IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
JUNE SESSION, 1996
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9508-CC-00226
)
Appellee, )
)
) FAYETTE COUNTY
VS. )
) HON. KERRY BLACKWOOD
TERRON BLEDSOE, aka “TONY,” ) JUDGE
Appellant.
)
) (Direct Appeal) FILED
July 3, 1997
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE: Appellate C ourt Clerk
LESLIE I. BALLIN CHARLES W. BURSON
MARK A. MESLER Attorney General and Reporter
200 Jefferson Avenue, Suite 1250
Memphis, TN 38103 CLINTON J. MORGAN
Assistant Attorney General
450 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, TN 37243
ELIZABETH RICE
District Attorney General
PERRY HAYES
Assistant District Attorney
302 Market Street
Somerville, TN 38068
OPINION FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED
JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
OPINION
A Fayette County Circuit Court jury convicted Appellant Terron Bledsoe,
aka “Tony,” of four counts of knowingly delivering a controlled substance. As
a Range I standard offender, Appellant received an effective sentence of nine
years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal, Appellant
presents the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in refusing to
grant his motion to dismiss for failure to provide a speedy trial, and (2) whether
the evidence presented at trial is legally sufficient to sustain convictions for
knowingly delivering a controlled substance.
After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
As accredited by the jury’s verdict, the proof shows that, on March 25,
1993, Sandy Gooden, a confidential informant, introduced Tennessee
Highway Patrol Officer Wendall Miller to Appellant. During the course of an
undercover drug operation, Officer Miller purchased crack cocaine from
Appellant on March 25, May 4, May 6, and July 6 of 1993. Each transaction
was tape recorded.
On July 23, 1993, a Fayette County Grand Jury returned an indictment
charging Appellant with four counts of knowingly delivering a controlled
substance in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. Sec. 39-17-417(a)(2). Appellant
was arrested pursuant to the indictment and capias on July 12, 1994. On
August 5, 1994, Appellant filed a motion to dismiss alleging that he had been
deprived of a speedy trial in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United
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States Constitution. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. On
Decem ber 5, 1994, Appellant was tried before a jury in the Fayette County
Circuit Court. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all four counts of the
indictm ent.
II. SPEEDY TRIAL
Appellant first alleges that the trial court erred in refusing to grant his
motion to dismiss for the alleged failure to provide him a speedy trial. The
right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). It is also
guaranteed by Article 1, Sec. 9 of the Constitution of Tennessee. In Barker
the United States Supreme Court enunciated the four following considerations
to be taken into account in determining whether a criminal defendant has been
deprived of his or her right to a speedy trial:
(1) the length of the delay,
(2) the reason for the delay,
(3) whether the defendant demanded a speedy trial, and
(4) whether the defendant was prejudiced by the delay.
Id. at 530.
In State v. Bishop, 493 S.W .2d 81 (Tenn. 1973), the Tennessee
Supreme Court adopted the test enunciated in Barker for adjudicating claims
of alleged speedy trial deprivations. Therefore, we will address each of the
four considerations listed above seriatim.
A. Length of Delay
The first factor, length of delay, is the triggering mechanism that
necessitates the consideration of the other three factors. State v. Wood, 924
S.W .2d 342, 346 (Tenn. 1996). Until the delay in bringing the accused is
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presumptively prejudicial, it is not necessary to consider the other factors.
Barker, 407 U.S. at 530; State v. Baker, 614 S.W.2d 352, 355 (Tenn. 1981).
In the case sub judice Appellant was indicted on July 26, 1993. This
formal accusation against Appellant in this matter began the time running for
the State to afford Appellant a speedy trial. Id. at 353. He was not tried until
Decem ber 5, 1994, approximately a year and five months following indictment.
The United States Supreme Court has noted that a delay after formal
accusation is presumptively prejudicial as it approaches one year. Doggett v.
United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 (1992).
Thus, a delay of almost one and a half years between indictment and
trial appears sufficient to trigger an analysis of the other three considerations
in Barker.
B. Reason for the Delay
The second factor, reason for delay, usually falls into one of four
categories:
(a) intentional delay to gain tactical advantage over
the defense or to harass the defendant,
(b) bureaucratic indifference or negligence,
(c) delay that is necessary for the fair and effective
prosecution of the case, or
(d) delay caused or acquiesced in by the defendant.
Appellant claims that the negligence or indifference of Fayette County
authorities caused the delay in his case. He claims his name had been
entered in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) computer following
his indictment and that he has lived at the same address all his life. He claims
he could have easily been arrested and brought to trial much sooner. The
record reflects that when Appellant was indicted the State had no information
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about him other than his name. Appellant’s name was entered into NCIC,
however a name without a date of birth, driving license number or social
security number is apparently insufficient to obtain an address over NCIC. In
August 1993 Fayette County authorities obtained a date of birth for Appellant,
but were apparently still unable to obtain his address. The Fayette County jail
administrator admitted she did at some point receive an F.B.I. fingerprint file
number for Appellant, and that given Appellant’s prior criminal record an
address recorded at the time of a previous arrest could “probably” have been
located using the F.B.I. number. No explanation was offered as to why this
avenue was left unexplored. In April of 1994 Appellant was arrested on
unrelated charges in Shelby County and it was discovered he was wanted in
Fayette County on the charges which are the subject of this appeal. Fayette
County lodged a detainer against Appellant and when the Shelby County
charges were resolved Appellant was returned to Fayette County for
arraignment on July 27, 1994.
Fayette County authorities did make some effort to secure the arrest
and prosecution of Appellant. His name was immediately entered in NCIC,
some efforts were made to obtain an address for Appellant, and once he was
located procedures were immediately instituted to return him to Fayette
County for trial. W hile it does appear that Fayette County authorities could
have been more aggressive in their efforts to locate Appellant, their actions do
not amount to negligence or a lack of due diligence so as to warrant weighing
this factor against the State.
