NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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Nos. 12-3822, 12-3823, 12-3824 and 12-3825
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IN RE: ASBESTOS PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION (NO. VI)
Harold W. Landes, Jr.,
Appellant, No. 12-3822
George L. Conner,
Appellant, No. 12-3823
Walter J. Specht, Jr.,
Appellant, No. 12-3824
Thomas Streber,
Appellant, No. 12-3825
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On Appeal from the MDL 875 in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Nos. 2-08-cv-88402, 2-09-cv-061817,
2-10-cv-067838 and 2-11-cv-64241)
District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 16, 2013
Before: FISHER, VANASKIE and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: October 17, 2013)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Harold Landes, George Conner, Walter J. Specht, and Thomas Streber
(collectively “Plaintiffs”) appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania‟s dismissal of their cases pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 41(b) for failure to comply with Administrative Order No. 12 (“AO 12”). For
the reasons stated below, we will affirm.
I.
We write principally for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and
procedural history of this case. Therefore, we will set forth only those facts that are
necessary to our analysis.
Plaintiffs‟ cases were consolidated with various other cases into Multidistrict
Litigation 875 (“MDL 875”), a consolidated docket for asbestos products liability claims
located in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. In order to “facilitate the expeditious
movement of pending cases on the MDL docket,” the District Court issued AO 12 in May
2007. App. 6. AO 12 required an MDL 875 plaintiff to disclose medical diagnoses
supporting his or her claims by submitting copies of the medical diagnosing report or the
opinion upon which the plaintiff‟s asbestos-related claim relied. App. 7. AO 12 further
required that a plaintiff‟s submissions be based upon objective and subjective data,
identified and descriptively set out within the report or opinion. App. 15. If a plaintiff
failed to comply with the requirements set forth in AO 12, the Court could dismiss the
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case pursuant to Rule 41(b).1 In August 2009, the District Court amended AO 12 to
require a plaintiff to submit, among other things, medical reports “upon which the
plaintiff now relies for the prosecution of the claims as if to withstand a dispositive
motion.” App. 15.
On November 14, 2011, the District Court dismissed a series of cases for failure to
comply with the requirements set forth in AO 12. Specifically, the Court dismissed all
cases involving plaintiffs who failed to submit, among other things, sufficient exposure
histories. App. 15. Although the plain language of AO 12 did not specifically require a
plaintiff to provide a complete exposure history, the District Court based its dismissal on:
[T]he language in AO 12 that emphasizes that plaintiffs should submit
medical diagnosis [sic] or opinions based on medically accepted principles
and practices, and based on statements from reputable medical
organizations that require occupational and environmental exposure history
when screening for asbestos-related diseases . . .
App. 35. The District Court interpreted AO 12 to require that submissions comply with
“generally accepted medical standards [that] call for information regarding „duration,
intensity, time of onset, and setting‟ of exposure to asbestos.” App. 33.
Plaintiffs in the instant proceeding served AO 12 disclosures on Defendants in
December 2007 (Landes), September 2007 (Conner), October 2007 (Specht), and April
2011 (Streber); each contained a diagnosing medical report. In response, Defendants
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Rule 41(b) provides: “If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these
rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it.
Unless the dismissal order states otherwise, a dismissal under this subdivision (b) . . .
operates as an adjudication on the merits.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
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filed motions to dismiss on the basis that each of Plaintiffs‟ AO 12 submissions failed to
comply with the November 2011 order because they did not contain a sufficient history
of exposure to asbestos. App. 288-89, 507-09, 609-10, 649-51. Plaintiffs filed responses
in opposition to Defendants‟ motions, arguing that their submissions were sufficient and
that the District Court‟s interpretation of AO 12 was incorrect. App. 652. On July 23,
2012, the District Court adopted its November 2011 interpretation of AO 12 and granted
the Defendants‟ motions, dismissing with prejudice Plaintiffs‟ cases for failure to provide
a sufficient AO 12 report with respect to exposure history. App. 53-60.
On August 17, 2012, Plaintiffs filed individual motions to reconsider the District
Court‟s order dismissing their cases with prejudice. The District Court denied
reconsideration. Plaintiffs‟ timely notice of appeal to this Court followed.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1407, which authorizes the
transfer to a single district court of cases presenting common issues of fact. We have
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
“We review a district court‟s interpretation of its own orders with deference,
particularly in the MDL context.” In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 718 F.3d
236, 243 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Gibbs v. Frank, 500 F.3d 202, 206 (3d Cir. 2007)). We
review a district court‟s decision to dismiss a complaint under Rule 41(b) for an abuse of
discretion. Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002).
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III.
Plaintiffs advance several arguments on appeal: (1) that the District Court erred in
interpreting AO 12; (2) that the District Court erred in retroactively applying its novel
interpretation of AO 12 to dismiss Plaintiffs‟ cases with prejudice for not complying with
AO 12; and (3) that the District Court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs‟ cases without
providing individualized analyses of the claims and the mandatory findings necessary to
justify dismissal with prejudice. Each of these arguments fails.
A.
