IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED
MARCH 1999 SESSION
July 1, 1999
Cecil W. Crowson
Appellate Court Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, * C.C.A. #01C01-9712-CC-00589
Appellee, * RUTHERFORD COUNTY
V. * Honorable J. S. Daniel, Judge
DARRICK WATKINS, * (Sale of Cocaine)
Appellant. *
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
GUY R. DOTSON, JR. JOHN KNOX WALKUP
102 South Maple Street Attorney General & Reporter
Murfreesboro, TN 37130
MARVIN E. CLEMENTS, JR.
Assistant Attorney General
425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37243
WILLIAM C. WHITESELL, JR.
District Attorney General
PAUL A. HOLCOMBE, III
Assistant District Attorney General
20 North Public Square, Suite 303
Murfreesboro, TN 37130
OPINION FILED: ___________________
AFFIRMED
JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS,
Judge
OPINION
The defendant, Darrick Watkins, appeals from a Rutherford County jury
verdict convicting him of the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class C
felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417(a), (c)(2). The trial judge sentenced
the defendant to eleven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, to be
served consecutively to sentences on two prior convictions for the sale of
controlled substances. On this appeal, the defendant argues (1) that the
evidence at trial was insufficient to support the jury’s finding of guilt and (2) that
the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial based on the state’s
allegedly discriminatory use of a peremptory challenge during jury selection. The
state cross-appeals, arguing that the trial court failed to accord sufficient weight
to certain enhancement factors and, therefore, that the defendant’s sentence
does not appropriately reflect the seriousness of his offense. We AFFIRM the
judgment of the trial court in all respects.
BACKGROUND
As part of an undercover drug sting, the Smyrna Police Department paid
an informant, Terry Harrison, to purchase cocaine from the defendant. Prior to
the transaction, Detective Robert Jacobs met with Harrison and searched her car
and person. Jacobs then outfitted Harrison with an audio transmitter and
instructed her to contact the defendant and attempt to purchase crack cocaine
from him. Jacobs followed Harrison to her meeting with the defendant, where
she conducted the purchase as planned. Although Jacobs was unable to
maintain visual surveillance of the transaction, he did hear and record the audio
transmission of the transaction. Immediately following the transaction, Jacobs
followed Harrison to a prearranged meeting point, keeping her in sight the entire
time. Harrison then delivered her purchase to Jacobs. The purchased
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substance was submitted to the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation and, after
testing, was determined to be .2 grams of cocaine.
At the defendant’s trial, the state introduced the audio recording of the
transaction between Harrison and the defendant. Harrison then identified the
defendant, testified to the transaction with him, and identified his voice on the
recording.
The defense presented two witnesses who testified that they were familiar
with the defendant’s voice and that the voice on the recording was not his.
Rather, each of these witnesses asserted that the recorded voice was that of the
other witness.
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
The defendant first asserts that the evidence at trial was insufficient to
support his conviction. When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence, this Court must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in a
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); State v. Duncan, 698 S.W.2d 63, 67 (Tenn.
1985); Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e). The appellee is entitled to the strongest
legitimate view of the evidence and to all reasonable inferences that may be
drawn therefrom. See State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978).
The credibility of witnesses, the weight of their testimony, and the
reconciliation of conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted exclusively to the
trier of fact. See State v. Sheffield, 676 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tenn. 1984); State v.
Gentry, 881 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). A jury verdict for the state
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accredits the testimony of the state’s witnesses and resolves all conflicts in favor
of the state. See State v. Williams, 657 S.W.2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983).
Moreover, a guilty verdict removes the presumption of innocence enjoyed by
defendants at trial and replaces it with a presumption of guilt. See State v.
Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973). Thus, an appellant challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence carries the burden of illustrating to this Court why the
evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. See State v. Freeman, 943
S.W.2d 25, 29 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).
The defendant has not carried this burden. The defendant asserts that
the state failed to sufficiently identify him as the person who sold cocaine to
Harrison. He relies primarily on the testimony of two defense witnesses that his
was not the voice on the recording of the transaction, and he attempts to
discredit Harrison’s testimony to the contrary.
The resolution of conflicting evidence and the credibility of witnesses is a
matter for the trier of fact; we will not revisit that issue here. The state presented
competent direct evidence as to every element of the defendant’s offense, and
the jury was entitled to credit that evidence. This issue is without merit.
