UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 96-40306
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ROGER LEE PUGH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JAMES A COLLINS, DIRECTOR,
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION, Walls Unit;
Nurses, Male and Female, Skyview Unit;
CORRECTIONS OFFICERS, Skyview Unit,;
PSYCHIATRIC DOCTORS, Skyview Unit,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
(6:95-CV-497)
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November 21, 1996
Before WISDOM, JONES, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Roger Lee Pugh appeals the February 27, 1996 order of
Judith K. Guthrie, United States Magistrate Judge, dismissing his
42 U.S.C. §1983 claim against former director Collins and
unidentified doctors and nurses at the Skyview unit as frivolous.
Finding no error, we affirm.
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
Appellant’s one page brief, if most liberally construed,
raises two issues: appointment of counsel and the legality of his
treatment with psychotropic drugs.
Appellant writes in his brief that he is unable to
understand the concepts in his complaint and needs the assistance
of counsel. There is no general right to appointment of counsel in
a civil case. Salmon v. Corpus Christi Indep. School Dist., 911
F.2d 1165, 1166 (5th Cir. 1990). The court may appoint counsel if
necessary to advance the proper administration of justice. 28
U.S.C. §1915(e)(1). Appointment of counsel should be reserved for
“exceptional circumstances.” Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 212
(5th Cir. 1982). There is no showing of exceptional circumstances
in this case. Appellant’s request for appointment of counsel is
denied.
Appellant also challenges the magistrate judge’s
conclusion that his treatment with psychotropic drugs was not in
violation of the constitution. The magistrate judge found that
appellant did not manifest a lack of consent to medication by
injection, thus the due process requirements for involuntary
medication were not triggered. Appellant refused to take his
medication orally and signed a refusal of treatment form. However,
appellant gave no indication of lack of consent to medication by
injection and did not sign a refusal of treatment form for
injections. The magistrate judge also found that the officials
were prepared to comply with the procedural requirements of
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Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990), if appellant had refused
treatment by injection.
There is no basis to dispute the conclusions of the
magistrate judge. Pugh never refused to take medication by
injection or notified prison officials that he would not
voluntarily do so; on the contrary, after executing written refusal
to take medication orally, he continued to take the injections
without objection. Absent such a refusal or objection, duly
communicated to prison officials, there is no involuntary
medication claim, and the Due Process protections of Washington v.
Harper were not implicated. Consequently, Pugh’s involuntary
medication claim under § 1983 was wholly without merit, and the
district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the
involuntary medication claim as frivolous pursuant to § 1915(e).
The judgment of the court is, therefore,
AFFIRMED.
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