FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION OCT 21 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JASPAL SINGH, No. 09-72039
Petitioner, Agency No. A078-046-272
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted October 11, 2013
San Francisco, California
Before: WALLACE, M. SMITH, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
Jaspal Singh (also known as Sukhwinder Singh), a native and citizen of
India, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision
affirming the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of his asylum, withholding of
removal, and Convention Against Torture (CAT) claims. We deny the petition for
review.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Because the BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision and cited to Matter
of Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872, 874 (BIA 1994), we review the decision of the IJ
as the BIA’s decision. Abebe v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 1037, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005).
We review the agency’s factual findings, including adverse credibility
determinations, for substantial evidence, and we uphold the findings unless the
record compels a contrary result. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Monjaraz-Munoz v.
INS, 327 F.3d 892, 895 (9th Cir. 2003).
The pre-REAL ID Act standards for adverse credibility determinations
govern this petition. See Rizk v. Holder, 629 F.3d 1083, 1087 n.2 (9th Cir. 2011).
“As long as one of the identified grounds underlying a negative credibility finding
is supported by substantial evidence and goes to the heart of the claims of
persecution, we are bound to accept the negative credibility finding.” Khadka v.
Holder, 618 F.3d 996, 1000 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted); see also Wang v.
INS, 352 F.3d 1250, 1259 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[W]hether we have rejected some of
the IJ’s grounds for an adverse credibility finding is irrelevant.”).
Here, substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility finding
because Singh provided inconsistent, vague, and unresponsive testimony when
questioned about fundamental aspects of his application. First, Singh’s testimony
regarding his role as village sarpanch was riddled with inconsistencies regarding
2
his assumption of that position, his duties, and his resignation. These
inconsistencies go to the heart of Singh’s asylum application because they raise
doubts as to whether he actually served as sarpanch, and whether the government
persecuted him on that basis.
Singh’s vague and unresponsive testimony regarding his political activities
also provides substantial evidence supporting the agency’s adverse credibility
determination. Despite several direct questions, Singh failed to provide specifics
about his role in the Block Samiti and the Akali Dal Mann party. Indeed, Singh
failed to mention that the central goal of the Akali Dal Mann party is the creation
of an independent Sikh state until the IJ asked him explicitly. This vague and
evasive testimony goes to the heart of Singh’s asylum application because it raises
serious questions regarding whether he was, in fact, engaged in political activities
in India, and whether the government persecuted him on that basis.
Because substantial evidence supports the denial of Singh’s application for
asylum, it likewise supports the denial of his withholding of removal claim. See
Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003). Further, because Singh’s
CAT claim relies on the same testimony that was properly “determined to be not
credible,” his CAT claim fails. Id. at 1157.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
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FILED
Singh v. Holder, 09-72039 OCT 21 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
Ikuta, J., dissenting: U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
Although it may seem like “common sense” to assume that Singh would
recall and be able to explain his duties as sarpanch or the goals of the Akali Dal
Mann party if he actually had held that position or was a member of that party,
Jibril v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1129, 1135 (9th Cir. 2005), our prior decisions have
held that similar assumptions by an immigration judge (IJ) are improper
speculation and conjecture. See, e.g., Joseph v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1235, 1245 (9th
Cir. 2010) (holding that the IJ’s assumption that the petitioner should understand
Haitian politics, given his claim that he was a high ranking member of the
president’s political party, was improper speculation and could not support an
adverse credibility determination).
While Singh’s testimony regarding his political activities was vague and
unresponsive, we deem such problems to constitute substantial evidence only when
there is “obvious evasiveness,” such as when a petitioner cannot “explain [an] all-
too-apparent contradiction in his testimony.” Wang v. INS, 352 F.3d 1250,
1256–57 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). There were no similar
glaring contradictions in Singh’s testimony.
Although Singh’s testimony and documentary evidence regarding the dates
1
he assumed and resigned his position as sarpanch were inconsistent by a few days
or months, such minor inconsistencies do not constitute substantial evidence
sufficient to support an adverse credibility finding, particularly when they do not
serve to enhance the petitioner’s claim of persecution. See Li v. Holder, 559 F.3d
1096, 1103–07 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that an adverse credibility determination
based on speculation and minor inconsistencies that did not go to heart of claim
was not supported by substantial evidence).
In sum, while common sense would lead me to join the majority, our case
law prevents me from doing so. I respectfully and reluctantly dissent.
2