BATSON CHALLENGE
The defendant next argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant a
new trial based on the state’s allegedly discriminatory use of a peremptory
challenge. During voir dire of the jury, the state asked a potential juror, Annie
Mae Gregory, whether, if the state proved its case, she could vote guilty knowing
that the defendant could go to jail for up to fifteen years. Gregory originally
replied, “Well, if he was going and learning some sense to leave it alone and go
to work and make honest money.” The state then asked a series of questions
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illustrating that no one could know whether incarceration would rehabilitate the
defendant and again asked Gregory whether she could vote guilty if the state
proved its case. Gregory answered, “Maybe.” On the state’s third inquiry,
Gregory stated that she could convict the defendant if the state proved its case.
With its fifth peremptory challenge, the state struck Gregory. The defense
immediately objected, pointing out that the defendant is African-American and
that Gregory was the only African-American member of the venire; impliedly
asserting that the state’s challenge was racially motivated. To this objection, the
state responded as follows:
GENERAL HOLCOMBE: First of all, I want to say for the record I
resent [defense counsel’s] implication, and that I’m even up here.
I’m going to point out to the court two reasons [for the challenge to
Gregory]. Number one–and they’re related. I watched the way she
answered my questions when I finally could hear her answer.1 Her
best answer originally was that she maybe could vote guilty. And I
noticed the look on her face as she looked over directly at [the
defendant] while she made that answer.
And that brings up my second reason. She has a child about his
age. In fact, she has two. One 22 and one 19. And I believe that
has something to do with it. Her mother instinct as she looks at
him sitting for trial there.
(footnote added). Following this explanation, the trial court overruled the
defense’s objection, specifically finding that the state’s nonracial explanation was
justified by responses in the record.
Following his conviction, the defendant renewed his assertion that the
state’s challenge of Gregory was racially motivated in his motion for a new trial.
In response, the state reiterated that its challenge was based on Gregory’s
hesitance to state that she could convict the defendant, her body language, and
her having children near the defendant’s age. After taking the matter under
1
The state had twice needed to ask Gregory to repeat her response to a question of
whethe r any of the ju rors had person ally seen the effects o f cocain e use.
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advisement, the trial court found that the defense had established a prima facie
case of purposeful discrimination. However, the court further found that the
state’s race-neutral explanation and an examination of all the relevant facts
satisfactorily indicated a nondiscriminatory basis for the state’s challenge.
In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the United States Supreme
Court held that the state’s use of a peremptory challenge to intentionally exclude
jurors of the defendant’s race violates the defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment
right to equal protection.2 Under Batson, a prima facie case of purposeful
discrimination may be established upon a showing that the defendant was a
member of a “cognizable racial group,” that the challenged juror is a member of
the defendant’s race,3 and that all relevant circumstances raise an inference that
the state challenged the potential juror because of his or her race. See id. at 96.
If the defendant establishes a prima facie case, then the state must show a race-
neutral reason for the challenge. See id. at 97. The state’s explanation,
however, need not rise to the level justifying a challenge for cause. In
determining the issue, the trial court examines the “totality of the relevant facts.”
State v. Bell, 759 S.W.2d 651, 653 (Tenn. 1988). Such facts may include the
number of members of the defendant’s race that were excluded by the state, but
see State v. Brown, 915 S.W.2d 3, 8 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (cautioning that
numbers alone are not conclusive); whether the state failed to exhaust its
peremptory challenges while leaving members of the defendant’s race on the
panel, see State v. Butler, 795 S.W.2d 680, 687 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990); or
whether the challenged venire member exhibited or acknowledged some race-
neutral attitude or relationship that would justify the state’s fearing his or her
2
In Georgia v. McCollum , 505 U.S. 42 (1992), the Supreme Court extended Batson,
mak ing the de fendan t's perem ptory challen ges su bject to eq ual protec tion scrutin y as well.
3
In Pow ers v . Ohio , 449 U.S. 400 (1991), the Court deleted the requirement that the
defend ant and th e exclud ed poten tial juror be of the sam e race.
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antipathy to the prosecution, see State v. Ellison, 841 S.W.2d 824, 827 (Tenn.
1992); Brown, 915 S.W.2d at 9; Butler, 795 S.W.2d at 687. Nevertheless, the
exercise of "even one peremptory challenge in a purposefully discriminatory
manner would violate equal protection." Ellison, 841 S.W.2d at 827.
