UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4361
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
KENNETH ODELL JACKSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Spartanburg. G. Ross Anderson, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (7:08-cr-00207-GRA-1)
Submitted: October 17, 2013 Decided: October 21, 2013
Before AGEE, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David W. Plowden, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenville,
South Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United
States Attorney, A. Lance Crick, Assistant United States
Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Kenneth Odell Jackson appeals the twenty-four-month
sentence imposed for violating his federal supervised release.
Jackson pled guilty to the violation based upon new criminal
conduct, here, his South Carolina conviction for possession with
intent to distribute methamphetamine. He alleges that the
district court imposed a procedurally unreasonable revocation
sentence because the district court imposed it to run
concurrently with his state sentence, but without reducing his
sentence to account for the two-month delay caused by state
officials who failed to deliver him to federal court when
originally scheduled. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
The district court heard arguments from the parties
(which included defense counsel’s arguments regarding the two-
month delay), listened to Jackson himself and to his sister, and
decided to impose a twenty-four-month sentence to be served
concurrently to Jackson’s South Carolina sentence. The court
specifically noted Jackson’s criminal history category of III,
that his offense was grade A, and that his advisory policy
statement was 18-24 months. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual § 7B1.4(a), p.s. (2012). The court expressly applied 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors.
A district court has broad discretion to impose a
sentence upon revoking a defendant’s supervised release. United
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States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). We will
affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release
if it is within the applicable statutory maximum and not
“plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433,
437, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). In determining whether a
revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we first assess the
sentence for unreasonableness, following generally the
procedural and substantive considerations that we employ in our
review of original sentences. Id. at 438.
A supervised release revocation sentence is
procedurally reasonable if the district court considered the
Sentencing Guidelines’ Chapter 7 advisory policy statements and
the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors it is permitted to consider in a
supervised release revocation case. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e) (West
2000 & Supp. 2013); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439. Although a
district court need not explain the reasons for imposing a
revocation sentence in as much detail as when it imposes an
original sentence, it still must provide a statement of reasons
for the sentence imposed. Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547. A
revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if the district
court stated a proper basis for concluding that the defendant
should receive the sentence imposed, up to the statutory
maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. Only if a sentence is found
procedurally or substantively unreasonable will we then decide
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whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable. Id. at 439. A
sentence is plainly unreasonable if it is clearly or obviously
unreasonable. Id.
Jackson contends that his sentence is procedurally
unreasonable because the district court did not specifically
address his argument regarding the two-month delay by state
officials transporting him to federal court for the revocation
hearing. We conclude that this contention is without merit and
note that the district court was not required to impose
Jackson’s revocation sentence concurrent to his state offense.
In announcing its sentence, the district court discussed
relevant § 3553(a) factors it was allowed to consider in
imposing a revocation sentence under § 3583(e). Assuming,
without deciding, that Jackson’s revocation sentence was
unreasonable because the district court failed to provide an
adequate explanation grounded in relevant § 3553(a) factors, we
conclude that the sentence is not “plainly unreasonable” because
the sentence does not exceed the applicable statutory maximum,
see 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(1) (2006); 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e)(3), and
Jackson fails to point to facts establishing that the sentence
is clearly or obviously unreasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
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adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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