Luanna Scott v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc.

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-1610

LUANNA SCOTT; SHUNDERIA GARLINGTON; RUTH BETH; WENDY BEVIS;
KATHERINE BRACEY; RUBY BRADY; MARIE ALICE BROCKWAY;
VICKIE CLUTTER; DIANE CONAWAY; JUDY CORROW; TRACI DAVIS;
CAROL DINOLFO; REBECCA DIXON; PAMELA EWALT; NANCY FEHLING;
TERESA FLEMING; IRENE GRACE; DOROTHY HARSON; CHARLENE HAZELTON;
SHELLY HUGHES; CHRISTAL J. JOSLYN; ADA L. KENNEDY;
NEITA LAFRENIERE; MARGIE A. LITTLE; CAROL MARTIN;
LEANNE MAXWELL; WANDA MAYFIELD; DORIS MOODY; VANESSA L. PEEPLES;
VERONICA PERRY-PREDDIE; RUTH ELLEN PHELPS; SHEILA PIPPIN;
LANA RADOSH; MICHELLE RODGERS; VADA ROSE; VICKEY JO SCRIVWER;
LINDA R. SILVA; SHARON SIPES; NANCY SMITH; MARIE E. SPELLISSY;
SYLVIA C. TENORIO; JUDY TIDRICK; BEVERLY L. TRIPLETT;
CAROL SUE VANFLEET; DEBBIE VASQUEZ; CLAIRE WHITE;
BONNIE WILLIAMS; CINDY MARIE ZIMBRICH,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

and

LINDA L. FULMER; JEAN MACQUARRIE; HELEN ZIMMERMAN,

Plaintiffs,

v.

FAMILY DOLLAR STORES, INC.,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr.,
District Judge. (3:08-cv-00540-MOC-DSC)

Argued: May 14, 2013 Decided: October 16, 2013
Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded by published
opinion. Judge Gregory wrote the majority opinion, in which
Judge Keenan joined. Judge Keenan wrote a concurring opinion.
Judge Wilkinson wrote a dissenting opinion.

ARGUED: Robert L. Wiggins, Jr., WIGGINS, CHILDS, QUINN &
PANTAZIS PC, Birmingham, Alabama, for Appellants.
John Robbins Wester, ROBINSON, BRADSHAW & HINSON, P.A.,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:
Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., David Bennet Ross, Rebecca S. Bjork,
SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, New York, New York; David C. Wright, III,
Adam K. Doerr, ROBINSON, BRADSHAW & HINSON, P.A., Charlotte,
North Carolina, for Appellee.

2
GREGORY, Circuit Judge:

In this sex discrimination and equal pay action filed

pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e, and Section 216(b) of the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29

U.S.C. § 206(d), Appellants appeal the district court’s grant of

Family Dollar Stores, Inc.’s (“Family Dollar”) motion to dismiss

and/or strike class claims under Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure 12(c), 12(f), and 23(d)(1)(D), and the district

court’s denial of Appellants’ first motion to amend their

complaint. We find that the district court’s denial of leave to

amend the complaint was based on an erroneous interpretation of

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011), and the

denial was thus an abuse of discretion. Without resolving the

class certification issue, we reverse and remand for the

district court to consider whether, based on our interpretation

of Wal-Mart, the proposed amended complaint satisfies the class

certification requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

23.

I.

Family Dollar operates a chain of over 7,000 stores in more

than forty states. Its operations are divided “into 95 regions,

each run by a vice president, and then into districts, each run

by a district manager. A district, which can vary in size from

3
a single city to an area within multiple States, includes 10 to

30 retail stores, each run by a salaried store manager.” Grace

v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 637 F.3d 508, 510 (4th Cir.

2011). Family Dollar has approximately 400 district managers.

Appellants are fifty-one named plaintiffs and a putative

class consisting of females who are, or have been, store

managers of Family Dollar stores. Appellants primarily allege

they are paid less than male store managers who perform the same

job, requiring the same skill, responsibility and effort, under

similar working conditions. In relevant part, Count I of their

complaint asserts a disparate impact claim predicated on the

following assertions:

Defendant engages in centralized control of
compensation for store managers at the corporate level
of its operations.
. . .

Defendant’s pay decisions and/or system includes
subjectivity and gender stereotyping that causes
disparate impact to compensation paid to female store
managers. Plaintiffs are aware, at this time, of no
other criteria which causes such disparate impact
other than gender bias, subjectivity and stereotyping.
Plaintiffs are unaware, at this time, of any other
specific criteria that are capable of separation and
job relatedness.

Count II alleges a pattern-or-practice of disparate treatment in

violation of Title VII, and asserts that Family Dollar, who

“engages in centralized control over compensation of store

managers,” “willfully violated Title VII by paying the

4
plaintiffs and other similarly situated females [] wages

[unequal] to . . . similarly situated males.” Count IV asserts

a violation of the Equal Pay Act. Appellants seek injunctive

and equitable relief, back pay, attorneys’ fees and costs, and

punitive damages.

In 2008, Appellants filed their complaint in the U.S.

District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. Upon a

grant of Family Dollar’s motion to dismiss or transfer, the case

was transferred to the U.S. District Court for the Western

District of North Carolina. In opposing the motion to dismiss

but consenting to transfer, Appellants cited Dukes v. Wal-Mart,

Inc., 509 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2007) on reh’g en banc sub nom.

603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010), pointing out that “[t]he Ninth

Circuit has now affirmed certification of such a nationwide

class having virtually identical claims of sex discrimination in

pay to those brought in this case.” As is relevant here, the

Ninth Circuit’s Dukes decision was subsequently reversed by the

Supreme Court in Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. 2541.

Following the transfer, Family Dollar filed a motion for

partial judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Appellants would

be unable to satisfy the class action requirements in Rule

23(b). The filing of this motion had the effect of staying

discovery. The district court denied Family Dollar’s motion

without prejudice, holding that the class allegations in the

5
complaint satisfied the pleading standards as established in

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2007). The court further found

that a fully developed evidentiary record was necessary to make

findings as to class certification.

In July 2010, Family Dollar moved for summary judgment, but

the court stayed the motion pending the completion of discovery.

In August 2010, Family Dollar moved for a protective order with

respect to class certification discovery, which the court

denied. From January to July 2011, the parties unsuccessfully

tried to resolve their dispute through mediation.

Following re-assignment of the case to a different judge,

in September 2011, Family Dollar filed a motion to dismiss

and/or strike the class allegations pursuant to Rules 12(c),

12(f), and Rule 23(d)(1)(D). Family Dollar argued that Wal-

Mart, which was issued by the Supreme Court in June 2011,

foreclosed Appellants’ class allegations and the monetary relief

sought in the complaint.

Appellants opposed the motion to dismiss and moved the

court for leave to file their first amended complaint, 1 arguing

that the proposed amended complaint “elaborate[s]” on the

1
Family Dollar’s motion to dismiss and Appellants’ motion
for leave to amend the complaint were filed before the deadlines
to end class certification discovery and to file a motion to
certify the class.

6
original complaint’s allegation of “centralized control of

compensation for store managers at the corporate level.” In the

proposed amended complaint, Appellants allege and challenge at

least four company-wide policies. First, Appellants assert the

existence of a mandatory salary range for Store Managers set

annually by the corporate headquarters, which locks in prior

disparities between male and female Store Managers’

compensation. Only corporate Vice Presidents can grant

exceptions above the salary range, and they grant these

exceptions disproportionally in favor of men. Second,

Appellants allege the existence of an annual pay raise

percentage set by corporate headquarters that corresponds to

performance ratings. Regional Managers and Divisional Vice

Presidents grant exceptions above the pay raise percentage, and

“significantly greater” exceptions are granted to men. Third,

Appellants claim a “built-in headwinds” corporate-imposed

compensation criteria for Store Managers that takes into account

“prior experience, prior pay, quartile rankings and other

specific criteria which have a disparate impact.” Finally,

Appellants allege the existence of a dual-system of compensation

structured to pay less to persons promoted to store managers

than to persons hired (from outside the company) to the same

position, where “women are disproportionately promoted to Store

7
Manager [positions,] while men are disproportionately hired into

such jobs.”

The district court granted Family Dollar’s motion to

dismiss, but denied Appellants’ motion for leave to amend. In

granting Family Dollar’s request and dismissing the class

allegations, the district court first relied on Appellants’ pre-

Wal-Mart admission that their claims were “virtually identical”

to those asserted by the Wal-Mart plaintiffs. Further, the

court reasoned that “as a matter of law” under Wal-Mart,

Appellants cannot satisfy the Rule 23(a) commonality requirement

because they allege they were discriminated against on the basis

of their gender as a result of “subjective decisions made at the

local store levels.” The court dismissed the Equal Pay Act

class claims on the same basis. Additionally, the district

court held that Appellants’ claims fail to satisfy the

predominance requirement in Rule 23(b)(3).

In denying Appellants’ motion for leave to amend, the court

first held that amendment was futile because the only source of

alleged discrimination in the proposed complaint is the

“discretionary pay of managers,” which are “foreclosed” under

Wal-Mart. Second, the court found that amendment would be

prejudicial to Family Dollar because the original complaint was

filed over three years prior, and the new complaint alleges a

“new theory” only in an attempt to avoid Wal-Mart.

8
 Appellants timely petitioned this Court under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 23(f) for interlocutory appeal of the class

certification decision.

II.

We granted Appellants’ petition under Rule 23(f), which

authorizes courts of appeals to review decisions denying or

granting class-action certification. 2 Appellants did not

petition us directly for interlocutory review of the decision

denying leave to amend the complaint. Appellate jurisdiction

pursuant to Rule 23(f)’s interlocutory provision lies only where

the subject matter of the appeal is the grant or denial of class

certification. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 23(f); see Brown v. Nucor

Corp., 576 F.3d 149, 155 n.8 (4th Cir. 2009) (“[A]ppellants

2
Class certification is typically pursued under Rule 23(c),
which provides that “[a]t an early practicable time after a
person sues or is sued as a class representative, the court must
determine by order whether to certify the action as a class
action.” Id. 23(c). Family Dollar filed its motion to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(c), 12(f), and 23(d)(1)(D)--rules not
expressly within Rule 23(f)’s jurisdictional purview. See Fed.
R. Civ. Pro. 23(f) advisory comm. note (1998). Nonetheless, we
have jurisdiction to review the district court’s grant of Family
Dollar’s motion to dismiss or strike the class allegations
because the district court’s ruling is the functional equivalent
of denying a motion to certify the case as a class action. See
In re Bemis Co., Inc., 279 F.3d 419, 421 (7th Cir. 2002)
(holding that the rejection of the position taken in the answer
that the case could not proceed as a class action is the
“functional equivalent of denying a motion to certify a case as
a class action”). Family Dollar does not dispute the basis for
asserting jurisdiction over the class certification decision.