Plaintiffs first argue that the District Court‟s interpretation of AO 12 as requiring a
complete exposure history is incorrect. The proper interpretation, according to Plaintiffs,
is that AO 12 only requires a diagnosis of an asbestos-related disease in a medical report
that is supported by identified objective and subjective data. Plaintiffs contend that since
their submissions satisfied the plain language of AO 12, they were sufficient. We
disagree.
“[W]e normally give great deference to a court‟s interpretation of its own
orders . . . .” See DirecTV, Inc. v. Leto, 467 F.3d 842, 844 (3d Cir. 2006); see also
Asbestos (No. VI), 718 F.3d at 244 (citing United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d 1, 58-59 (1st
Cir. 2001) (“We defer to [the district court‟s interpretation of its own case management
order] because the district court was uniquely positioned to explain the meaning of its
own pretrial order.”)).
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Here, the District Court set forth the requirements of AO 12 in its November 2011
order. The language of AO 12, requiring plaintiffs to submit medical diagnoses or
opinions based on objective and subjective data, and statements from reputable medical
organizations emphasizing the importance of exposure history in screenings for asbestos-
related diseases, informed the District Court‟s interpretation. While the broad language
of AO 12 could support other interpretations, we find no reason not to defer to the
District Court‟s interpretation of its own order requiring plaintiffs to submit asbestos
exposure history. See Asbestos (No. VI), 718 F.3d at 244. For the same reasons, we also
find that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the asbestos exposure
history requirement.
B.
Plaintiffs also argue that the District Court erred in retroactively applying its novel
interpretation of AO 12 to dismiss their cases with prejudice. They contend that their
cases should have been dismissed without prejudice.
In determining whether a district court abused its discretion in dismissing a case
pursuant to Rule 41(b), we review the manner in which it balanced the six factors set
forth in Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984).
Asbestos (No. VI), 718 F.3d at 246. These six factors include:
(1) the extent of the party‟s personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the
adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to
discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party
or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness alternative
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sanctions other than dismissal; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or
defense.
Id. (citing Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868). “„No single Poulis factor is dispositive‟” and “„not
all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied in order to dismiss a complaint.‟” Id. (citing
Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 263 (3d Cir. 2008)). While engaging in this analysis, we
bear in mind that district judges “must have authority to manage their dockets, especially
during [a] massive litigation.” Id. (quoting In re Fannie Mae Sec. Litig., 552 F.3d 814,
822 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). Due to the inherent difficulties in administering cases in
multidistrict litigation, “district courts must have wide discretion to manage „complex
issues and potential burdens on defendants and the court‟ – namely . . . through managing
discovery.” Id. (quoting Acuna v. Brown & Root Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 340 (5th Cir.
2000)).
We conclude that the District Court properly considered the Poulis factors and,
accordingly, did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Plaintiffs‟ cases with prejudice
pursuant to Rule 41(b). “[O]ur ability to satisfy ourselves that the district court did not
act arbitrarily, and did consider the relevant factors, is made easier when the dismissal
resulted from the defendant‟s motion and was challenged by the plaintiff before the
district court ruled.” Id. at 248. Here, the District Court considered the Poulis factors in
its November 2011 order, and the Plaintiffs addressed them in their briefs in opposition to
Defendants‟ motions to dismiss. While the District Court did not explicitly weigh all of
the factors in its July 2012 order, it reiterated the case management needs of asbestos
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multidistrict litigation and the objectives of AO 12, including the need “to avoid
unnecessary burdens on defendants.” App. 54 n.2. Specifically, the Court stated:
“Without evidence of an exposure history for each plaintiff and a medical diagnosis that
allows defendants and the Court to sort through, for example, which plaintiffs allegedly
were exposed to whose asbestos at which locations, the litigation of thousands of cases
could not go forward.” App. 53-54 n.2. By not presenting the exposure history
necessary to withstand a motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs delayed the progress of their cases
and unduly burdened the Defendants.
C.
Plaintiffs‟ final argument challenges the District Court‟s failure to provide
Plaintiffs with individualized analyses of their claims and the mandatory findings
necessary to justify dismissal with prejudice. This argument fails because, as previously
stated, the District Court properly considered the Poulis factors in its November 2011
order, the parties addressed them in their briefs, and the Court incorporated those factors
into its dismissal of the Plaintiffs‟ claims in July 2012. Because Plaintiffs failed to
provide the submissions necessary to withstand a dispositive motion, the Court was left
with little to assess in terms of individualized analysis.
Plaintiffs‟ argument also fails because they were put on notice in November 2011
of the District Court‟s view on the diagnostic information required for their cases. See
Asbestos (VI), 718 F.3d at 248. Rather than correcting their submissions to comply with
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AO 12, which they had ample opportunity to do, Plaintiffs chose to argue that the District
Court‟s interpretation was flawed and that their submissions were sufficient. The
consequences of taking this route were clear given the District Court‟s previous
dismissals in November 2011. See id. (“Plaintiffs chose the strategy of arguing to the
contrary, in seeming denial, while the consequences of doing so . . . were quite clear, and
admittedly drastic.”).
Because the District Court adequately weighed the parties‟ arguments in
accordance with Poulis, and Plaintiffs were given the opportunity to cure any potential
defects, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Plaintiffs‟ cases
pursuant to Rule 41(b).
IV.
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the District Court‟s dismissal with
prejudice of the claims in the instant appeal.
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