UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4042
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
VICTOR VALLIN-JAUREGUI,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan,
District Judge. (5:11-cr-00105-FL-3)
Submitted: September 20, 2013 Decided: October 15, 2013
Before DUNCAN, DAVIS, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jorgelina E. Araneda, ARANEDA LAW FIRM, P.C., Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States
Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant
United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Victor Vallin-Jauregui appeals from his seventy-month
sentence following his guilty plea to assault causing serious
bodily injury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 and § 113(a)(6)
(2006). Vallin-Jauregui challenges the district court’s
enhancement of his offense level based on his use of a dangerous
weapon during the assault, see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
(“USSG”) § 2A2.2(b)(2)(B) (2012), and the denial of his request
for a sentence below his Guidelines range. We affirm.
When assessing a challenge to the district court’s
application of the Guidelines, we review factual findings for
clear error and legal conclusions de novo. United States v.
Alvarado Perez, 609 F.3d 609, 612 (4th Cir. 2010). The
Sentencing Guidelines define a dangerous weapon as “an
instrument capable of inflicting death or serious bodily injury”
or an object closely resembling such an instrument. See USSG
§ 2A2.2 cmt. n.1 (looking to USSG § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(D) for
definition of “dangerous weapon”). “Serious bodily injury” is
defined as “injury involving extreme physical pain or the
protracted impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ,
or mental faculty; or requiring medical intervention such as
surgery, hospitalization, or physical rehabilitation.” USSG
§ 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(L). “[W]hat constitutes a dangerous weapon
depends not on the object’s intrinsic character but on its
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capacity, given the manner of its use, to endanger life or
inflict serious physical harm.” United States v. Sturgis, 48
F.3d 784, 787 (4th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Here, Vallin-Jauregui’s victim was repeatedly and
forcefully struck with a bar of soap inserted into a sock.
Under such circumstances, we conclude the district court did not
err in finding that Vallin-Jauregui’s improvised club
constituted a dangerous weapon. United States v. Passaro, 577
F.3d 207, 222 (4th Cir. 2009) (“The Guideline[s]-sanctioned
definition of dangerous weapon encompasses an extremely broad
range of instrumentalities.”); see Tolliver v. Sheets, 594 F.3d
900, 911 n.3 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting that sock containing bars
of soap could be considered deadly weapon); United States v.
Daulton, 488 F.2d 524, 524-25 (5th Cir. 1973) (stating that bars
of soap wrapped in towel and swung like club was potentially
deadly weapon). We also reject Vallin-Jauregui’s suggestion
that § 2A2.2(b)(2)(B) should not be applied in the absence of
evidence that the dangerous weapon in fact caused serious
injury. Because the district court properly relied on
judicially found facts at sentencing, the district court did not
err in the calculation of Vallin-Jauregui’s Guidelines range.
United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 312 (4th Cir. 2008).
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Finally, Vallin-Jaurequi asserts the district court
abused its discretion in denying his request for a downward
variance. Our review of the record leads us to conclude that
the district court adequately addressed the request for a
variance and did not rely on clearly erroneous facts in denying
it. Thus, the sentence imposed is reasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
See United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 576, 578 (4th Cir.
2010) (stating standard of review). We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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