he received ineffective
assistance of counsel.1 Upon a complete review of the record, we conclude the
evidence does not preponderate against the post-conviction court’s findings that
counsel was effective. Thus, we AFFIRM the dismissal of the petition.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In October 1993, petitioner went to trial and was convicted of especially
aggravated robbery, attempted second degree murder, and burglary. Petitioner
received sentences of twenty-two, ten, and three years, respectively. The trial court
ordered all sentences to run consecutively for an effective term of thirty-five years.
On direct appeal, a panel of this Court affirmed the convictions and
sentences imposed by the trial court. See State v. Leonard Lebron Ross, C.C.A.
No. 03C01-9404-CR-00153, Hamilton County (Tenn. Crim. App. filed June 15,
1995, at Knoxville). The Tennessee Supreme Court granted permission to appeal
and remanded the cause to this Court for reconsideration of sentencing in light of
State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933, 939 (Tenn. 1995). Upon remand, this Court
again affirmed the trial court’s sentencing decision. State v. Leonard Lebron Ross,
C.C.A. No. 03C01-9404-CR-00153, Hamilton County (Tenn. Crim. App. filed April
10, 1996, refiled August 15, 1996, at Knoxville).
1
Petitioner’s brief combines a statement of facts and issues within which it
identifies numerous issues for appeal. However, the majority of the allegations constitute
sub-parts to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
2
On July 1, 1996, petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief
primarily alleging ineffective assistance of counsel both at trial and on appeal. After
an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court found the allegations to be without
merit and entered an order denying post-conviction relief. This appeal followed.
II. FACTS
A. Trial
At trial, the state presented evidence that petitioner and two co-defendants
entered the home of Mary Sanders, a seventy-nine year old great-grandmother,
beat her with a hammer, and robbed her of her television in order to buy crack
cocaine. The physical evidence placing petitioner at the scene was a latent
fingerprint on a watch case in the victim’s bedroom. Furthermore, the co-
defendants testified against petitioner.
B. Post-Conviction
Petitioner’s brief presents numerous allegations in support of his claim for
post-conviction relief. Most of those allegations relate to ineffective assistance of
counsel, and can be consolidated into the following:
(1) Trial counsel failed to produce expert testimony relating
to the accuracy of latent fingerprints, or to introduce
other testimony showing petitioner had been in the
victim’s residence many times;
(2) Trial counsel failed to obtain information from the state
regarding petitioner’s statements to law enforcement;
(3) Trial counsel failed to object to the repetitive
examination of certain witnesses;
(4) Trial counsel failed to object to co-defendant Owens’
speculation about petitioner’s motive for handing her a
pillow;
(5) Trial counsel failed to emphasize in closing argument
that co-defendant Owens was an admitted liar;
(6) Trial counsel failed to object to the assistant district
attorney’s use of overly-inflammatory statements in
closing argument;
(7) Trial counsel failed to file a petition for re-hearing
regarding this Court’s opinion on direct appeal;
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(8) Trial counsel failed to challenge the trial court’s denial
of a continuance in his motion for new trial;
(9) Trial counsel failed to interview petitioner’s co-
defendants in anticipation that they might testify against
petitioner;
(10) Trial counsel failed to attack the state’s failure to arraign
petitioner within seventy-two hours of his arrest; and
(11) Trial counsel failed to offer individualized instructions
concerning non-statutory mitigating circumstances.
Allegations relating to previously determined issues include:
(1) The trial court erred by admitting petitioner’s first
statement into evidence;
(2) The trial court erred by its imposition of consecutive
sentences; and
(3) The trial court erred by its imposition of a greater
effective sentence than received by co-defendant
Owens who actually hit the victim in the head with a
hammer.
The post-conviction court conducted an evidentiary hearing and received
testimony from petitioner and trial counsel. Petitioner generally testified that he did
not believe he was proven guilty and complained that trial counsel failed to protect
his constitutional rights. Petitioner complained that counsel failed to point out
inconsistency in the proof and to emphasize the co-defendants’ conflicting stories.
Trial counsel was an experienced criminal defense attorney. His recollection
of trial preparation in this case included several meetings with petitioner and
petitioner’s active participation in the tactical, decision-making process.
Counsel obtained the preliminary hearing transcript, information about or
copies of petitioner’s statements to investigators, and talked to the district attorney
regarding the fingerprint evidence which put petitioner in the victim’s home. In
general, he assured that the evidence was proper and filed an unsuccessful motion
to suppress the statements petitioner gave to police.
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According to trial counsel, there were a number of possible defenses based
upon what petitioner told him happened that night. He reviewed each with petitioner
and let petitioner make the final decision regarding which to use at trial.2 However,
the co-defendants’ testimony against petitioner completely controverted his claim
that he went back to the house to help the victim after co-defendant Owens
committed the offenses.
The post-conviction court determined that the petitioner failed to prove his
allegations and entered an order of dismissal.
IV. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Post-Conviction
The trial judge's findings of fact on post-conviction hearings are
conclusive on appeal unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. Butler v. State,
789 S.W.2d 898, 899 (Tenn. 1990); Adkins v. State, 911 S.W.2d 334, 341 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1995). The trial court’s findings of fact are afforded the weight of a jury
verdict, and this Court is bound by the trial court’s findings unless the evidence in
the record preponderates against those findings. Henley v. State, 960 S.W.2d 572,
578 (Tenn. 1997); Alley v. State, 958 S.W.2d 138, 147 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997);
Dixon v. State, 934 S.W.2d 69, 72 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
This Court reviews a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the
standards of Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930 (Tenn. 1975), and Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The petitioner
has the burden to prove that (1) the attorney’s performance was deficient, and (2)
the deficient performance resulted in prejudice to the defendant so as to deprive
2
According to trial counsel, an alibi defense was not presented because petitioner
admitted being in the victim’s home the morning of the crimes. Furthermore, this
admission negated the need to present testimony challenging the fingerprint or explaining
its presence.