9
cannot appeal a discovery order under [Rule] 23(f).”). Thus,

Family Dollar contends we lack jurisdiction to review the

district court’s denial of Appellants’ motion for leave to amend

their complaint.

We find that under our pendent appellate jurisdiction

jurisprudence, we have jurisdiction and exercise our discretion

to review the denial of the motion for leave to amend. See Rux

v. Republic of Sudan, 461 F.3d 461, 475 (4th Cir. 2006) (stating

that pendent appellate jurisdiction, a judicially created

exception to the final judgment rule, is discretionary).

Pendent appellate jurisdiction is available only in two

scenarios: “(1) when an issue is ‘inextricably intertwined’

with a question that is the proper subject of an immediate

appeal; or (2) when review of a jurisdictionally insufficient

issue is ‘necessary to ensure meaningful review’ of an

immediately appealable issue.” Id. (quoting Swint v. Chambers

Cnty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 50–51 (1995)).

We may review the leave-to-amend decision under the

“inextricably intertwined” methodology. Two separate rulings

are “inextricably intertwined” if “the ‘same specific question’

will ‘underlie both the appealable and the non-appealable

order,’ such that resolution of the question will necessarily

resolve the appeals from both orders at once.” Ealy v.

Pinkerton Gov’t Servs., Inc., No. 12-1252, 2013 WL 980035, at *8

10
(4th Cir. Mar. 14, 2013) (per curiam, unpublished) (quoting

Myers v. Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537, 553 (2d Cir. 2010)

(alterations omitted)). Here, the crux of the denial of class

certification based on the allegations of the original

complaint, and the denial of leave to amend the complaint turns

on the district court’s interpretation of Wal-Mart. Because the

interpretation of Wal-Mart underlies both the appealable

certification decision and the non-appealable leave-to-amend

decision, and resolution of the interpretation of Wal-Mart will

necessarily resolve both appeals, we find that our exercise of

pendent appellate jurisdiction is proper.

We may also review the leave-to-amend decision under the

“necessary to ensure meaningful review” methodology. An issue

is “necessary to ensure meaningful review” if “resolution of the

appealable issue necessarily resolves the nonappealable issue or

where review of the nonappealable issue is necessary to ensure

meaningful review of the appealable one.” Berrey v. Asarco,

Inc., 439 F.3d 636, 647 (10th Cir. 2006). Here, as detailed

below, the proposed amended complaint includes specific company-

wide policies that allegedly cause a disparate impact--polices

not specified in the original complaint that would ensure

meaningful review of the class certification decision. Thus, we

exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction to review the denial of

leave to amend the complaint.

11
 III.

Appellants raise three primary arguments on appeal. First,

Appellants contend that the district court erred in holding that

pursuant to Wal-Mart, the proposed class claims in the original

complaint fail to satisfy Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement.

Second, Appellants urge that the district court failed to

conduct a rigorous analysis of the certification issue and

failed to consider the evidence. Finally, Appellants argue that

the district court abused its discretion by failing to grant

leave to amend the complaint. Because we find that the proposed

amended complaint contains substantial allegations of

centralized control, which are necessary to satisfy the

commonality requirement for class certification as set forth in

Wal-Mart, we focus our review in this appeal on the district

court’s denial of leave to amend the complaint.

We review a district court’s decision to deny leave to

amend a complaint for abuse of discretion, and it is our “policy

to liberally allow amendment in keeping with the spirit of

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a).” Galustian v. Peter, 591

F.3d 724, 729 (4th Cir. 2010). A district court abuses its

discretion “by resting its decision on a clearly erroneous

finding of a material fact, or by misapprehending the law with

respect to underlying issues in litigation.” Quince Orchard

12
Valley Citizens Ass’n, Inc. v. Hodel, 872 F.2d 75, 78 (4th Cir.

1989) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The district court denied Appellants’ request for leave to

amend their complaint for two primary reasons. First, the

district court determined that the proposed amendment was

foreclosed by Wal-Mart, reasoning that like the original

complaint, the proposed complaint pointed to subjective,

individualized decisions and failed to satisfy the commonality

requirement of Rule 23(a). 3 Second, the district court found

that amendment would be prejudicial to Family Dollar because the

proposed complaint was filed three years after the filing of the

original complaint and alleges a new legal theory in order to

avoid Wal-Mart. We address each rationale in turn.

A.

The district court’s denial of leave to amend the complaint

on grounds that it was foreclosed by Wal-Mart is erroneous and

based on a misapprehension of the applicable law. A review of

Wal-Mart and its principles reveal the district court’s error.

3
Under Rule 23, a class may be certified if (1) “the class
is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable”
(numerosity); (2) there are one or more “questions of law or
fact common to the class” (commonality); (3) the named parties’
“claims or defenses are typical of the claims or defense of the
class” (typicality); and (4) the class representatives “will
fairly and adequately protect the interests the class” (adequacy
of representation). Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Commonality is the
only factor at issue in this appeal. We make no findings or
conclusions as to the other requirements.

13
 i.

In Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court considered whether the

commonality requirement under Rule 23 for class actions was

satisfied in a sex discrimination suit alleging violations of

Title VII. The plaintiffs filed suit on behalf of 1.5 million

current and former female employees of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

(“Wal-Mart”), asserting that Wal-Mart’s local managers exercised

discretion over employees’ pay and promotions in a manner that

disproportionally favored male employees and had an unlawful

disparate impact on the female employees. Further, the

plaintiffs alleged that Wal-Mart’s failure to curtail its

managers’ discretion essentially amounted to unlawful disparate

treatment.

In holding that the allegations were insufficient to

satisfy the commonality requirement for class actions, the Court

found that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate that the class

members “suffered the same injury,” i.e., their claims did not

depend upon a “common contention” capable of “classwide

resolution.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. The Court reasoned

that in the Title VII context, one individual’s claim turns on

“‘the reason for the particular employment decision.’” Id. at

2552 (quoting Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S.

867, 876 (1984)). And, in the class action context, “[w]ithout

some glue holding the reasons for all those decisions together,

14
it will be impossible to say that examination of all class

members’ claims for relief will produce a common answer to the

crucial question why was I disfavored.” Id.

The Court explained that such glue might exist if: (1) the

employer uses a biased testing procedure that produces a common

result; or (2) there is “‘[s]ignificant proof that an employer

operated under a general policy of discrimination.’” Id. at

2253 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159

n.15 (1982)). The latter form was more applicable in Wal-Mart,

yet the Court found that a “general policy of discrimination”

was “entirely absent.” Id. Specifically, the Court pointed to:

(1) Wal-Mart’s express policy forbidding sex discrimination;

(2) expert testimony of a “strong corporate culture” that made

it vulnerable to gender bias but which lacked a nexus to

employment decisions; and (3) a corporate policy of allowing

discretion by local supervisors over employment matters, which

to the Court was “just the opposite of a uniform employment

practice that would provide the commonality needed for a class

action” because it was “a policy against having uniform

employment practices.” Id. at 2553-54.

The Court acknowledged that it previously recognized that

giving discretion to lower-level employees may form the basis of

Title VII liability under a disparate impact theory, but to do

so, the plaintiffs must first identify the “specific employment

15
practice that is challenged.” Id. at 2555 (citing Watson v.

Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988)). However, in

the case before it, the Court noted “[o]ther than the bare

existence of delegated discretion, respondents have identified

no ‘specific employment practice’--much less one that ties all

their 1.5 million claims together.” Id. Thus, the Court

concluded that the commonality requirement was not satisfied.

Two principles readily derived from Wal-Mart are applicable

to this case. First, Wal-Mart did not set out a per se rule

against class certification where subjective decision-making or

discretion is alleged. Rather, where subjective discretion is

involved, Wal-Mart directs courts to examine whether “all

managers [] exercise discretion in a common way with[] some

common direction.” Id. at 2554. Thus, to satisfy commonality,

a plaintiff must demonstrate that the exercise of discretion is

tied to a specific employment practice, and that the “subjective

practice at issue affected the class in a uniform manner.”

Elizabeth Tippett, Robbing a Barren Vault: the Implications of

Dukes v. Wal-Mart for Cases Challenging Subjective Employment

Practices, 29 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L. J. 433, 446 (2012).

As a corollary, even where company-wide subjective

decision-making or discretion is alleged in the employment

discrimination context, Wal-Mart indicates that if another

company-wide policy is also alleged, courts must also consider

16
it. See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2553 (considering evidence of a

company-wide “strong corporate culture” that makes Wal-Mart’s

decision-makers susceptible to gender bias, but finding it

unsatisfactory because the adduced expert testimony failed to

demonstrate that the corporate culture or “stereotyped thinking”

affected employment decisions). Thus, even in cases where the

complaint alleges discretion, if there is also an allegation of

a company-wide policy of discrimination, the putative class may

still satisfy the commonality requirement for certification.

Second, Wal-Mart is limited to the exercise of discretion

by lower-level employees, as opposed to upper-level, top-

management personnel. This qualitative distinction is critical

because typically, in exercising discretion, lower-level

employees do not set policies for the entire company; whereas,

when high-level personnel exercise discretion, resulting

decisions affect a much larger group, and depending on their

rank in the corporate hierarchy, all the employees in the

company. Consequently, discretionary authority exercised by

high-level corporate decision-makers, which is applicable to a

broad segment of the corporation’s employees, is more likely to

satisfy the commonality requirement than the discretion

exercised by low-level managers in Wal-Mart.

17
 ii.

Courts’ rulings on class certification since Wal-Mart bear

out the principles announced herein. See McReynolds v. Merrill

Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 489 (7th Cir.

2012) cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 338 (U.S. 2012) (allowing Title

VII class certification where the plaintiffs pointed to two

company-wide policies); see also, Tabor v. Hilti, Inc., 703 F.3d

1206, 1229 (10th Cir. 2013) (denying class certification where

challenged policy was “highly discretional,” and the only other

alleged company-wide policy was not maintained in a uniform

manner); Bolden v. Walsh Constr. Co., 688 F.3d 893, 898 (7th

Cir. 2012) (denying class certification in a Title VII case

where the only company-wide policy alleged was a policy of

giving discretion to lower-level managers and there was a lack

of evidence that discretion was exercised in a common way at

some common direction).

