IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED
AUGUST 1999 SESSION
October 5, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate Court Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
) NO. 01C01-9901-CC-00007
Appellee, )
) MARION COUNTY
VS. )
) HON. THOMAS W. GRAHAM,
TOUSSIANT D. TURNER, ) JUDGE
)
Appellant. ) (Probation Revocation)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
L. THOMAS AUSTIN PAUL G. SUMMERS
116 E. Cherry Attorney General and Reporter
P.O. Box 666
Dunlap, TN 37327-0666 KIM R. HELPER
Assistant Attorney General
Cordell Hull Building, 2nd Floor
425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
JAMES MICHAEL TAYLOR
District Attorney General
STEVEN H. STRAIN
Assistant District Attorney General
265 Third Avenue, Suite 300
Dayton, TN 37321
OPINION FILED:
AFFIRMED
JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
OPINION
The appellant, Toussiant D. Turner, appeals the Marion County Circuit
Court’s order revoking his probation and requiring him to serve the balance of an
eight-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he claims that the
trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation. We find no merit to this
assertion and AFFIRM the judgment of the trial court.
FACTS
In March 1997, appellant pled guilty and was convicted of the sale and
delivery of cocaine over 0.5 grams, a Class B felony. The trial court gave appellant
an eight-year sentence in the Department of Correction.
After completion of the “boot camp” program, appellant was released onto
probation. Appellant’s supervision was transferred to Atlanta, Georgia, immediately
upon his release from the penitentiary. In October 1998, appellant was arrested by
the Atlanta police for felony possession of cocaine with intent to distribute,
possession of marijuana, and a weapons charge. The probation officer filed a
probation violation warrant.
Atlanta narcotics investigator, Robert Daniels, testified at the probation
revocation hearing. Working undercover on October 12, 1998, Daniels observed
a number of apparent drug transactions in an Atlanta housing development. The
officer observed a person on the street collect money form various people, take the
money to an apartment, get something in return, and then hand it over to the person
who gave him the money. After one of these transactions, a woman walked directly
past him with what looked like crack cocaine in her hand. Daniels alerted uniformed
officers in the area, but they arrived too late to make an arrest.
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Daniels continued his surveillance of the apartment. Between ten to fifteen
minutes later, Daniels saw appellant leave the apartment with a black tote bag,
place the bag in a car parked across the street, and return to the apartment.
Daniels then called uniformed officers back to the scene and instructed them
to make inquiries at the apartment. Those inquiries resulted in a consent to search
both the car and the apartment by Monique Waters, who was the owner of the car
and the lessor of the apartment. When Waters gave her consent to search the car,
she stated, “let me get the keys from Toussiant.” Appellant told W aters, “no, baby,
no,” when she “came out with the keys.”
The search of the car revealed one black tote bag which contained sixty-five
“hits” of what appeared to be crack cocaine, a fully-loaded “Tech 9" semi-automatic
weapon, and approximately $1,000 in cash. The search of the apartment revealed
a small amount of marijuana and various cocaine manufacturing paraphernalia.
Georgia law enforcement charged appellant with felony possession of cocaine with
intent to distribute, possession of marijuana, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a crime. At the time of the probation revocation hearing, Georgia
police did not yet have an analysis of the substance retrieved from the tote bag.
The trial court made the following finding:
“[T]his seems to be fairly straight forward as far as what appears by
a preponderance of the proof to have occurred down there. . . . It
appears [appellant] was involved in a location which was selling drugs
that he in fact possessed . . . drugs, that he was charged ultimately
with that crime. That’s what the preponderance of the proof is, I don’t
think anybody could hold otherwise, so he’s violated his probation.”
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court may revoke probation and order the imposition of the original
sentence upon a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the person has
violated a condition of probation. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-310, 311. The
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decision to revoke probation rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.
State v. Mitchell, 810 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). Revocation of
probation is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review, rather than a de
novo standard. State v. Harkins, 811 S.W.2d 79, 82 (Tenn. 1991). Discretion is
abused only if the record contains no substantial evidence to support the conclusion
of the trial court that a violation of probation or community correction sentence has
occurred. Id.; State v. Gregory, 946 S.W.2d 829, 832 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).
Proof of a violation need not be established beyond a reasonable doubt, and the
evidence need only show that the trial judge exercised a conscientious and
intelligent judgment, rather than acting arbitrarily. Gregory, 946 S.W.2d at 832;
State v. Leach, 914 S.W.2d 104, 106 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).
PROBATION REVOCATION
Appellant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his
probation. Appellant argues that at the time of the revocation hearing, he had not
been tried or convicted on any of the Georgia charges. Essentially, appellant
argues that the mere existence of new criminal charges against him is an
insufficient ground upon which to base a probation revocation.
“A mere accusation, standing alone, is not sufficient to justify revocation. . .
[t]he state is required to present at least some fact which would permit the trial court
to make a conscientious and intelligent judgment as to the violation.” State v. Mark
Crites, C.C.A. No. 01C01-9711-CR-00512, Sumner County (Tenn. Crim. App. filed
February 9, 1999, at Nashville)(citing State v. Harkins, 811 S.W.2d 79, 82 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1991)). In this instance, the state presented the testimony of
Investigator Daniels who personally observed the appellant’s violative actions.
We note that although Investigator Daniels did not have a lab report
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confirming the identity of the substance discovered in the black tote bag, his
testimony that the substance appeared to be crack cocaine was properly admitted.
An officer may testify as to the identity of an illegal controlled substance based upon
his experience. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 644 S.W.2d 423, 424 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1982); State v. Peter Gunn, C.C.A. No. 02C01-9511-CR-000352, Shelby
County (Tenn. Crim. App. filed September 30, 1996, at Jackson).1
The proof revealed the appellant was in an apartment where apparent drug
transactions were taking place. He carried a bag out of the apartment containing
sixty-five hits of what appeared to be crack cocaine, a Tech 9 weapon, and $1,000
cash and placed it in a car. Cocaine manufacturing paraphernalia and marijuana
were found in the apartment. This evidence was sufficient to permit the trial court
to make a conscientious and intelligent judgment that appellant violated the terms
and conditions of his probation.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by revoking appellant’s probation and ordering him to serve the balance
of his eight-year sentence in the Department of Correction. Thus, we AFFIRM the
judgment of the trial court.
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We also note that the presence of the semi-automatic weapon and a large amount
of cash in the same bag as the substance is indicative of drugs and may be considered in
evaluating the identity of the substance.
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____________________________
JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
CONCUR:
____________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE
____________________________
L.T. LAFFERTY, SENIOR JUDGE
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