writ as he raised claims new and different from those raised in his
previous petitions. 3 See NRS 34.810(1)(b)(2); NRS 34.810(2). Appellant's
petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause
and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS
34.810(3). Moreover, because the State specifically pleaded laches,
appellant was required to overcome the rebuttable presumption of
prejudice. NRS 34.800(2).
Appellant claimed that he had good cause because he recently
learned that his trial counsel was in a romantic relationship with a client
for an unrelated matter, which appellant asserted caused counsel to be
distracted during appellant's case. This claim failed to demonstrate good
cause because a procedurally barred claim of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel cannot constitute cause for additional claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel. See Hathaway v. State, 119 Nev. 248, 252-53, 71
P.3d 503, 506 (2003). In addition, appellant failed to overcome the
presumption of prejudice to the State. Therefore, the district court did not
err in dismissing the petition as procedurally barred. Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
Hardesty
pc
Parraguirre Cherry
3Evans v. State, 117 Nev. 609, 28 P.3d 498 (2001); Evans v. State,
Docket No. 56140 (Order of Affirmance, May 9, 2011).
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cc: Hon. Elissa F. Cadish, District Judge
Verne11 Ray Evans
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
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