IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED
NOVEMBER 1998 SESSION
February 8, 1999
Cecil W. Crowson
Appellate Court Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
) C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9803-CC-00141
Appellee, )
) ROBERTSON COUNTY
VS. )
) HON. ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER,
FREDDIE RAY GUYE, ) JUDGE
)
Appellant. ) (Driving Under the Influence -
) Second Offense; Driving
) on Revoked License)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
MICHAEL R. JONES JOHN KNOX WALKUP
District Public Defender Attorney General & Reporter
110 Sixth Ave., West
Springfield, TN 37172 TIMOTHY BEHAN
Asst. Attorney General
Cordell Hull Bldg., 2nd Fl.
425 Fifth Ave., North
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
JOHN W. CARNEY
District Attorney General
DENT MORRISS
Asst. District Attorney General
Main St.
Springfield, TN 37172
OPINION FILED:
AFFIRMED
JOHN H. PEAY,
Judge
OPINION
The defendant was found guilty in a bench trial of driving under the
influence (second offense) and driving on a revoked license. The trial court sentenced
the defendant to serve sixty days of an eleven month, twenty-nine day sentence for
driving under the influence. The defendant was also sentenced to sixty days to be served
concurrently for driving on a revoked license. The defendant now appeals and argues
that the trial court erred in ruling that the roadblock set up by White House police officers
was constitutional. After a review of the record and applicable law, we find no merit to
the defendant’s contention and thus affirm the judgment of the lower court.
On June 30, 1995, the defendant was stopped at a roadblock conducted
by police officers of White House, Tennessee. When the defendant stopped, Officer
Campbell approached his car. Officer Campbell testified that he smelled alcohol on the
defendant’s breath and asked him to pull to the side of the road. Officer Campbell then
performed three field sobriety tests on the defendant, all of which indicated that the
defendant was under the influence of alcohol. The defendant was arrested and
subsequently indicted.
The defendant contends that the roadblock at which he was stopped was
unconstitutional in that it did not conform to predetermined operational guidelines and did
not have the proper supervisory authority present as required by State v. Downey, 945
S.W.2d 102 (Tenn. 1997). In Downey, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that
a sobriety roadblock, although a seizure, can be a reasonable
seizure under the Tennessee Constitution, provided it is establ-
ished and operated in accordance with predetermined operational
guidelines and supervisory authority that minimize the risk of arb-
itrary intrusion on individuals and limit the discretion of law enforce-
ment officers at the scene.
2
Downey, 945 S.W.2d at 104.
In this case, the White House police department had procedural guidelines
in place at the time of the roadblock during which the defendant was stopped. The
guidelines provided that prior to setting up a roadblock, the chief of police or the next
immediate supervisor would be notified of the roadblock. In addition, the procedures
required that before any roadblock was set up, prior permission must be obtained from
the chief of police or the next immediate supervisor. The guidelines further required that
the roadblocks be conducted in accordance with constitutional mandates, that driver
licenses could not be checked without probable cause to arrest or cite the driver for an
offense, and that there would be no random stops.
The roadblock set up by the White House police officers on June 30, 1995,
complied with these procedural guidelines. The officers notified and obtained permission
for the roadblock from either Chief Mann or Sergeant Benton.1 Citizens’ driver licenses
were not checked unless the police had probable cause to arrest or issue a citation to the
driver. In addition, each car that came through the roadblock was stopped so that there
would be no random stops.
The defendant contends that because the procedural guidelines did not
provide for roadblocks to be publicized in advance, the guidelines do not meet the
constitutional requirements set out in Downey. However, the lack of publicity is only one
factor to be considered when determining the reasonableness of a roadblock. See
Downey, 945 S.W.2d at 111. It is not, in and of itself, determinative.
1
Chief Mann is the chief of police of the city of White House and Sergeant Benton was the next
immediate supervisor in charge in Chief Mann’s absence.
3
The defendant further contends that the procedures do not require prior
approval of supervisory authority, but instead only require notification and, as such, the
guidelines do not meet the standards set out in Downey. However, the procedural
guidelines specifically state that “[n]o police officer employed by the White House Police
Department shall/will set up a roadblock or assist any other Agency without prior
permission from the Chief of Police or the next supervisor that may be in charge in the
absence of the Chief.” This guideline requires the approval of, not just the notification to,
supervisory authority. As such, this contention is without merit.
The defendant contends that because the procedural guidelines give the
officer in the field the power to choose the location, the timing, and the moving of
roadblocks, they are unconstitutional. However, the guidelines only give the officer in
charge, not just any officer in the field, the power to choose a new location for a
roadblock. In addition, the timing of the roadblock at issue was set out and approved by
a supervisor before the actual roadblock. This satisfies the standard of supervisory
authority set out in Downey, 945 S.W.2d at 110-11.
The defendant also contends that the roadblocks are unconstitutional
because the procedural guidelines do not provide for supervisory authority to be present
at the scene. However, Downey does not require that a supervisory authority be present
at the scene, only that there be supervisory authority guiding certain decisions so as to
limit the discretion of officers in the field. In the case at hand, Sergeant Benton, the
immediate supervisor under the chief of police, was present during the roadblock. The
defendant contends that Sergeant Benton does not qualify as a supervisory authority
because he is charged with patrol duties in addition to supervisory duties. However,
Sergeant Benton’s position is as a supervisor immediately below the chief of police. As
4
such, he is a supervisory authority and, as he was in charge of the roadblock at issue, the
roadblock was sufficiently supervised so as to limit the discretion of officers in the field.
Downey, 945 S.W.2d at 110-11.
In sum, the roadblock at issue was operated in accordance with established
procedural guidelines, supervisory authority authorized and conducted the roadblock,
there was no evidence of any arbitrary intrusion on individuals, and the discretion of
officers at the scene was limited by the supervising officer. Therefore, the roadblock
meets the requirements set out in Downey and is valid under the Tennessee Constitution.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
_________________________________
JOHN H. PEAY, Judge
CONCUR:
______________________________
GARY R. WADE, Presiding Judge
______________________________
JERRY L. SMITH, Judge
5