This Court reviews the findings of a trial court relative to a Batson
challenge under an abuse of discretion standard. That is, we “cannot substitute
our judgment for that of the trial court or declare error absent a finding that the
trial judge abused his or her discretion.” State v. Matthew L. Moates, No.
03C01-9610-CR-00383, (Tenn. Crim. App. filed June 24, 1997, at Knoxville);
State v. Jerry Blaylock, No. 02C01-9602-CC-00069 (Tenn. Crim. App. filed Aug.
21, 1997, at Jackson).
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's conclusion that the
totality of relevant facts do not indicate purposeful discrimination. Indeed, in
accordance with the cited precedent, the state’s challenge of the only African-
American potential juror does not, standing alone, establish even a prima facie
showing of purposeful discrimination. See Batson, 476 U.S at 96; Bell, 759
S.W.2d at 653. Rather, the objecting party must also demonstrate that the
relevant circumstances raise an inference that the potential juror was challenged
because of his or her race. See Batson, 476 U.S at 96. The record reflects no
circumstances indicative of a race-based motive for the state’s challenge. We,
therefore, respectfully disagree with the trial court’s conclusion that the
defendant established a prima facie case. This aside, however, we find no
abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ultimate conclusions that the state’s race-
neutral explanation of its challenge is supported by the record and that the
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totality of relevant facts do not indicate purposeful discrimination. This issue is
without merit.
SENTENCING--CROSS APPEAL
The state cross-appeals, challenging the severity of the imposed
sentence. When an appellant challenges the length or manner of service of a
sentence, it is the duty of this Court to conduct a de novo review on the record
“with a presumption that the determinations made by the court from which the
appeal is taken are correct.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401(d). This
presumption “is conditioned upon the affirmative showing in the record that the
trial court considered the sentencing principles and all relevant facts and
circumstances.” State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). The
appellant carries the burden of showing that the sentence is improper. See
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401(d) sentencing comm’n cmts; State v. Jernigan,
929 S.W.2d 391, 395 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).
The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range III persistent offender
to eleven years confinement. The sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine is a
Class C felony, carrying a Range III sentence of ten to fifteen years. See Tenn.
Code Ann. §§ 39-17-417(a), (c)(2); 40-35-112(c). The presumptive sentence for
a Class C felony is the minimum sentence in the range, absent enhancement or
mitigating factors. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210(c). At the defendant’s
sentencing hearing, the trial court found applicable the following three
enhancement factors:
The defendant has a previous history of criminal convictions or
criminal behavior in addition to those necessary to establish the
appropriate range;
The defendant has a previous history of unwillingness to comply
with the conditions of a sentence involving release in the
community;
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The felony was committed while on [probation] . . . from a prior
felony conviction.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(1), (8), (13). The defense presented no mitigating
factors, and the trial court found none applicable. Based on these findings, the
court enhanced the defendant’s sentence from the presumptive sentence of ten
years to eleven years.
The state does not contest any of the trial court’s findings except to
challenge the weight that the trial court accorded the stated enhancements.
Arguing that these factors warrant a sentence of at least mid-point in the range,
the state notes that one of the purposes of the 1989 Sentencing Reform Act is to
restrain defendants who have a lengthy history of criminal conduct and asserts
that, in the present case, “a sentence near the minimum in the range is not
entirely consistent with that purpose.”
We initially observe that the record reflects ample consideration of all
relevant sentencing principles. Therefore, the trial court’s findings are
accompanied by a presumption of correctness. Moreover, the weight to be
accorded enhancement or mitigating factors is left to the sound discretion of the
trial judge so long as it complies with the purposes and principles of sentencing
and the court's findings are adequately supported by the record. See T.C.A. §
40-35-210, sentencing comm’n cmts; State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 169
(Tenn. 1991); State v. Moss, 727 S.W.2d 229, 238 (Tenn. 1986). Our review
reflects that the trial court followed the statutory sentencing procedure, imposed
a lawful sentence, and made findings of fact adequately supported by the record.
Thus, we may not modify the sentence even if we would have preferred a
different result. See State v. Fletcher, 805 S.W.2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1991). This issue is without merit.
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CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court is, in all respects, AFFIRMED.
_____________________________
JOHN EVERETT W ILLIAMS, Judge
CONCUR:
____________________________
DAVID H. WELLES, Judge
_____________________________
JOE G. RILEY, Judge
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