A comparison of McReynolds and Bolden, both decisions from

the Seventh Circuit, highlight the parameters of Wal-Mart. In

McReynolds, the plaintiff contested two national, company-wide

policies--a teaming policy and an account distribution policy.

672 F.3d at 488. The teaming policy allowed brokers to form and

distribute commissions with teams; brokers could decide for

themselves whether to form teams; and, once the team was formed,

brokers decide which other brokers to admit. Id. The

18
plaintiffs argued that this national policy had a disparate

impact because some successful teams refused to admit blacks.

Under the account distribution policy, the customers’ accounts

of a broker that had left the company were transferred within a

branch office; brokers in that office competed for the accounts,

and the broker who ultimately won the accounts was determined by

company-wide criteria that included the competing brokers’ past

records of revenue generated, and number of investments and

clients retained. Id. at 488-89.

The Seventh Circuit noted that “Complex Directors” and

“branch-office managers” “have a measure of discretion with

regard to teaming and account distribution [because] they can

veto teams or supplement criteria for distributions.” Id. at

489. The court explained:

[T]o the extent that these regional and local managers
exercise discretion regarding the compensation of the
brokers whom they supervise, the case is indeed like
Wal-Mart. But the exercise of discretion is
influenced by the two company-wide policies at issue:
authorization to brokers, rather than to managers to
form and staff teams; and basing account distribution
on the past success of the brokers who are competing
for transfers.
. . .

[P]ermitting brokers to form their own teams and
prescribing criteria for account distributions that
favor the already successful--those who may owe their
success to having been invited to join a successful or
promising team--are practices of Merrill Lynch, rather
than practices that local managers can choose or not
at their whim. Therefore challenging those policies

19
 in a class action is not forbidden by the Wal-Mart
decision.

Id. at 489-90. The court noted that in the absence of the

teaming or account distribution policies, if instead the case

involved delegation to local management the decision to allow

teaming and the criteria for account distribution, McReynolds

would be more like Wal-Mart. Id. at 490. Satisfied with the

distinction between McReynolds and Wal-Mart, the court reversed

the district court’s denial of class certification.

In Bolden, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district

court’s grant of class certification. There, twelve black

construction workers alleged that the supervisors practiced or

tolerated racial discrimination in assigning overtime work and

in working conditions (for example, derogatory graffiti in

portable toilets and hangman’s nooses in toilets or break

sheds). 688 F.3d at 895. The plaintiffs attempted to certify a

class covering the employer’s 262 project sites in Chicago. Id.

The Seventh Circuit noted that “[t]he sites had different

superintendents, with different policies . . . and many of the

allegedly discriminatory practices depended on the foremen, who

made most overtime offers, [and] chastised (or failed to

chastise) workers who used racially inflammatory language.” Id.

at 896. Additionally, the court pointed out the plaintiffs’

concessions that “[d]ifferent sites had materially different

20
working conditions[;] . . . most superintendents the[]

[plaintiffs] had worked with did not discriminate; [and] their

objections concerned only a handful of superintendents and

foremen.” Id. The court likened the case to Wal-Mart and held

that “when multiple [local] managers exercise independent

discretion, conditions at different stores (or sites) do not

present a common question.” Id. It then distinguished the case

before it from McReynolds:

[In McReynolds,] we held that a national class could
be certified to contest the polic[ies], which [were]
adopted by top management and applied to all of
Merrill Lynch’s offices throughout the nation. This
single national policy was the missing ingredient in
Wal-Mart. . . . [Here,] Walsh had no relevant
company-wide (or Chicago SMSA-wide) policy other than
(a) its rule against discrimination, and (b) its grant
of discretion to superintendents assigning work and
coping with offensive or bigoted conduct. The first
of these policies presents no problem . . . and the
second--the policy of on-site operational discretion
is the precise policy that Wal-Mart says cannot be
addressed in a company-wide class action.

Id. at 898. Thus, the court reversed the grant of class

certification.

As evident from our application of the two principles in

our discussion below, we believe the allegations in the proposed

amended complaint bear a closer resemblance to McReynolds.

iii.

As a preliminary matter, we note that the class allegations

in the original complaint were insufficient to satisfy the

21
commonality standard set forth in Wal-Mart, because the

complaint fails to allege that the “subjectivity and

stereotyping” regarding compensation paid to female store

managers were exercised in a common way with some common

direction, and conclusorily alleges that Family Dollar engaged

in “centralized control of compensation for store managers at

the corporate level of its operations.” Aside from this bare

allegation, the original complaint does not identify the

decision-makers responsible for pay and promotion. Thus, we

affirm the district court’s dismissal of the original complaint.

We view the proposed amended complaint differently.

Applying the above principles, we find that the district

court erred in denying leave to amend the complaint because it

failed to consider whether: (1) in light of the discretion

alleged, the discretion was exercised in a common way under some

common direction, or despite the discretion alleged, another

company-wide policy of discrimination is also alleged; and (2)

the discretionary authority at issue was exercised by high-level

managers, as distinct from the low-level type managers in Wal-

Mart.

In dismissing the proposed amended complaint, the district

court held that Wal-Mart precludes Appellants’ class allegations

of sex discrimination in pay because it believed that

Appellants’ claims rest only on a theory that Family Dollar’s

22
“use of subjective decision-making created disparities between

male and female employees.” Additionally, the district court

concluded that the company-wide employment policies in the

proposed amended complaint were limited to subjective,

individualized decision-making--a theory which it stated was

“simply foreclosed” by Wal-Mart. The district court’s reasoning

is based on a misapprehension of both the applicable law and

policies alleged by Appellants.

The proposed amended complaint clearly specifies the

following company-wide practices: (1) a salary range policy;

(2) a pay raise percentage policy; (3) a “built-in headwinds”

policy; and (4) dual pay system for hirees and promotees. To

expound, the salary range policy sets mandatory minimum and

maximum pay for Store Managers. According to Appellants, as a

result of this company-wide salary range policy, there are

significant disparities in the number of women in the upper pay

levels of that range, and exceptions above the range--granted by

the corporate Vice Presidents--are often granted more in favor

of men. Further, under the pay raise percentage policy, an

increase to a store manager’s compensation is determined by the

manager’s prior performance ratings. The Regional Manager and

Divisional Vice President grant exceptions above that pay raise

percentage, and do so “significantly greater” in favor of men.

Additionally, the “built-in headwinds” policy is a method for

23
evaluating and determining compensation based on “prior

experience, prior pay, quartile rankings and other specific

criteria that have a disparate impact on women’s salaries

because they incorporate and perpetuate such past

discrimination.” Essentially, this is a testing or evaluation

method that Appellants allege is biased. Finally, the dual pay

system for hirees and promotees caps the compensation paid to

individuals who are promoted below what lateral hires can make.

Statistics proffered by Appellants show more women promoted, and

more men hired laterally, influencing the disparity in pay.

We do not now rule on the sufficiency of the allegations of

the proposed amended complaint concerning the company-wide

policies or on whether certification of the putative class will

ultimately be warranted. However, in considering whether

amendment of the complaint would be futile, we observe that the

proposed amended complaint’s allegations of uniform corporate

policies and of high-level corporate decision-making are

substantively different from those that the Supreme Court held

sufficient in Wal-Mart. For instance, the dual pay policy

referenced in the proposed amended complaint is a company-wide

policy that is in place in all Family Dollar Stores. The

amended complaint alleges that women suffer disparate impact as

a direct result of this corporate-imposed pay preference for

lateral hires. In contrast, if decisions regarding the pay of

24
hirees and promotees were left to the discretion of low-level

managers, then the alleged discrimination would be akin to the

discrimination alleged in Wal-Mart. See McReynolds, 672 F.3d at

490.

Moreover, the discretionary decisions set forth in the

proposed amended complaint are made by high-level corporate

decision-makers with authority over a broad segment of Family

Dollar’s employees, not on an individual store level as in Wal-

Mart. Contrary to the dissent’s unsupported characterization of

the decision-makers in the present case as “middle management,”

the amended complaint explains that exceptions to centrally

determined salary ranges can only be made by “the corporate Vice

President at corporate headquarters.” Similarly, exceptions to

corporate-imposed raise percentages were made by regional

managers and senior vice presidents, again at “corporate

headquarters.” These allegations of high-level decision-making

authority exercised by officials at corporate headquarters are

thus different in kind from the allegations in Wal-Mart, in

which local supervisors were vested with almost absolute

discretion over pay and promotion decisions. Wal-Mart, 131 S.

Ct. at 2547.

Given these substantial distinctions, Wal-Mart does not

preclude as a matter of law a class certification based on the

amplified allegations of the proposed amended complaint. In

25
light of our policy favoring liberal amendment of complaints, we

hold that the district court erred in concluding that amendment

would be futile and in denying leave to amend the complaint.

The district court therefore should revisit the certification

question when the record underlying the allegations in the

amended complaint has been more fully developed.

B.

The district court next denied leave to amend on grounds

that amendment would be prejudicial to Family Dollar. In

support of its prejudice conclusion, the district court stated

that the original complaint was filed over three years prior,

and Appellants did not seek to amend until briefing on Family

Dollar’s motion for summary judgment was almost complete.

Further, the court stated that the proposed complaint alleges a

“new theory” in an attempt to avoid Wal-Mart. For the reasons

stated below, we find that the district court’s determinations

as to prejudice are clearly erroneous.

First, as to the delayed filing of the proposed complaint,

review of the record indicates that the cited delay, for the

most part, is attributable to Family Dollar. On numerous

occasions, Family Dollar moved to dismiss the complaint and this

had the effect of staying discovery, thereby prolonging the

litigation. Appellants ought not to be penalized for this

delay. Further, the typical briefing schedule for motions to

26
dismiss or summary judgment involves the initial filing of a

dismissal motion by the defendant, then the plaintiff files an

opposition to the motion and if necessary, a motion to amend the

complaint, and then the defendant files a reply brief. That

Appellants filed the motion for leave to amend simultaneously

with their opposition to Family Dollar’s motion for summary

judgment does not appear out of turn and cannot be grounds for

finding prejudice to Family Dollar.

With respect to the alleged “new theory,” review of the two

complaints indicates that Appellants do not allege an entirely

new theory in the amended complaint, but rather elaborate on one

of two allegations that were previously pled in a conclusory

fashion. In their original complaint, Appellants alleged both

“subjectivity and gender stereotyping,” as well as “centralized

control of compensation for store managers at the corporate

level of [Family Dollar’s] operations.” They originally failed

to support either theory with substantial factual allegations,

including the nature of the claimed “centralized control,”

though the district court initially held that the original

complaint survived Rule 12(b)(6). Following Wal-Mart, it became

clear that Appellants needed to allege more control over pay

determinations by upper-level decision-makers to meet the

commonality requirement. The Appellants filed a proposed

amended complaint accordingly and included numerous additional

27
facts supporting their previous assertion of centralized

corporate control.

