IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED
FEBRUARY 1999 SESSION
July 1, 1999
Cecil W. Crowson
Appellate Court Clerk
JAMES RICHARD ROMINE, )
) C.C.A. No. 01C01-9805-CC-00211
Appellant, )
) Lincoln County
V. )
) Honorable Charles Lee, Judge
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
) (Post-Conviction)
Appellee. )
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
CLIFFORD K. McGOWN, JR. JOHN KNOX WALKUP
113 North Court Square Attorney General and Reporter
P. O. Box 26
Waverly, TN 37185 MARVIN E. CLEMENTS, JR.
(On appeal only) Assistant Attorney General
425 Fifth Avenue North
2d Floor, Cordell Hull Building
Nashville, TN 37243
W. MICHAEL McCOWN
District Attorney General
WEAKLEY E. BARNARD
Assistant District Attorney General
17th Judicial District
P. O. Box 878
Fayetteville, TN 37334
OPINION FILED: _______________
AFFIRMED
JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS,
Judge
OPINION
The petitioner, James Richard Romine, appeals from the trial court’s
dismissing his claim for post-conviction relief. In the Lincoln County Circuit
Court, Romine pleaded guilty to second degree murder and is presently serving
a sentence of twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. He is
ineligible for release until he completes eighty-five percent of that sentence. The
petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance
of counsel, and the post-conviction court, finding that the pertinent statute of
limitations barred the claim, dismissed the petition. W e AFFIRM the trial court’s
dismissal.
BACKGROUND
The petitioner's date of birth was March 18, 1979, and he was seventeen
years of age on April 16, 1996, when he entered his plea of guilty to second
degree murder. In March of 1998, the petitioner filed his petition for post-
conviction relief. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition because the
one-year statute of limitations had expired, and that court appointed counsel1 for
the petitioner’s subsequent appeal.
ANALYSIS
The petitioner asserts that “the trial court err[ed] in dismissing [his] Petition
for Post-Conviction Relief based upon the applicable statute of limitations.” The
Code establishes both the pertinent statute of limitations and the exceptions to
that statute:
[A] person in custody under a sentence of a court of this state must
petition for post-conviction relief . . . within one (1) year of the date
on which the judgment becomes final, or consideration of such
petition shall be barred. The statute of limitations shall not be
tolled for any reason . . . . Time is of the essence of the right to file
1
The District Public Defender’s Office represented the petitioner prior to his post-conviction
app eal.
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a petition . . . , and the one-year limitations period is an element of
the right to file such an action and is a condition upon its exercise.
Tenn. Code Ann § 40-30-202(a). “No court has jurisdiction to consider a petition
filed after this time” unless either (1) a final ruling by an appellate court
establishes a new constitutional right that requires retrospective application; or
(2) the petition asserts a claim based on pertinent new scientific evidence; or
(3) certain circumstances involving an enhancement based on a prior conviction
exist in the case.
Upon waiving his right to appeal on the day of his guilty plea, the judgment
became final, and the statute of limitations began to run. See Passarella v.
State, 891 S.W.2d 619, 624 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994); Warren v. State, 833
S.W.2d 101, 102 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). Accordingly, the statute of limitations
began to run on April 16, 1996 and expired on April 16, 1997. The petitioner
admits that his age during the initial portion of his confinement is irrelevant under
the applicable statute. Compare Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202(a)-(b) with State
v. David Wayne Britt, No. 02C01-9410-CC-00234 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 25,
1995, filed at Jackson) ( A panel of the Court recognized that the applicable
statute at that time tolled the statute of limitations until a minor reached the age
of majority.).2
However, the petitioner asserts that he was “held in what amounted to
isolation during his minority” and therefore could not learn about post-conviction
relief procedures from adult inmates. He further asserts that “youthfulness and
lack of maturity on his part” merit this Court's ignoring the statute of limitations
and remanding the cause for a hearing. We disagree because the petitioner
does not qualify his claim as any of the three possible exceptions.
2
See Karn T om T hongk umg ool v. State , No. 0 1C0 1-97 07-C R-0 028 1 (T enn . Crim . App . April
9, 1998, filed at Nashville) (Rule 20 opinion concluding that the Code no longer precludes tolling of
the statute of limitations for a minor petitioner.).
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He identifies neither circumstances involving enhancement by a prior
conviction nor new scientific evidence establishing his innocence. Regarding the
remaining basis for possible exception to the statute, the right in question must
be “based upon a final ruling of an appellate court establishing a constitutional
right that was not recognized as existing at the time of the plea,” Tenn. Code
Ann. § 40-30-202(b)(1), and “not on a claim that the appellant did not know this
constitutional right existed at the time of his plea,” Pete Smith v. State, No.
03C01-9805-CR-00182 (Tenn. Crim. App. April 30, 1999, filed at Knoxville).
Ignorance of the law, even if a person is ignorant of a right to appeal from a
conviction, does not toll the statute. See Passarella v. State, 891 S.W.2d 619,
625 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (The statute of limitations is not affected by when a
petitioner “learns” that his constitutional rights might have been violated.);
Donnie Carpenter v. State, No. 01C01-9703-CC-00114 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec.
17, 1997, filed in Nashville); Bernard Nelson v. State, No. 01C01-9212-CC-
00375 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 18, 1993 filed at Nashville) (“[I]lliteracy, ignorance,
and difficulty in obtaining assistance while incarcerated” does not toll the statute
of limitations.); Melvin Douglas Boyle v. State, No. 02C01-9201-CC-00003,
(Tenn. Crim. App. November 18, 1992, filed at Jackson) (Lack of legal materials
does not toll the statute of limitations.).
“Legislative intent and purpose is to be ascertained primarily from the
natural and ordinary meaning of the language used, without a forced or subtle
construction that would limit or extend the meaning of the language,” Tuggle v.
Allright Parking Sys., Inc, 922 S.,W.2d 105, 107 (Tenn. 1996), and no authority
cited by the petitioner compels this Court’s contravening the plain language of
the applicable statute.
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CONCLUSION
The judgment below is AFFIRMED.
_____________________________
JOHN EVERETT W ILLIAMS, Judge
CONCUR:
______________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, Judge
______________________________
JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., Judge
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