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C. Demand for Speedy Trial
The third factor for our consideration is whether Appellant asserted his
right to a speedy trial by making a demand for one. The uncontradicted
testimony of Appellate established that he was not aware of the existence of
Fayette County charges against him until he was returned to Fayette County
in July 1994, approximately one year from the time of his indictment. He has
never made a demand for a speedy trial. However, under the circumstances
we decline to weigh this fact against him. Appellant cannot be expected to
make a demand for trial on charges he did not know existed.
D. Prejudice From the Delay
Possible prejudice to Appellant is the fourth factor taken into account in
determining whether he has been deprived of a speedy trial. This
consideration is given the greatest weight of all the factors. W ood, 924
S.W.2d at 349. The only proof in the record that as a result of the delay
Appellant was hampered in his ability to defend himself are his statements that
he could not remember his whereabouts on the dates he was accused of
delivering cocaine in Fayette County. On appeal Appellant argues that the
delay in bringing him to trial increased the chances he was misidentified since
the undercover officer had, during the period of delay, handled so many other
narcotics cases involving other individuals.
Neither of Appellant’s arguments as to possible prejudice are
convincing. Appellant made no attempt to establish an alibi, and never
claimed he was not in Fayette County on the dates of the offenses. He only
claimed he could not remember where he was on those dates. Secondly, the
possibility of misidentification is fairly remote. Two eyewitnesses positively
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dentified Appellant as the perpetrator of the offenses in question. One of
these witnesses had known Appellant for fifteen years. In addition, Appellant’s
expert witness, a professor of speech pathology, compared a tape recording
of one of the drug transactions allegedly involving Appellant with a known tape
recording of Appellant’s voice. The expert testified in his professional opinion
there was an eighty to eighty-five percent chance the speakers on the tapes
were two different people. This testimony was apparently rejected by the jury.
Under the circumstances the ability of Appellant to defend himself does not
appear to have been impaired by the delay between indictment and trial. This
factor weighs against Appellant.
In summary, although the delay of approximately one and a half years
from indictment to trial is sufficient to trigger an analysis of the other factors in
an inquiry as to whether Appellant was denied a speedy trial, this is not an
extraordinary delay. The reason for the delay appears to have arisen more
from a lack of specific information concerning the Appellant than from any sort
of negligence or indifference. The lack of a demand for a speedy trial results
from Appellant’s ignorance of the charges against him and should not be held
against him. Finally, this record simply does not establish that the ability of
Appellant to defend himself was hampered. Due consideration of all these
relevant factors com pels us to conclude that Appellant was not deprived of his
constitutional right to a speedy trial.
III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Appellant also alleges that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient
to sustain his convictions for knowingly delivering a controlled substance.
W hen an appeal challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the standard of
review is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
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State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318
(1979); State v. Evans, 838 S.W .2d 185, 190-91 (Tenn. 1992); Tenn. R. App.
P. 13(e). On appeal, the State is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of
the evidence and all reasonable or legitimate inferences which may be drawn
therefrom. State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). This Court
will not reweigh the evidence, re-evaluate the evidence, or substitute its
evidentiary inferences for those reached by the jury. State v. Carey, 914
S.W.2d 93, 95 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). Furthermore, in a criminal trial, great
weight is given to the result reached by the jury. State v. Johnson, 910
S.W .2d 897, 899 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).
Once approved by the trial court, a jury verdict accredits the witnesses
presented by the State and resolves all conflicts in favor of the State. State v.
W illiams, 657 S.W .2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983). The credibility of witnesses, the
weight to be given their testimony, and the reconciliation of conflicts in the
proof are matters entrusted exclusively to the jury as trier of fact. State v.
Sheffield, 676 S.W .2d 542, 547 (Tenn. 1984). A jury’s guilty verdict removes
the presumption of innocence enjoyed by the defendant at trial and raises a
presumption of guilt. State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W .2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982).
The defendant then bears the burden of overcoming this presumption of guilt
on appeal. State v. Black, 815 S.W .2d 166, 175 (Tenn. 1991).
In order to sustain convictions in this case, the proof must show that
Appellant knowingly delivered a controlled substance to Officer Miller.
Appellant argues that he was not the individual who sold the cocaine to Officer
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Miller and points to the expert testimony regarding the audio tapes of the
transactions to support his claim. Dr. William H. Manning of the University of
Memphis testified that, based upon the fundamental pitch test that he
performed on the tape of the fourth incident, he was eighty to eighty-five
percent sure that the speaker on the tape was not Appellant. However, the
evaluation and accreditation of expert testimony are matters within the sole
province of the jury as the trier of fact. Edwards v. State, 540 S.W .2d 641, 647
(Tenn. 1976). Furthermore, as stated previously, determining the credibility of
witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony as well as resolving
conflicts in the proof are matters entrusted exclusively to the jury as trier of
fact. Sheffield, 676 S.W .2d at 547. This Court, even if it wished to do so, may
not substitute its evidentiary inferences for those drawn by the jury. Carey,
914 S.W.2d at 95. Here, it appears that the jury gave greater weight to the
testimony of Officer Miller and Mr. Gooden regarding the cocaine sales than to
the testimony of Appellant and his expert witness. Under well-settled
Tennessee law, the jury was within its province in doing so. Thus, we
conclude that, when viewed in a light most favorable to the State, the evidence
presented at trial is legally sufficient to sustain Appellant’s convictions for
knowingly delivering a controlled substance.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
____________________________________
JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
CONCUR:
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___________________________________
JOSEPH M.TIPTON, JUDGE
___________________________________
DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
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