Family Dollar makes much of the fact that Appellants

previously stated their claims were virtually identical to those

dismissed in Wal-Mart, seemingly alleging an estoppel argument.

Even assuming that Appellants seek to pursue a completely new

legal theory from the one asserted previously, such an approach

is not cause for “judicial estoppel.” See Lowery v. Stovall, 92

F.3d 219, 224 (4th Cir. 1996) (For judicial estoppel to apply,

“the party sought to be estopped must be seeking to adopt a

position that is inconsistent with a stance taken in prior

litigation. And the position sought to be estopped must be one

of fact rather than law or legal theory.” (emphasis added)

(citation omitted)). Appellants’ present factual position in

the proposed amended complaint is consistent with the original

complaint. As Appellants contend, the proposed amended

complaint merely elaborates on the allegation in the original

complaint that Family Dollar engages in “centralized control of

compensation for store managers at the corporate level.” The

legal theory remains the same, thus, judicial estoppel is not

cognizable in this action.

Further, we have held that “the filing of a supplemental

pleading is an appropriate mechanism for curing numerous

possible defects in a complaint.” Franks v. Ross, 313 F.3d 184,

28
198 (4th Cir. 2002) (also noting that “[u]nder Rule 15(d), a

party may supplement its complaint ‘even though the original

pleading is defective in its statement of a claim for relief or

defense.’”). Hence, as Family Dollar believed that the original

complaint was defective in light of Wal-Mart, Appellants should

have been granted leave to amend to cure the defect, more

especially because this was the first time they sought to amend

their complaint.

Besides, although prejudice can result where a new legal

theory is alleged if it would entail additional discovery and

evidentiary burdens on the part of the opposing party, this

“basis for a finding of prejudice essentially applies where the

amendment is offered shortly before or during trial.” Johnson

v. Oroweat Foods Co., 785 F.2d 503, 510 (4th Cir. 1986).

Because the parties were still in discovery, and many steps

removed from trial, the purported undue prejudice to Family

Dollar is overstated. We emphasize that our holding does not

condone an automatic three-year period for plaintiffs to seek

leave to amend a complaint. Rather, we conclude that Family

Dollar would not be unduly prejudiced by the amendment under all

the particular circumstances presented in this case.

29
 IV.

The district court abused its discretion in denying

Appellants’ request for leave to amend their complaint by

primarily basing the denial on its erroneous interpretation of

Wal-Mart. We reverse the district court’s decision in part and

remand for the court to consider, consistent with this opinion,

whether the proposed amended complaint satisfies the class

certification requirements of Rule 23.

AFFIRMED IN PART,
REVERSED IN PART,
AND REMANDED

30
BARBARA MILANO KEENAN, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I join Judge Gregory’s fine majority opinion in full. I

write briefly to emphasize that despite the dissent’s dystopian

view, the majority has rendered a straightforward and limited

decision: that the plaintiffs should be permitted to amend their

original complaint after a dramatic shift in the law regarding

class action certification.

Meaningful access to the courts requires that plaintiffs

have a fair opportunity to plead their case in accordance with

the prevailing legal standard. The plaintiffs here should not

be penalized for failing to amend their complaint in

anticipation of Wal-Mart, but should be permitted this first

attempt to amend following that decision. Additionally, the

plaintiffs obtained new information about the corporate

structure of Family Dollar during mediation occurring after the

original complaint was filed, which facts they reasonably chose

to include in the proposed amended complaint. Despite the

dissent’s apparent assumption that the class will be certified

by the district court, if the allegations included in the

amended complaint ultimately are not substantiated, the class

simply will not be certified, and the plaintiffs’ case will

fail.

The dissent nevertheless sweeps broadly and bleakly,

convinced that the class action mechanism is being used to

31
“punish” the business community “for nothing more than being

companies.” Dissent at 35. However, the majority opinion

simply allows a putative class to re-plead its class

allegations, in accordance with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

15 and 23. Under the majority’s holding, the ability of

litigants to seek access to our courts will be restricted solely

by the strength of their case.

32
WILKINSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I cannot join the majority’s decision, because it fails to

respect the two other levels of the federal judiciary, namely

the Supreme Court and the district courts. First as to the

Supreme Court. The decision is Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,

131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011), and the majority opinion has drained it

of meaning. The defendant here, as in Wal-Mart, relies on what

plaintiffs admit are multitudinous, discretionary decisions by

middle and lower management, which would seem to render class

action treatment under Wal-Mart impermissible and ineffectual.

Notwithstanding this, the majority has unloaded on the district

court the prospect of a massive, nationwide class action whose

administrability would in all likelihood prove impossible.

In the majority’s view, Wal-Mart applies only where

decisions are left to the complete discretion of low-level

managers, maj. op. at 25, and are implemented on an “individual

store level.” Id. The fact that a company delegates extensive

discretion to 95 vice presidents and 400 district managers,

Appellee’s Br. at 3 (citing Grace v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc.

(In re Family Dollar FLSA Litig.), 637 F.3d 508, 510 (4th Cir.

2011)), does not, in the majority’s view, bring this case within

the ambit of Wal-Mart and still permits nationwide class action

treatment. The majority assumes that nearly 500 middle managers

somehow all exercise their discretion in lockstep. That cannot

33
be. The fact that some middle managers would promote from

within, and others recruit from without, as they are given the

discretion to do, does not, in the majority’s view, preclude

nationwide class action treatment. The fact that many managers

would elevate women from either inside or outside the company,

as they are perfectly free to do, would hardly seem

discriminatory, but it would be contrary to the commonality Wal-

Mart requires for a nationwide class action to proceed.

The majority responds to this point by citing the fact that

exceptions to corporate salary ranges may be granted by a

corporate vice president. Maj. op. at 25. But this fact only

confirms the assertion that placements within the ranges are

determined by middle managers. The fact that exceptions to

corporate limits on raises are made by regional managers and

senior vice presidents is similarly unavailing to the majority’s

position -- regional managers, by definition, do not make

decisions on a national level. In the majority’s view, middle

managers at Family Dollar are purely robotic with respect to

those they supervise, but no American company operates in such a

way.

The majority plainly believes Wal-Mart does not apply to

middle managers exercising delegated discretion under guidelines

such as these because if it believed Wal-Mart applied, the

district court’s denial of nationwide class certification would

34
be promptly affirmed. The majority’s insistence that Wal-Mart

does not apply to middle management (but only to lower-level

store managers) suggests not so subtly that it wants this class

to be certified. But the commonality Wal-Mart insists is

necessary for class action certification is plainly absent here,

though the majority purports to find it in some centralized

policy. The fact that a company sets pay ranges or values prior

experience or performance as factors in compensation is not

sinister. Vast numbers of companies do just that. A policy

with an obvious business justification may occasionally produce

some statistical disparity nationwide. But Wal-Mart makes clear

that the fact that a policy may have some statistical disparity

nationwide does nothing to dispel the fact that in many

districts, the policy will not have a statistical imbalance, but

indeed may work to the decided advantage of the putative class.

131 S. Ct. at 2555.

The policies cited by plaintiffs are not “built-in

headwinds,” maj. op. at 23 (internal quotation marks omitted),

but rather common management techniques that make common sense.

If centralized delegations of discretion such as these are

enough for a nationwide class action to get rolling, then few

companies will be exempt. The law is punishing companies for

nothing more than being companies, which is apparently the new

status offense.

35
 In reaching its decision, the majority faults the district

court for denying plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint.

But if this is an abuse of discretion, and these findings are

clearly erroneous, then class action litigation will almost

never end. Not content with finding the district court “abused

its discretion,” maj. op. at 30, the majority holds its factual

findings “clearly erroneous” as well. Id. at 26. The district

judge should be commended, not condemned. The amended complaint

severely prejudiced the defendants by forcing them to defend a

wholly different suit three years after the original complaint

was filed. The amended complaint contradicted assertions in the

original complaint to such an extent as to do violence to the

values of forthrightness and fair dealing that the district

court had every right to expect from the litigants before it.

It was also every bit as irreconcilable with the Supreme Court’s

decision in Wal-Mart as the original, making denial of leave

fully justifiable on futility grounds.

In sum, the district court has been brought up short and

found to have abused its discretion for doing nothing more than

faithfully following a Supreme Court decision and for attempting

to ensure a small measure of candor and consistency in the

filings of that court. It is our obligation to respect the

Supreme Court’s preeminent place in a hierarchical judicial

system, as well as the trial court’s discretion and experience

36
in matters explicitly entrusted by both logic and precedent to

its competence. This decision does neither.

I.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), which governs

pretrial requests for leave to amend, advises that “[t]he court

should freely give leave when justice so requires.” The Supreme

Court has accordingly required some “justifying reason” in

support of the rejection of a party’s request to amend. Foman

v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized

that “the grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within

the discretion of the District Court.” Id.; see also Krupski v.

Costa Crociere S. p. A., 130 S. Ct. 2485, 2496 (2010). Denying

leave to amend is appropriate when at least one of three

circumstances exists: (1) “the amendment would be prejudicial to

the opposing party;” (2) “there has been bad faith on the part

of the moving party;” or (3) “the amendment would have been

futile.” Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 426-27 (4th Cir. 2006)

(internal quotation marks omitted). For the reasons that

follow, it is abundantly clear that the district court was

justified in denying plaintiffs’ motion for leave on all three

grounds -- prejudice, bad faith, and futility.

37
 II.

A.

As to the first ground, “[w]hether an amendment is

prejudicial will often be determined by the nature of the

amendment and its timing.” Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 427

(4th Cir. 2006). With respect to the amendment’s nature, “[a]

common example of a prejudicial amendment is one that ‘raises a

new legal theory that would require the gathering and analysis

of facts not already considered by the defendant.’” Id.

(quoting Johnson v. Oroweat Foods Co., 785 F.2d 503, 510 (4th

Cir. 1986)) (alterations omitted). By contrast, “[a]n amendment

is not prejudicial . . . if it merely adds an additional theory

of recovery to the facts already pled.” Id.