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him of a fair trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064; Goad v. State, 938
S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996); Overton v. State, 874 S.W.2d 6, 11 (Tenn. 1994);
Butler, 789 S.W.2d at 899.
The test in Tennessee in determining whether counsel provided effective
assistance is whether his performance was within the range of competence
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Baxter, 523 S.W.2d at 936. The
petitioner must overcome the presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the
wide range of acceptable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104
S.Ct. at 2065; Alley, 958 S.W.2d at 149; Hicks v. State, 983 S.W.2d 240, 246
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). Therefore, in order to prove a deficiency, a petitioner
must show that counsel’s acts or omissions were so serious as to fall below an
objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2065; Henley, 960 S.W.2d at 579; Goad,
938 S.W.2d at 369.
V. DISPOSITION OF PETITIONER’S CLAIMS
We begin by noting the three allegations relating to errors by the trial court
have been previously determined by this Court on direct appeal. See State v.
Leonard Lebron Ross, C.C.A. No. 03C01-9404-CR-00153, Hamilton County (Tenn.
Crim. App. filed April 10, 1996, refiled August 15, 1996, at Knoxville). They may not
be re-visited in a post-conviction proceeding. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-206(h).
We now address each of the other eleven allegations raised with regard to
ineffective assistance of counsel:
(1)
Petitioner contends trial counsel should have presented expert testimony to
challenge the accuracy of latent fingerprints, or testimony which offered an
alternative explanation for the presence of his fingerprint in the victim’s home. In
his statement to law enforcement the petitioner said he went in the house after a co-
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defendant committed the crimes. Under these circumstances, there was no need
to challenge the accuracy of the fingerprint or offer further evidence explaining the
fingerprint. This issue is without merit.
(2)
Petitioner claims trial counsel failed to obtain information regarding his
statements to the police. However, trial counsel testified he knew about the
statements and filed a motion to suppress. Thus, this issue is without merit.
(3)
Petitioner argues that trial counsel was deficient for failing to object to
repetitive questioning of witnesses. Trial counsel testified he did not object unless
or until such questioning became excessive. Petitioner has failed to show what
benefit would be derived from such objection, or what prejudice was suffered by
such failure. This issue is without merit.
(4)
Petitioner contends trial counsel was deficient for failing to object to
speculation by co-defendant Owens regarding the pillow petitioner handed her to
smother the victim. At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel offered a tactical
explanation for not making an objection. Furthermore, petitioner has failed to show
that such objection would have been sustained by the trial court. This issue is
without merit.
(5)
Petitioner claims trial counsel should have emphasized co-defendant Owens’
untruthfulness to police. Petitioner has failed to show a reasonable probability that
emphasizing this in counsel’s closing argument would have changed the outcome
of the proceeding. This issue is without merit.
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(6)
Petitioner charges trial counsel with failure to object to the state’s use of
overly-inflammatory statements in its closing argument. Petitioner has failed to
demonstrate any prejudice as a result of the comments. This issue is without merit.
(7)
Petitioner claims that trial counsel was deficient for not filing a petition to re-
hear regarding this Court’s opinion issued in April 1996. There is no requirement
that appellate counsel file such a motion upon an adverse decision by this Court.
Furthermore, there has been no showing that such a petition would likely have been
granted. This issue is without merit.
(8)
Petitioner claims that trial counsel failed to challenge the trial court’s denial
of a continuance after the state added petitioner’s co-defendants as witnesses on
the morning of trial. While it is true that trial counsel did not raise the issue in his
motion for new trial, it was raised on appeal and determined on the merits by this
Court. Clearly, counsel’s failure did not prejudice petitioner. This issue is without
merit.
(9)
Petitioner further contends that trial counsel failed to interview the co-
defendants in anticipation of their testimony against petitioner at trial. Trial counsel
was given a full opportunity to cross-examine the co-defendants at trial.
Furthermore, petitioner has failed to produce evidence showing that such interviews
would have changed counsel’s strategy at trial, or changed the outcome. This issue
is without merit.
(10)
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Petitioner charges trial counsel should have attacked the state’s failure to
arraign petitioner within seventy-two hours of his arrest. This issue was not pursued
at the post-conviction hearing. The record before this Court does not establish any
deficiency by trial counsel in this regard. This issue is without merit.
(11)
Petitioner challenges trial counsel’s failure to offer individualized instructions
concerning non-statutory mitigating circumstances. This allegation relates to the
presentation of mitigating circumstances in the penalty phase of a first degree
murder trial where the jury determines the sentence. It has no application to the
case at bar. This issue is without merit.
VI. CONCLUSION
Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that any of the alleged deficiencies
caused him prejudice; nor does the record preponderate against the post-conviction
court’s findings that trial counsel in this case was effective. Based upon the
foregoing, we AFFIRM the judgment of the court below.
__________________________
JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
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CONCUR:
__________________________
JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
__________________________
NORMA McGEE OGLE, JUDGE
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