United States v. Patrick Taylor

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4319

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

PATRICK LEE EDWARD TAYLOR,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Greenville. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (6:09-cr-00785-HMH-7)

Submitted: October 10, 2013 Decided: October 21, 2013

Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Lora E. Collins, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenville,
South Carolina, for Appellant. William Jacob Watkins, Jr.,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville, South
Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

Patrick Lee Edward Taylor appeals the twelve-month

sentence imposed upon revocation of his supervised release.

Taylor’s counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California,

386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious

grounds for appeal, but questioning whether the district court

abused its discretion by revoking Taylor’s supervised release

and imposing a twelve-month sentence. Although advised of his

right to file a pro se supplemental brief, Taylor has not done

so. * For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

A decision to revoke a defendant’s supervised release

is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Pregent,

190 F.3d 279, 282 (4th Cir. 1999). The district court need only

find a violation of a condition of supervised release by a

preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e)(3) (West

Supp. 2013). In this case, Taylor admitted that he violated the

*
Taylor has filed a letter with this court, questioning the
propriety of the district court’s rejection of counsel’s request
for service of the revocation sentence to commence immediately.
But, at the time of the revocation hearing, Taylor was in
federal court on a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum.
Accordingly, he was not then in federal custody, nor was he
capable of being taken into federal custody, because he was
already in state custody. See 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a) (2006) (“A
sentence to a term of imprisonment commences on the date the
defendant is received in custody awaiting transportation
to . . . the official detention facility at which the sentence
is to be served.”). We therefore conclude the district court
properly denied Taylor’s request. See United States v. Hayes,
535 F.3d 907, 910 (8th Cir. 2008).

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conditions of supervision. We accordingly find no abuse of

discretion in the district court’s decision to revoke Taylor’s

supervised release.

Turning to Taylor’s sentence, we will not disturb a

sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release that is

within the prescribed statutory range and is not plainly

unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437–39

(4th Cir. 2006). In making this determination, “we follow

generally the procedural and substantive considerations” used in

reviewing original sentences. Id. at 438.

A sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district

court has considered the policy statements contained in Chapter

Seven of the Guidelines and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

(2006) factors, id. at 440, and has adequately explained the

sentence chosen, though it need not explain the sentence in as

much detail as when imposing the original sentence. United

States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). A

sentence is substantively reasonable if the district court

states a proper basis for its imposition of a sentence up to the

statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. If, based on this

review, we decide that the sentence is not unreasonable, we will

affirm. Id. at 439.

In the initial inquiry, we take a more deferential

posture concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion

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than when we apply the reasonableness review to post-conviction

Guidelines sentences. United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652,

656 (4th Cir. 2007). Only if we find the sentence unreasonable

must we decide whether it is “plainly” so. Id. at 657.

Although counsel questions whether there is any error

rendering Taylor’s sentence plainly unreasonable, she identifies

no such error. Indeed, as counsel acknowledges, the district

court properly calculated the applicable policy statement range

and sentenced Taylor to twelve months’ imprisonment, a sentence

within the policy statement range and below the statutory

maximum. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e)(3); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines

Manual § 7B1.4(a) (2009), p.s. Further, our review of the

record confirms that there was no sentencing error warranting

correction on plain error review. See United States v. Knight,

606 F.3d 171, 178 (4th Cir. 2010).

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire

record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for

appeal. We therefore affirm the judgment. This court requires

that counsel inform Taylor, in writing, of his right to petition

the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If

Taylor requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes

that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move

in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.

Counsel’s motion must state that a copy of the motion was served

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on Taylor. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

AFFIRMED