The majority acts as a cheerleader for the amended

complaint, glossing over its gross incompatibility with the

original and casually dismissing the threat of prejudice as

“overstated.” Maj. op. at 29. A comparative analysis of the

two complaints makes recognition of the night-and-day

differences between them unavoidable. The majority’s statement

that appellants do not allege a new theory, id. at 27, finds

support neither in the record nor in the law. The text of the

two complaints speaks -- nay, screams -- this conclusion for

itself.

38
 1.

At its core, the original complaint attacks Family Dollar

for maintaining a supposedly subjective and decentralized

decision-making structure for determining store manager

compensation, which plaintiffs alleged produced illegal

discrepancies between male and female pay. A crucial paragraph,

in particular, levels the following accusation with great force:

Defendant’s pay decisions and/or system includes
subjectivity and gender stereotyping that causes
disparate impact to compensation paid to female store
managers. Plaintiffs are aware, at this time, of no
other criteria which causes such disparate impact
other than gender bias, subjectivity and stereotyping.
Plaintiffs are unaware, at this time, of any other
specific criteria that are capable of separation and
analyses.

Compl. ¶ 22 (emphases added).

The import of that paragraph is crystal clear: according

to plaintiffs themselves, any actionable discrimination derived

solely from “subjectivity and gender stereotyping” -- nothing

less, nothing more. 1 Where subjectivity and gender stereotyping

translate directly into discriminatory employment outcomes for a

nationwide group of employees (as alleged here), the contested

decisions must necessarily have occurred outside the

1
As discussed in Part III, plaintiffs also repeatedly
represented to the district court the extreme similarity of
their claims to those brought in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,
131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011), which were founded on allegedly
discriminatory exercises of discretion.

39
corporation’s core. Any centralized employment policy -- even

if rooted in the prejudicial predilections of a particular

officer or group of officers -- could result in generally

unfavorable consequences for plaintiffs only if implemented

through objective standards, such that the lower-level decision-

makers who determine individual store managers’ salaries have

little personal power to deviate from the commands dictated by

corporate headquarters. But plaintiffs’ complaint was that

lower-level managers had too much discretion to deviate, not too

little.

Nor does the original complaint specify any other aspect of

Family Dollar’s compensation policies as a source of plaintiffs’

injury. In light of prior litigation involving Family Dollar,

it should come as no surprise that the original complaint is

rooted exclusively in allegations of permissive “subjectivity

and gender stereotyping.” In a previous suit brought by

plaintiffs’ counsel against Family Dollar, for instance,

plaintiffs (some of whom are also parties to the instant action,

Appellee’s Br. at 4) alleged that “[d]espite [gender-based

disparities in pay, Family Dollar] continues to allow its

District Managers to subjectively decide what a Store Manager

should earn.” Opponent’s Responsive Submission in Resp. to Ex.

B of the Ct.’s Order at 12, Collins v. Family Dollar Stores,

40
Inc., No. 7:04-cv-00553-VEH (N.D. Ala. Nov. 17, 2006), ECF No.

235.

Plaintiffs seek to avoid the thrust of their original

complaint by clinging to a single sentence repeated (with

immaterial variations) several times in their original complaint

-- that “[d]efendant engages in centralized control of

compensation for store managers at the corporate level of its

operations.” Compl. ¶¶ 18, 37, 46, 53. This uninformative bit

of boilerplate seeks to subject corporations to nationwide class

actions by virtue of their mere existence. Plaintiffs’

reasoning in this respect would penalize a company for little

more than operating on a national scale under the same corporate

name. Even if taken as true, the fact that some centralized

directive comes from some corporate headquarters is entirely

unremarkable. Surely corporations of national scope cannot

flourish in the modern economy without some “centralized control

of compensation” for their many thousands of employees. At the

very least, corporate headquarters must allocate resources and

articulate certain general policies to guide regional or other

mid-level managers in setting individual salaries and wages.

The alternative would operate to inhibit the most basic

tools of management and result in budgetary chaos. The

question, therefore, is how much “centralized control of

compensation” the original complaint actually alleges with

41
respect to the challenged employment decisions. The answer is,

clearly, not much. If this bare, conclusory statement in the

complaint is given weight, then nationwide class action suits

are off and running, notwithstanding Wal-Mart and the pleading

standards laid down in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009),

and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).

2.

The amended complaint, in stark contrast to the original,

pivots 180 degrees to assert that Family Dollar’s compensation

scheme actually operates in an objective and centralized manner.

The amended complaint is not, as the majority contends, a

“mere[] elaborat[ion]” on the original. Maj. op. at 28. It is

what the district court says it is: a bald attempt to assert a

completely new theory. It backtracks on the earlier assertion

that the flaw in Family Dollar’s compensation scheme was too

much decentralized, subjective decision-making, by alleging that

the system “requires pay to be set by uniform, company-wide

criteria.” Am. Compl. ¶ 29. The complaint now decides to

challenge the purported lack of subjectivity inherent in the

company’s supposedly centralized compensation scheme -- the very

subjectivity that plaintiffs had earlier insisted was the

hallmark of Family Dollar’s corporate structure.

42
 As for plaintiffs’ allegations concerning the

implementation of Family Dollar’s compensation criteria, the

following passage is typical:

Store Managers’ compensation is not set by
managers who have unfettered discretion to use their
own judgment without regard to any corporate-imposed
criteria or standards. All Store Managers’ salaries .
. . are subject to the same corporate-administered pay
system and policy established by corporate
headquarters; all Store Manager’s salaries are subject
to store payroll budgets established at corporate
headquarters; and all Store Managers have the same job
description which sets forth a common set of duties
and responsibilities regardless of location. There is
no policy against having uniform employment practices
at Family Dollar.

Id. ¶ 32. We are now explicitly told, moreover, in a complete

about-face from the original complaint, that “Family Dollar is

not operated in a decentralized, subjective manner. Nor is the

pay-setting process for Store Managers based on decentralized,

subjective decisionmaking.” Id. ¶ 34. The demons in the

original complaint were those runaway lower-level managers. The

demon in the amended complaint is a controlling “corporate

headquarters.” Id. ¶ 35.

3.

Given all of the foregoing, it should be plain that the

amended complaint is not some mere modification of the original,

as the majority contends. Instead, it is manifestly,

substantively different from the original. The two are utterly

irreconcilable. They describe two different companies. By

43
transforming their claims from a frontal assault on an

excessively subjective and decentralized compensation system

into an intricate attack on a purportedly objective and

centralized scheme, plaintiffs have done far more than “raise[]

a new legal theory.” Laber, 438 F.3d at 427 (internal quotation

marks omitted).

The majority breezily dismisses these concerns, asserting

in conclusory terms that “[t]he legal theory remains the same.”

Maj. op. at 28. My colleagues would be wise to pay some modest

heed to the opinion of the district judge, who was better

situated to evaluate the actual implications of the transfigured

complaint. The new complaint, by virtue of its novel

allegations, would require significant “gathering and analysis

of facts not already considered by the defendant.” Laber, 438

F.3d at 427 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

As the district judge emphasized: “Plaintiffs wish to pursue

extensive discovery to support and clarify their new theories,

which will require the parties to re-open and conduct new expert

discovery based on plaintiffs’ changed version of the facts.”

J.A. 418.

Thus, the district court was correct to conclude that

granting leave to amend would be prejudicial to Family Dollar.

Id. at 417-18. “The proof required to defend against this new

claim would be of an entirely different character than the proof

44
which the defendant [was] led to believe would be necessary.

Belated claims which change the character of litigation are not

favored.” Deasy v. Hill, 833 F.2d 38, 42 (4th Cir. 1987). The

district court acted well within its discretion by denying

plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend.

B.

The timing of a proposed pleading amendment also bears on

whether the change would prejudice the opposing party. Laber,

438 F.3d at 427. In particular, whereas an amendment “offered

before any discovery has occurred” is unlikely to be

prejudicial, “the further [a] case [has] progressed . . . , the

more likely it is that the amendment will prejudice the

defendant.” Id.; see also United States ex rel. Nathan v.

Takeda Pharm. N. Am., Inc., 707 F.3d 451, 461 (4th Cir. 2013)

(affirming denial of motion for leave to amend in light, inter

alia, of a two-year gap between filing of complaint and

dismissal); Mayfield v. Nat’l Ass’n for Stock Car Auto Racing,

Inc., 674 F.3d 369, 379 (4th Cir. 2012) (affirming denial of

motion for leave to amend where “a significant amount of

discovery had already been conducted”).

Here, plaintiffs’ attempt to amend their complaint came

three years after the case was initially filed -- and only when

Family Dollar appeared poised to succeed on its motion to

dismiss and/or strike the original complaint’s class

45
allegations. Moreover, the district judge observed that

plaintiffs had been given “adequate time to conduct discovery,”

that they had in fact “conducted significant discovery,” and

that plaintiffs’ own counsel had even admitted “that discovery

is mostly completed.” J.A. 414-15. Hence, the district court

concluded that any “additional discovery would be . . .

prejudicial to defendant.” Id. at 415. The court proceeded to

hold that:

[A]llowing plaintiffs to amend the complaint would
prejudice defendant. Since the filing of the
complaint three years ago, the parties have pursued
discovery . . . and have attempted to mediate claims
under the original complaint. Here, plaintiffs chose
not to file their proposed amended complaint until the
briefing on defendant’s motion to dismiss was nearly
complete . . . . Plaintiffs wish to pursue extensive
discovery to support and clarify their new theories,
which will require the parties to re-open and conduct
new expert discovery based on plaintiffs’ changed
version of the facts.

Id. at 417-18.

Plaintiffs attempt to blame the three-year delay in filing

for leave to amend on the various motions and objections that

were exchanged between the parties during the course of

discovery. Such tit for tat, however, is not peculiar to this

litigation; every complex class action of this variety will have

just this sort of pretrial motion exchange. The majority’s

adoption of plaintiffs’ reasoning in this respect, maj. op. at

26, thus comes close to establishing a per se three-year grace

46
period for motions for leave to amend. Such a protracted

interval is excessive and susceptible to manipulative conduct.

The new rule established by today’s opinion endorses filing

delays that patently prejudice opposing parties.

Moreover, the delay in this particular case is especially

unjustifiable. Plaintiffs’ counsel have extensive experience

with defendant’s corporate structure: by their own admission,

they have sued Family Dollar over labor and employment matters

“approximately 15” times since 2001. See Pls.’ Reply to Def.’s

Resp. to Pls.’ Opp’n to Terry Price Serving as Local Counsel and

Req. for Emergency Hr’g at 3 n.2, Scott v. Family Dollar Stores,

Inc., No. 3:08-cv-00540-MOC-DSC (W.D. N.C. Nov. 4, 2008), ECF

No. 15. As the district court noted, plaintiffs were plenty

familiar through their multiple prior lawsuits with defendant’s

corporate organization. J.A. 417. Although plaintiffs assert

in a conclusory footnote that defendant’s compensation policies

have changed since the time of these many prior suits,

Appellants’ Br. at 53 n.7, they provide no substantiation for

this claim nor do they identify any specific ways in which the

policies have been altered.

