UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4404
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SHAWN HORTON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, Chief District
Judge. (4:12-cr-00576-TLW-6)
Submitted: October 17, 2013 Decided: October 21, 2013
Before AGEE, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. Thomas McBratney, III, MCBRATNEY LAW FIRM, PA, Florence,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Alfred William Walker Bethea,
Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Shawn Horton pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement
to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
powder cocaine and cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846
(2006), and was sentenced to 192 months in prison. Horton’s
counsel filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that, in counsel’s view, there are
no meritorious issues for appeal, but questioning whether the
district court: (1) complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 when the
court accepted Horton’s guilty plea; (2) erred in denying
Horton’s motion for a downward departure sentence; and (3)
properly determined that Horton was a career offender. Horton
has not filed a pro se supplemental brief, despite receiving
notice of his right to do so, and the Government has declined to
file a responsive brief. We affirm.
The purpose of the Rule 11 colloquy is to ensure that
the defendant knowingly and voluntarily enters the guilty plea.
See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 58 (2002). Thus, before
accepting a guilty plea, a trial court must inform the defendant
of, and determine that he understands the nature of, the charges
to which the plea is offered, any mandatory minimum penalty, the
maximum possible penalty he faces, and the various rights he is
relinquishing by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b). The
court also must determine whether there is a factual basis for
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the plea. Id.; United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 120 (4th
Cir. 1991).
There is a strong presumption that a defendant’s
guilty plea is binding and voluntary if the Rule 11 hearing was
adequate. United States v. Puckett, 61 F.3d 1092, 1099 (4th
Cir. 1995). Additionally, in the absence of a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea in the district court, we review for
plain error the adequacy of the guilty plea proceeding under
Rule 11. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir.
2002). “To establish plain error, [Horton] must show that an
error occurred, that the error was plain, and that the error
affected his substantial rights.” United States v. Muhammad,
478 F.3d 247, 249 (4th Cir. 2007). Even if Horton satisfies
these requirements, “correction of the error remains within our
discretion, which we should not exercise . . . unless the error
seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation
of judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
Horton has not presented any evidence or argument to
demonstrate plain error. Indeed, the record reveals that the
district court fully complied with Rule 11’s requirements during
the plea colloquy, ensuring that Horton’s plea was knowing and
voluntary, that he understood the rights he was giving up by
pleading guilty and the sentence he faced, and that he committed
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the offenses to which he was pleading guilty. Horton also
attested during the hearing that he fully understood the
ramifications of his guilty plea, and that no one made promises
to him outside those made by the Government in his plea
agreement. We conclude that Horton’s plea was knowing,
voluntary, and supported by a sufficient factual basis.
Accordingly, we affirm Horton’s conviction.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying an
abuse of discretion standard. See Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 51 (2007); see also United States v. Layton, 564 F.3d
330, 335 (4th Cir. 2009). This review requires consideration of
both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the
sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. We first assess whether the
district court properly calculated the advisory Guidelines
range, considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)
(West 2000 & Supp. 2013), analyzed any arguments presented by
the parties, and sufficiently explained the selected sentence.
Gall, 552 U.S. at 49–51; United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572,
575–76 (4th Cir. 2010). If the sentence is free of significant
procedural error, we review the substantive reasonableness of
the sentence, “examin[ing] the totality of the circumstances to
see whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in
concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards
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set forth in § 3553(a).” United States v. Mendoza–Mendoza, 597
F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010).
In this case, the district court properly calculated
Horton’s Guidelines range, 1 granted the Government’s motion for a
downward departure sentence, 2 treated the Guidelines as advisory,
and considered the applicable § 3553(a) factors. Moreover, the
record establishes that the district court based Horton’s
sentence on its “individualized assessment” of the facts of the
case. United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir.
2009). Accordingly, we conclude that Horton’s sentence is both
procedurally and substantively reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We
therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Horton, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Horton requests that a petition be filed, but
1
We discern no error in the district court’s decision to
classify Horton as a career offender. See U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1 (2012); United States v.
Allen, 446 F.3d 522, 529-30 (4th Cir. 2006).
2
We may not review the district court’s decision to deny
Horton’s motion for a downward departure. United States v.
Brewer, 520 F.3d 367, 371 (4th Cir. 2008) (“We lack the
authority to review a sentencing court’s denial of a downward
departure unless the court failed to understand its authority to
do so.”).
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counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Horton. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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