United States v. Ryan Eaddy

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4174

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

RYAN CHRISTOPHER EADDY,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, Chief District
Judge. (4:10-cr-00604-TLW-1)

Submitted: September 10, 2013 Decided: October 21, 2013

Before KEENAN, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

William F. Nettles, IV, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
Florence, South Carolina, for Appellant. Arthur Bradley Parham,
Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for
Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

Ryan Eaddy appeals his conviction and 200-month prison

sentence imposed following his guilty plea, pursuant to a plea

agreement, to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to

distribute more than fifty grams of crack cocaine in violation

of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006). Eaddy’s counsel has filed a brief

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),

certifying that there are no meritorious issues for appeal but

questioning whether the district court substantially complied

with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting Eaddy’s guilty plea and

whether Eaddy’s sentence is reasonable. Eaddy, though given the

opportunity to do so, has not filed a pro se supplemental brief.

We affirm.

We first address Eaddy’s guilty plea. Prior to

accepting a guilty plea, a trial court, through colloquy with

the defendant, must inform the defendant of, and determine that

the defendant understands, the nature of the charges to which

the plea is offered, any mandatory minimum penalty, the maximum

possible penalty he faces, and the various rights he is

relinquishing by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1).

The district court also must ensure that the defendant’s plea

was voluntary, was supported by a sufficient factual basis, and

did not result from force, threats, or promises not contained in

the plea agreement. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2), (3). “In

2
reviewing the adequacy of compliance with Rule 11, this Court

should accord deference to the trial court’s decision as to how

best to conduct the mandated colloquy with the defendant.”

United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 1991).

Because Eaddy did not move to withdraw his guilty plea

in the district court or raise any objections during the Rule 11

colloquy, the plea colloquy is reviewed for plain error. United

States v. General, 278 F.3d 389, 393 (4th Cir. 2002). To

demonstrate plain error, a defendant must show that: (1) there

was an error; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the error

affected his “substantial rights.” United States v. Olano, 507

U.S. 725, 732 (1993). A defendant’s substantial rights are

affected if the court determines that the error “influenced the

defendant’s decision to plead guilty and impaired his ability to

evaluate with eyes open the direct attendant risks of accepting

criminal responsibility.” United States v. Goins, 51 F.3d 400,

402-03 (4th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted); see

also United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 532 (4th Cir.

2002) (holding that defendant must demonstrate that he would not

have pled guilty but for the error).

Our review of the record reveals that the district

court substantially complied with Rule 11. The district court

properly ensured that Johnson’s plea was knowing, voluntary, and

supported by a sufficient factual basis. The district court

3
properly informed Eaddy of the maximum possible penalties he

faced and of the advisory nature of the Sentencing Guidelines.

Though the district court did not inform Eaddy of his right to

be protected from compelled self-incrimination, Fed. R. Crim. P.

11(b)(1)(E), we conclude that this error did not affect Eaddy’s

substantial rights because there is no indication that, but for

the error, Eaddy would not have pled guilty.

Next, we address the reasonableness of Eaddy’s

sentence. We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying an

abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.

38, 51 (2007); United States v. Layton, 564 F.3d 330, 335 (4th

Cir. 2009). In so doing, we first examine the sentence for

significant procedural error, including failing to calculate (or

improperly calculating) the advisory Sentencing Guidelines

range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider

the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, selecting a sentence

based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to explain

adequately the chosen sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. When

considering the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, we

take into account the totality of the circumstances. United

States v. Mendoza–Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010).

If the sentence is within the Guidelines range, we presume on

appeal that the sentence is reasonable. United States v. Go,

517 F.3d 216, 218 (4th Cir. 2008); see Rita v. United States,

4
551 U.S. 338, 346–56 (2007) (permitting appellate presumption of

reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentence). Upon review of

the record, we conclude that the district court did not commit

procedural error and gave sufficient reasons for Eaddy’s

within-Guidelines sentence. Moreover, Eaddy has not rebutted

the presumption that his sentence is substantively reasonable.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment and deny

Eaddy’s motion to remand. This Court requires that counsel

inform Eaddy, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme

Court of the United States for further review. If Eaddy

requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that

such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in

this Court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s

motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Eaddy.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before this Court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

AFFIRMED