The majority inexplicably focuses on the fact that

plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend was made prior to trial.

Maj. op. at 29. The crux of this dispute, however, is class

certification. That issue is routinely decided pretrial. See

47
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A) (“At an early practicable time after

a person sues or is sued as a class representative, the court

must determine by order whether to certify the action as a class

action.”). Any potential source of prejudice, therefore, lies

not in inconveniences at trial but rather in the superfluous or

additional discovery costs imposed on defendant as a result of

plaintiffs’ fluctuating class action theories. If the

majority’s misplaced emphasis on trial represents a new standard

for identifying prejudice in class certification proceedings,

prejudice will almost never be found.

I see no reason whatsoever to usurp the district court’s

essential case management functions or to question the accuracy

of its characterizations. It was entirely proper for the

district court to conclude that permitting plaintiffs to amend

their complaint so substantially and at such a late stage of the

game would impermissibly prejudice Family Dollar. It was

altogether sound for the trial court to hold that Family Dollar

should not be forced to defend a new suit three years after the

original complaint was filed. See Newport News Holdings Corp.

v. Virtual City Vision, Inc., 650 F.3d 423, 439-41 (4th Cir.

2011) (affirming on prejudice grounds denial of motion for leave

where amendment was filed at the “eleventh hour,” “would

probably have necessitated additional discovery,” and would have

“substantially change[d] the nature and scope” of litigation)

48
(internal quotation marks omitted); Equal Rights Ctr. v. Niles

Bolton Assocs., 602 F.3d 597, 603-04 (4th Cir. 2010) (same).

III.

As to why plaintiffs wanted to undertake such an extensive

overhaul of their complaint in the first place, the majority

opinion points to the Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart, 131

S. Ct. 2541. The majority, however, misapprehends the import of

Wal-Mart with respect to the final two grounds on which a

district court may deny a motion for leave to amend a pleading -

- the lack of good faith, to which I now turn, and futility,

discussed in Part IV. See Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 426-27

(4th Cir. 2006).

A district court’s refusal to permit a pleading amendment

on bad faith grounds is justified where “the plaintiff’s first

theory of recovery is based on his own reading of . . . cases

and it turns out that he misinterpreted how that theory would

apply to the facts of his case.” Id. at 428 (emphasis omitted).

That situation is precisely what occurred here. Plaintiffs

misinterpreted how certain class action precedents would apply

to their case and then sought to construct an entirely new set

of facts to overcome their error. Their willingness to adopt

contradictory factual positions in order to match their evolving

legal theories evidences a degree of bad faith sufficient to

49
warrant denial of leave to amend. To the old-fashioned view

that prior representations to a court actually count for

something, the majority answers: Not much.

Plaintiffs were wholly content to ride the coattails of the

proposed class in Wal-Mart while that class was enjoying success

in the lower federal courts. In consenting to a transfer of

venue in 2008, plaintiffs explicitly stated that, with respect

to a then-recent round of the Wal-Mart litigation, “[t]he Ninth

Circuit . . . affirmed certification of . . . a nationwide class

having virtually identical claims of sex discrimination in pay

to those brought in this case.” J.A. 221 (citing Dukes v. Wal-

Mart, Inc., 509 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2007)) (emphasis added).

Later in the litigation, plaintiffs argued that “[t]he evidence

is expected to show that this case is more like . . . the Ninth

Circuit’s decision in” Wal-Mart than the cases cited by

defendant. S.A. 527.

Then plaintiffs adopted a dramatically different stance

after the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s

certification decision in 2011. See 131 S. Ct. 2541. In their

briefing before this court, for instance, plaintiffs contend

that “Family Dollar’s salary system is the opposite of that in

Wal-Mart,” Appellants’ Br. at 5; that “[t]he current case has

never alleged any store-level decisionmaking similar to that in

Wal-Mart,” id. at 16, 21-22 (emphasis omitted); that “[t]he Wal-

50
Mart decision was limited to localized decisionmaking within

each store that was not subject to any centralized policies or

control similar to those alleged here,” id. at 20-21; and that

“Wal-Mart simply does not apply to [the] Complaint [here],” id.

at 52 (emphasis omitted).

Statements made at oral argument help to illustrate the

gross incompatibility between the factual allegations made by

plaintiffs’ original and amended complaints. The court

inquired: “Don’t we have a big difference . . . between your

complaint and your amended complaint . . . in terms of the

substantive allegations?” Plaintiffs’ counsel responded: “No, I

do not believe so.” He later elaborated:

We say that this case involves centralized criteria .
. . and that we can show that that centralized
criteria is what’s causing the disparity, not . . .
anything localized. . . . That’s our complaint from
Day 1. If you read our original complaint, it says
that we are attacking a centralized system. It says
nothing but that.

(emphasis added). Despite these protestations to the contrary,

the original complaint actually says precisely the opposite. It

states explicitly that “Plaintiffs are aware, at this time, of

no other criteria which causes such disparate impact other than

gender bias, subjectivity and stereotyping.” Compl. ¶ 22

(emphasis added).

To be sure, counsel must enjoy latitude in amending

complaints to address intervening developments in the law and to

51
incorporate factual material uncovered since the original

filing. Some evolution of a plaintiff’s approach to a case is

to be expected, for good advocacy is adaptive in some measure.

It is a matter of degree, however, and the district court was

right to spot in plaintiffs’ new attack a bridge too far.

For the instant plaintiffs do not merely present a new

legal argument predicated on their original factual allegations,

or some modification based upon new revelations. Instead, they

seek to invent an entirely new set of facts tailored to their

revised theory of recovery. The corporate defendant described

in the amended complaint bears no more than a nominal

relationship to that described in the original. The proposed

amendment is “not merely clerical or corrective. It

[establishes] an entirely new factual basis for the plaintiffs'

claims.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 952 F.2d 841, 846 (5th

Cir. 1992), reinstated in relevant part, 37 F.3d 1069, 1073 &

n.8 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc); see also Cornell & Co., Inc. v.

OSHRC, 573 F.2d 820, 824-25 (3rd Cir. 1978) (denying leave to

amend where plaintiff “changed the factual basis for the charge

as well as his legal theory”) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

This is more than some commonplace doctrinal point.

Complaints must bear some relationship to the external reality

which they purport to describe. When a corporation is

52
reinvented from one employing decentralized, subjective

decision-making to one with rigid, entirely centralized

policies, law’s relationship to reality is stretched too thin.

See Bradley v. Chiron Corp., 136 F.3d 1317, 1324-26 (Fed. Cir.

1998) (disregarding “sham” facts in an amended complaint that

contradicted the factual allegations pled in the original and

represented “a transparent attempt to conform the facts to the

requirements of the cause of action”). Law is not a mere set of

expressions to be manipulated toward a given end. It is a

system designed to ascertain truth as far as possible in order

to produce justice, to the extent possible. To do this, law

must maintain some concrete relationship with facts as they

exist. Plaintiffs’ contradictory pleadings, which treat reality

as a plastic entity to be molded to their purposes, run directly

counter to this principle. See Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc.,

912 F.2d 291, 296-97 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Although leave to amend

should be liberally granted, the amended complaint may only

allege other facts consistent with the challenged pleading.”)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Were plaintiffs permitted to substitute contradictory

factual narratives every time an intervening opinion cast doubt

upon their claims, they could hold defendants hostage by

indefinitely postponing final judgment. The majority finds the

original complaint deficient because it alleged only a

53
subjective decision-making structure. Maj op. at 21-22. But

when plaintiffs sought to run from their prior representations

and assert a highly controlled decision-making apparatus, the

majority says no problem. I regret that the majority encourages

litigants to approach courts in such a manner.

IV.

Finally, the district court’s rejection of plaintiffs’

motion for leave to amend was warranted on a third ground:

futility. See Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 426-27 (4th Cir.

2006). “Futility is apparent if the proposed amended complaint

fails to state a claim under the applicable rules and

accompanying standards” -- that is, if it “fails to satisfy the

requirements of the federal rules.” Katyle v. Penn Nat’l

Gaming, Inc., 637 F.3d 462, 471 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Wal-Mart itself expounded “the

requirements of the federal rules” -- specifically, Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 23’s commands concerning the certification of

class actions. It is plain that the amended complaint fails to

state a claim by virtue of that decision.

A.

As in Wal-Mart, “[t]he crux of this case is commonality --

the rule requiring a plaintiff to show that ‘there are questions

of law or fact common to the class.’” 131 S. Ct. at 2550-51

54
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2)). Wal-Mart’s central teaching

is that the claims of each class member “must depend upon a

common contention.” Id. at 2551. That common contention, in

turn, must “be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide

resolution -- which means that determination of its truth or

falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of

each one of the claims in one stroke.” Id. Thus, “[w]hat

matters to class certification . . . is not the raising of

common ‘questions’ -- even in droves -- but, rather the capacity

of a classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt to

drive the resolution of the litigation.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted).

Applying these principles to employment discrimination

claims, the Wal-Mart Court made clear that “[w]ithout some glue

holding the alleged reasons for [each of the challenged]

decisions together, it will be impossible to say that

examination of all the class members’ claims for relief will

produce a common answer to the crucial question why was I

disfavored.” Id. at 2552. As relevant here, plaintiffs must

show “‘[s]ignificant proof that an employer operated under a

general policy of discrimination’” in order to demonstrate the

existence of the requisite “glue.” Id. at 2553 (quoting Gen.

Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n.15 (1982))

(alteration in original). For two reasons, plaintiffs have

55
failed to satisfy this standard. First, the claims in the

amended complaint fail on their face. Second, even if the

claims were not facially deficient, the proffered evidence would

still be incapable of supporting such claims on a classwide

basis.

1.

In light of the stunning similarities between this case and

Wal-Mart, the allegations in the amended complaint -- just as in

the original complaint -- are legally insufficient from the

outset. In both cases, defendants are large corporations

operating nationwide chains of consumer-goods stores. From Wal-

Mart:

Petitioner Wal–Mart is the Nation’s largest
private employer. It operates four types of retail
stores throughout the country . . . . Those stores are
divided into seven nationwide divisions, which in turn
comprise 41 regions of 80 to 85 stores apiece. Each
store has between 40 and 53 separate departments and
80 to 500 staff positions. In all, Wal–Mart operates
approximately 3,400 stores and employs more than one
million people.

