UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4319
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
PATRICK LEE EDWARD TAYLOR,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Greenville. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (6:09-cr-00785-HMH-7)
Submitted: October 10, 2013 Decided: October 21, 2013
Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Lora E. Collins, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenville,
South Carolina, for Appellant. William Jacob Watkins, Jr.,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Patrick Lee Edward Taylor appeals the twelve-month
sentence imposed upon revocation of his supervised release.
Taylor’s counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious
grounds for appeal, but questioning whether the district court
abused its discretion by revoking Taylor’s supervised release
and imposing a twelve-month sentence. Although advised of his
right to file a pro se supplemental brief, Taylor has not done
so. * For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
A decision to revoke a defendant’s supervised release
is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Pregent,
190 F.3d 279, 282 (4th Cir. 1999). The district court need only
find a violation of a condition of supervised release by a
preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e)(3) (West
Supp. 2013). In this case, Taylor admitted that he violated the
*
Taylor has filed a letter with this court, questioning the
propriety of the district court’s rejection of counsel’s request
for service of the revocation sentence to commence immediately.
But, at the time of the revocation hearing, Taylor was in
federal court on a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum.
Accordingly, he was not then in federal custody, nor was he
capable of being taken into federal custody, because he was
already in state custody. See 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a) (2006) (“A
sentence to a term of imprisonment commences on the date the
defendant is received in custody awaiting transportation
to . . . the official detention facility at which the sentence
is to be served.”). We therefore conclude the district court
properly denied Taylor’s request. See United States v. Hayes,
535 F.3d 907, 910 (8th Cir. 2008).
2
conditions of supervision. We accordingly find no abuse of
discretion in the district court’s decision to revoke Taylor’s
supervised release.
Turning to Taylor’s sentence, we will not disturb a
sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release that is
within the prescribed statutory range and is not plainly
unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437–39
(4th Cir. 2006). In making this determination, “we follow
generally the procedural and substantive considerations” used in
reviewing original sentences. Id. at 438.
A sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district
court has considered the policy statements contained in Chapter
Seven of the Guidelines and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2006) factors, id. at 440, and has adequately explained the
sentence chosen, though it need not explain the sentence in as
much detail as when imposing the original sentence. United
States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). A
sentence is substantively reasonable if the district court
states a proper basis for its imposition of a sentence up to the
statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. If, based on this
review, we decide that the sentence is not unreasonable, we will
affirm. Id. at 439.
In the initial inquiry, we take a more deferential
posture concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion
3
than when we apply the reasonableness review to post-conviction
Guidelines sentences. United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652,
656 (4th Cir. 2007). Only if we find the sentence unreasonable
must we decide whether it is “plainly” so. Id. at 657.
Although counsel questions whether there is any error
rendering Taylor’s sentence plainly unreasonable, she identifies
no such error. Indeed, as counsel acknowledges, the district
court properly calculated the applicable policy statement range
and sentenced Taylor to twelve months’ imprisonment, a sentence
within the policy statement range and below the statutory
maximum. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e)(3); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual § 7B1.4(a) (2009), p.s. Further, our review of the
record confirms that there was no sentencing error warranting
correction on plain error review. See United States v. Knight,
606 F.3d 171, 178 (4th Cir. 2010).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm the judgment. This court requires
that counsel inform Taylor, in writing, of his right to petition
the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If
Taylor requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move
in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.
Counsel’s motion must state that a copy of the motion was served
4
on Taylor. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
5