131 S. Ct. at 2547. And from the briefing here: “Family Dollar

operates a chain of over 7,000 stores in more than 40 states”

and “‘has divided its operations into 95 regions, each run by a

vice president, and then into districts, each run by a district

manager.’” Appellee’s Br. at 3 (quoting Grace v. Family Dollar

Stores, Inc. (In re Family Dollar FLSA Litig.), 637 F.3d 508,

510 (4th Cir. 2011)). There are approximately four hundred

56
districts, each of which includes between ten and thirty stores.

Id.

In both cases, the proposed class encompassed many

thousands of retail-level, female employees and former

employees. In both cases, plaintiffs challenged various pay and

promotion decision procedures as improperly gender-related.

Compare Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2547 (“The named plaintiffs in

this lawsuit, representing the 1.5 million members of the

certified class, are three current or former Wal–Mart employees

who allege that the company discriminated against them on the

basis of their sex by denying them equal pay or promotions, in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . .

.”), with Am. Compl. ¶ 5 (“The plaintiffs bring this action on

behalf of themselves and all female Store Managers pursuant to

Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act . . . and § 216(b) of the

Equal Pay Act of 1963 . . . to redress the defendant’s

widespread and pervasive gender discrimination in employment

opportunities.”).

And most significantly, in both cases, all of the contested

employment actions derived from the same type of decision-making

structure. In Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court stated that mid-level

managers were allowed to exercise “discretion” within “limits”

imposed and enforced by “corporate oversight,” with such

oversight including “preestablished ranges” and “certain

57
objective criteria” for pay and promotions. 131 S. Ct. at 2547.

The district court in Wal-Mart provided even greater detail,

explaining that “the company maintains centralized corporate

policies that provide some constraint on the degree of

managerial discretion over in-store personnel decisions.” Dukes

v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 152-53 (N.D. Cal.

2004). For instance, “there is a basic compensation structure

that applies similarly to all in-store salaried management

positions across all types of Wal–Mart stores, in that the

computation begins with a base salary within a range set by the

corporation . . . , with adjustments allowed for profit

incentives and/or merit increases.” Id. at 148.

As discussed in Part II, the factual and legal allegations

contained in the amended complaint in this case were so novel as

to warrant a finding of prejudice. The fact that certain

allegations are new, however, does not indicate that they are

viable. Here, despite plaintiffs’ efforts to allege extensive

centralized control, the amended complaint reveals the existence

of a corporate decision-making structure parallel to that

described in Wal-Mart. As the district court here explained,

“Although plaintiffs [now] purport to deny that class members’

pay is set through a discretionary, subjective process, . . .

the discretionary pay of managers, within uniformly established

parameters, remain[s] the only source of discrimination

58
alleged.” J.A. 417. That pattern of dispersed managerial

discretion within centralized parameters is precisely that of

Wal-Mart.

While plaintiffs fail to so much as identify the source of

many of the supposed nefarious corporate parameters, see, e.g.,

Am. Compl. ¶ 51, even if we were to accept these dubious

assertions at face value, plaintiffs’ proffered amendment would

still be futile. In an effort to identify a “specific

employment practice” responsible for the alleged pay

discrepancies, Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2555 (internal quotation

marks omitted), plaintiffs (and the majority) point to four

corporate policies. With respect to each claim, plaintiffs’ own

brief gives away the ballgame. First, plaintiffs challenge the

corporate-imposed salary ranges for store managers. Appellants’

Br. at 13-14; Am. Compl. ¶ 35. A salary range, however,

intrinsically imparts discretion to those charged with

administering it. As the district judge noted, “a large number

of decision-makers, . . . located around the country, exercise

individual discretion in placing Store Managers within the

established pay ranges.” J.A. 419. Discretion cabined by broad

corporate policies -- including salary ranges -- is precisely

the structure that Wal-Mart found not to be susceptible to class

action treatment. 131 S. Ct. at 2547 (denying class

certification despite defendant’s use of salary ranges). If the

59
existence of such discretion defeated class action commonality

in Wal-Mart, it must do so here.

Second, plaintiffs decry the alleged corporate-imposed cap

on pay raises and contend that exceptions to this cap, which may

only be granted by Regional Managers and Divisional Vice

Presidents, are granted disproportionately to males.

Appellants’ Br. at 13; Am. Compl. ¶ 36. Regional Managers and

Divisional Vice Presidents, however, as their respective titles

indicate, are middle managers. See J.A. 419. By definition,

they are incapable of dictating corporate-wide policies. As the

district judge noted, plaintiffs’ allegations in this respect

again converge with the facts in Wal-Mart: both cases involve

dispersed decision-makers exercising discretion (e.g., granting

exceptions) free of direct corporate control and oversight. Id.

at 417, 419.

Third, plaintiffs argue that defendant’s criteria for

determining compensation -- criteria which include prior

experience and performance evaluations -- disparately impact

women. Appellants’ Br. at 32; Am. Compl. ¶¶ 40, 51. The use of

such criteria is hardly remarkable; the only thing that would be

remarkable is if Family Dollar failed to find prior experience

and prior performance relevant. The business justification for

this practice is obvious.

60
 Plaintiffs do not allege, moreover, that these criteria

constitute a rigid formula; instead, the criteria appear to be

simple guideposts listing multiple factors designed to channel

the discretionary decisions of those middle managers charged

with setting store manager salaries. It is the business

equivalent of a judicial totality-of-the-circumstances test,

with the weight and relevance of the factor or circumstance to

be determined individually. Indeed, it would be senseless to

set rigid salaries for every store manager at corporate

headquarters, both because it would strip the system of

incentives and because the performance of each manager simply is

not identical. As noted above, this type of broad corporate

constraint on what is fundamentally a discretionary

determination does not satisfy the commonality requirement.

Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2547 (denying certification despite

defendant’s use of “objective criteria” in making promotion

decisions).

Fourth, plaintiffs complain that corporate policies require

that store managers promoted from within be paid less than those

who are hired laterally. Appellants’ Br. at 9; Am. Compl. ¶ 52,

54. This policy allegedly produces a disparate impact insofar

as female store managers are disproportionately promoted in-

house. Appellants’ Br. at 10; Am. Compl. ¶ 55. Plaintiffs do

not allege, however, that either method of selection is

61
centrally mandated, nor do they allege that any central policy

is even responsible for the supposed tendency of females to be

promoted from within rather than hired laterally.

Given that the alleged policy does not dictate the internal

or external route of store manager selection, any disparate

impact that arises will necessarily be the result of

decentralized choices by middle managers. Whether women are

disproportionately hired from within will vary from region to

region. In short, “[i]n a company of [Family Dollar’s] size and

geographical scope, it is quite unbelievable that all managers

would exercise their discretion in a common way without some

common direction.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2555. Consequently,

the existence of any disparate impact resulting from this

particular policy will be resistant to coherent analysis at the

national level.

The business justification for allotting a slight premium

to lateral hires is hardly obscure. It may well take such an

allowance to persuade an employee to switch companies.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court has noted that the mere fact that

a business practice produces some statistical disparity is,

standing alone, insufficient to conclude that a class action

will be viable. Id. at 2555-56. Under the lateral hire policy

at issue here, for example, some middle managers will hire women

from outside, or promote men from within. In other cases, the

62
hiring party may herself be female. The alleged policy could

very well work to the benefit of women in certain districts. In

short, the results will vary by district and by region;

nationwide patterns are inadequate to justify an inference of

discrimination at the subnational level. The variable results

produced by this particular practice -- which is neutral on its

face and supported by an obvious business justification -- are

precisely what Wal-Mart envisioned as inimical to class action

commonality.

The fact that each of plaintiffs’ key claims ultimately

reduces to an allegation of cabined discretion should be

unsurprising. There is nothing inherently discriminatory about

delegated discretion. Companies must rely on delegated

discretion. It would be virtually impossible, as a matter of

sheer practicality, for a company as extensive in scope as

Family Dollar to micromanage store manager compensation via

centralized policies. It is simply unfathomable that Family

Dollar’s corporate headquarters could afford to dictate the

compensation paid to managers in each of its 7,000 stores. Some

discretion is intrinsic to this type of national business. See

id. at 2554 (noting that an employment policy of decentralized

decision-making is “a very common and presumptively reasonable

way of doing business”).

63
 The inference is therefore inescapable that Family Dollar

relies on middle managers -- who have greater and more intimate

knowledge of facts on the ground than the members of top

management -- to attend to the details of store manager

compensation within the broad constraints imposed by corporate

headquarters. Family Dollar expects its intermediate executives

to be more than mere automatons. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank

& Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988) (noting that “it may be

customary and quite reasonable simply to delegate employment

decisions to those employees who are most familiar with the jobs

to be filled and with the candidates for those jobs”).

Plaintiffs’ inventive pleadings simply cannot disguise the

economic and managerial realities associated with running a

national corporation. “[L]ocal discretion cannot support a

company-wide class no matter how cleverly lawyers may try to

repackage local variability as uniformity.” Bolden v. Walsh

Constr. Co., 688 F.3d 893, 898 (7th Cir. 2012). The presence of

such variability makes it difficult to establish the commonality

necessary for class action treatment because, among other

things, business managers in many regions and districts will

exercise delegated discretion in favor of the plaintiff class.

Plaintiffs’ argument, therefore, continues to boil down to

the contention that an “exercise of discretion results in

disparities in pay based on gender.” J.A. 419. Wal-Mart, of

64
course, found challenges based on such a decision-making

structure largely resistant to class action treatment. 131 S.

Ct. at 2555-56. The district court nicely summarized this

aspect of the futility analysis when it concluded that “the

proposed amended complaint appears to be an attempt to recast

plaintiffs’ class claims simply to avoid dismissal under [Wal-

Mart], but even the allegations in the amended complaint

ultimately point to subjective, individualized decisions rather

than pointing to any uniform company-wide policy that

discriminates against [female] Store Managers.” J.A. 417.

2.

Plaintiffs’ amended complaint is deficient for an

additional reason: the evidence plaintiffs have offered fails to

satisfy the standards suggested by Wal-Mart. As the Court in

that case made clear, “Rule 23 does not set forth a mere

pleading standard.” 131 S. Ct. at 2551. Rather, “[a] party

seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate his

compliance with the Rule -- that is, he must be prepared to

prove that there are in fact . . . common questions of law or

fact, etc.” Id. (emphasis omitted); see also Comcast Corp. v.

Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013). In light of the fact

that plaintiffs have already “conducted significant discovery in

this and other similar cases against defendant in other

jurisdictions,” J.A. 415, the data that they have gathered is

65
inadequate to satisfy the evidentiary standard imposed by Wal-

Mart.

Wal-Mart emphasized that “left to their own devices most

managers in any corporation . . . would select sex-neutral,

performance-based criteria for hiring and promotion that produce

no actionable disparity at all.” 131 S. Ct. at 2554.

Furthermore, with respect to a large national corporation like

Wal-Mart or Family Dollar, “it is quite unbelievable that all

managers would exercise their discretion in a common way without

some common direction.” Id. at 2555. And while Wal-Mart did

not foreclose the theoretical possibility that such coordinated,

discriminatory, discretionary activity might one day be

demonstrated, it concluded that the “statistical and anecdotal

evidence” in that case fell “well short.” Id.

Here, the only real evidence that plaintiffs have provided

is numerical in nature, and it fails for the same reason as that

in Wal-Mart. The amended complaint supplies figures purporting

to show “statistically significant disparities in what Family

Dollar pays men and women for the same job of Store Managers.”

Am. Compl. ¶ 24. Plaintiffs point to an alleged salary gap

amounting to approximately $2,500 per year between 2008 and

2010, which they peg at twenty-two to twenty-three standard

deviations above “what would be expected in the absence of

gender-based discrimination” when “controll[ing] for non-gender

66
factors that may affect pay such as store, district, region,

store type, store size, store location, store volume, education

and prior work history, and length of service.” Id. ¶¶ 24-27.

But this lengthy enumeration of “controlled” elements itself

belies plaintiffs’ claim that any alleged discrepancy in store

manager pay is the product of a rigid collection of centralized

corporate policies.

Plaintiffs’ statistical evidence is insufficient under Wal-

Mart on two counts, both stemming from the fact that it is

national in scope. First and fundamentally, the Supreme Court

specifically underscored the “failure of inference” inherent in

attempting to draw particularized conclusions from national

statistical data. 131 S. Ct. at 2555. That is, “[i]nformation

about disparities at the regional and national level[s] does not

establish the existence of disparities at individual stores,” or

within individual districts, “let alone raise the inference that

a company-wide policy of discrimination is implemented by

discretionary decisions at the store and district level.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bolden, 688 F.3d at

896 (“If [the defendant employed] 25 superintendents, 5 of whom

discriminated in awarding overtime, aggregate data would show

that black workers did worse than white workers -- but that

result would not imply that all 25 superintendents behaved

similarly, so it would not demonstrate commonality.”); Bennett

67
v. Nucor Corp., 656 F.3d 802, 815-16 (8th Cir. 2011) (“[A]

bottom-line [statistical] analysis is insufficient to

demonstrate that any disparate treatment or disparate impact

present in one department was also common to all the others.”).

Second, nationwide data fails to account for various

nondiscriminatory conditions that may have produced divergent

results from one area to another. For instance, as Wal-Mart

tells us, “[s]ome managers will claim that the availability of

women, or qualified women, or interested women, in their stores’

area does not mirror the national or regional statistics.” 131

S. Ct. at 2555. The controls that plaintiffs claim to have

factored into their statistical conclusions here do not account

for those factors, nor could their crude statistics possibly

comprehend the myriad other conceivable circumstances that may

affect comparative compensation levels in specific locales.

B.

Plaintiffs have thus failed to provide “convincing proof”

of any policy that discriminates in a “companywide” manner; as a

result, “they have not established the existence of any common

question.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2556-57. The amended

complaint suffers from the same fatal flaw as the original,

rendering plaintiffs’ attempt to reboot the litigation futile,

and rendering the district court’s decision to refuse the

amendment on that ground an entirely proper exercise of its

68
discretion. Even without reaching the patent inadequacies of

the amended complaint under Rule 23(b) -- including the obvious

further difficulties raised by plaintiffs’ request for backpay

in light of the Court’s remedial holding in Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct.

at 2557 -- the entire class action fails for a lack of

commonality under Rule 23(a)(2).

It bears reemphasis that the employment decision-making

structure at issue here -- in which a business articulates

certain centralized policies but also imparts to mid-level

managers some discretion to implement them -- is not only common

to Wal-Mart and Family Dollar. It is typical of most national

corporations. See McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &

Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 488 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that

large corporations may grant discretion to local managers “as a

matter of necessity”). The result is a substantial variety of

outcomes attributable to the disparate management philosophies,

priorities, and circumstances of each decentralized decision-

maker -- exactly what one would expect in a company staffed by

human beings.

The majority fails even to suggest why the challenged

policies might be legally suspect. Indeed, the corporate

guidelines targeted by plaintiffs -- such as the use of salary

ranges, the purported bonuses for lateral hires, and the

inclusion of prior experience and performance as factors in pay

69
decisions -- are among the most anodyne in the corporate world.

Permitting a class action suit to proceed on such a slender

basis exposes a large swath of companies to class-action

liability simply for adopting perfectly ordinary, plain vanilla

policies. These policies do, however, share one relevant

feature: they delegate discretion.

Wal-Mart recognized the difficulty of accounting for

regional discrepancies and individual exercises of discretion

through the blunderbuss of class action litigation. The

gravamen of that decision is that nationwide classes face a

steep climb to certification under Rule 23. 131 S. Ct. at 2554

(holding that under the circumstances discussed, “[a] party

seeking to certify a nationwide class will be unable to show

that all the employees’ Title VII claims will in fact depend on

the answers to common questions”). Given the managerial

nightmares encountered by district judges assigned these

unwieldy pieces of litigation, no other conclusion would be

possible. 2

2
The concurring opinion of my good colleague, which ignores
this reality, is notable chiefly for its silences. It advances
an analysis even more cursory than that of the majority on the
theory that some vague, soothing assurance about ordinary Rule
15 motions will obscure the extraordinary steps that have been
taken. Granted, it is in the nature of a concurrence to be
brief in relative terms, but surely some revelatory engagement
with appellee’s claims should be forthcoming. The concurrence
neglects to address which of the district court’s factual
(Continued)
70
 It is also important to note that denial of nationwide

class certification here would not leave plaintiffs without a

path forward. Each could continue to pursue a personal claim of

discrimination, as the district court made clear. J.A. 420.

Or, should plaintiffs choose to take a different tack on remand,

class certification could perhaps be suitable for more modest --

and thus more manageable -- groups, such as district-level

findings were clearly erroneous, or which of its discretionary
judgments ran afoul of the abuse-of-discretion standard of
review. It declines to say exactly what new information was
supposedly discovered during mediation, or why that information
was not known to plaintiffs’ counsel as a result of their
fifteen previous suits against Family Dollar. It fails to
justify the irreconcilability of the various pleadings or the
changed thrust of the factual allegations contained therein. It
neglects to address the district court’s finding that this
entirely new case severely prejudiced defendant three years
after the filing of the original complaint. It refuses to
explain why Wal-Mart’s commonality holding, by its plain
language, does not apply to middle managers. It further refuses
to explain why 500 vice presidents and district managers who
concededly made discretionary decisions within delegated ranges
are anything other than middle management, or why a system in
which discretion is channeled by broad corporate guidelines does
not fall within Wal-Mart’s literal terms. It does not state why
it is justifiable to rope regions and districts with progressive
hiring practices into nationwide litigation, or how this
national class action, with all its disparate and moving parts,
is supposed to be administered, or what the district court is
even supposed to do upon remand. It fails, finally, to
illuminate for courts and litigants why this decision does not
subject every company in America with similarly unremarkable
policies to the prospect of class-action liability (and the
reality of interminable class certification disputes) merely for
existing. Perhaps my fine colleagues will some day provide some
answers to some of these questions, but for now they are doing
what football teams usually do on fourth down.

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clusters, where the differences in the circumstances faced by

each member may be less pronounced. See Bolden, 688 F.3d at 899

(denying class certification but suggesting that smaller

subclasses might be certifiable). While plaintiffs have chosen

to bite off more than they can chew thus far, smaller morsels

may prove more palatable in the end.

V.

In holding Wal-Mart inapplicable to the manifold

discretionary decisions of middle managers, the majority has

hollowed out that case. Moreover, the district court engaged in

a sound exercise of discretion on any one of the three grounds

commonly recognized as reasons for denying leave to amend. The

majority’s decision is unjustifiable under the straightforward

application of governing precedent.

In a larger sense, though, the majority’s ruling is more

damaging even than the disregard of precedent. It impairs the

judicial process in three significant ways. First, it prolongs

disputes far past the point of reason. It requires companies to

defend completely different cases no less than three years after

the filing of the complaint. No other court has gone this far.

In so doing, the majority fails to address even the rudimentary

managerial realities of modern national corporations. The

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more’s the pity, because in many places and under many managers,

the chief beneficiary would have been the plaintiff class.

Second, the majority pulls up curbside and dumps on the

district court an utterly unwieldy, unmanageable piece of

litigation. It is a truism that unpleasant tasks roll downhill,

and it is also worth the observation that the majority will not

have to deal with the many problems it has wrought. We use an

abuse of discretion standard in this context for a reason. The

district judge is best situated to make the type of

determinations at issue on this appeal. See Amchem Prods., Inc.

v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 630 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in

part and dissenting in part) (noting in the class action context

that a district court “is far more familiar with the issues and

litigants than is a court of appeals”). Given the standard,

this is a rude reversal, as it would be even for a trial court

opinion less well reasoned than the one reversed.

Third, the majority has subverted a Supreme Court decision

that, whether congenial or not, was written precisely for a

dispute such as this one. We count upon district courts to

faithfully apply our decisions and precedents. The Supreme

Court should be able to count upon us to do the same.

I yield to no one in my respect for the truly fine judges

in the majority. But let this much be clear. Even the above

unfortunate consequences pale in comparison to the incentives

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today’s ruling creates for future parties. The plaintiffs in

this case played fast and loose with the district court,

offering not an “amended complaint,” but rather a completely

contradictory one. They assumed that the allegations in a

complaint need bear no discernible relationship to any external

reality but reflect only the limitless malleability of lawyers’

verbal skills. The district court recognized that the system

was being gamed and moved to instill respect for the integrity

of the process over which it had the duty to preside. That we

should not only reverse the trial court, but do so as clearly

erroneous and an abuse of discretion, is simply wrong.

The abuse was committed on appeal.

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