FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
TENTH CIRCUIT October 23, 2013
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
PHILLIP CHEATHAM, JR.,
Petitioner-Appellant, No. 13-3138
v. (D. Kansas)
SAM CLINE, Warden; DEREK (D.C. No. 5:12-CV-03249-SAC)
SCHMIDT, Attorney General of the State
of Kansas,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER DENYING A
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before TYMKOVICH, ANDERSON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
In Kansas state court, Mr. Phillip Cheatham, Jr. was convicted on charges
of murder, attempted murder, aggravated battery, and criminal possession of a
firearm. After unsuccessfully petitioning the district court for habeas relief under
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006), Mr. Cheatham appeals. We can only entertain the
appeal if we hold that Mr. Cheatham is entitled to a certificate of appealability.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2006). Holding that he is not, we dismiss the
appeal.
*
This order does not constitute precedent. See 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
Standard for a Certificate of Appealability
To obtain a certificate of appealability, Mr. Cheatham must make “a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2) (2006). This showing exists only if “reasonable jurists could debate
whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in
a different manner or that the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.’” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484
(2000).
Mr. Cheatham’s Criminal Cases and His
Arguments for a Certificate of Appealability
Mr. Cheatham was convicted twice, once in 1995 for voluntary
manslaughter (Case No. 94-CR-1801) and once in 2005 (Case No. 03-CR-2635)
for first-degree murder, attempted murder, aggravated battery, and unlawful
possession of a firearm. He appealed the 2005 conviction; but while waiting for a
decision, he filed a habeas petition, claiming in part that the state-court appeal
was taking too long and that he had suffered a double-jeopardy violation when
evidence was elicited about his 1995 conviction for manslaughter.
Forty-five days after Mr. Cheatham began the habeas action, the Kansas
Supreme Court decided the appeal in his favor, reversing the 2005 conviction on
all counts and remanding for a new trial. State v. Cheatham, 292 P.3d 318 (Kan.
2013). The district court held that the state appellate decision mooted the habeas
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claims. R. vol. 1, at 175. Mr. Cheatham disagrees and seeks a certificate of
appealability, arguing that the state-court appeal took too long and that the
double-jeopardy violation prevented a retrial.
Mootness of Mr. Cheatham’s Habeas Claim
Involving Delay in the State-Court Appeal
Though the state appeals court ultimately decided in favor of Mr.
Cheatham, he continues to claim that the court took too long. We can assume for
the sake of argument that the delay resulted in a denial of due process. See
Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538, 1566 (10th Cir. 1994). But Mr. Cheatham
ultimately obtained a favorable appellate decision, one which vacated his
conviction and ordered a new trial. Even if Mr. Cheatham were to prevail in the
habeas action, the federal district court would have no obligation to grant any
further relief even if the state appellate delay had resulted in a due-process
violation. See Harris v. Champion, 938 F.2d 1062, 1070 (10th Cir. 1991) (“When
the federal habeas court addresses a petitioner’s substantive claim of
unconstitutional delays in his state appeal, the most typical remedy is to order the
defendant released from custody unless the state court hears the petitioner’s
appeal within a clearly-defined, relatively short period of time (such as 90 days).”
(footnote omitted)).
In virtually identical circumstances, we held that a habeas action was moot
in Hayes v. Evans, 70 F.3d 85 (10th Cir. 1995). There the petitioner challenged a
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state-court conviction and appealed. While this appeal was pending, the
petitioner sought habeas relief. But, before the federal court could rule on the
habeas petition, the state appellate court decided the appeal in the petitioner’s
favor, reversing and remanding for a new trial. Hayes, 70 F.3d at 86. The
petitioner argued that the reversal did not moot the habeas claim because the state
court’s delay prejudiced his ability to defend in a retrial. Id. We disagreed,
concluding that the habeas action was moot because the most the district court
could have done would have been to grant the same relief that the petitioner had
already obtained in his state-court appeal. Id.
Hayes v. Evans is governing here. Like the petitioner in Hayes, Mr.
Cheatham contends that he has been prejudiced by the delay in his state-court
appeal. For example, he alleges that an alibi witness died during the pendency of
the appeal. But, we held in Hayes that reversal of a conviction moots the habeas
claim even if the state court’s delay has been prejudicial. Id. Under Hayes v.
Evans, the delay claim is moot and cannot supply the basis for a certificate of
appealability.
Invalidity of the Habeas Claim Involving Double Jeopardy
In addition to complaining about the state appellate delay, Mr. Cheatham
alleges a double-jeopardy violation based on use of his 1995 manslaughter
conviction in his trial in Case No. 03-CR-2635. The district court regarded this
claim as moot because the Kansas Supreme Court reversed the conviction in Case
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No. 03-CR-2635. We need not decide whether this rationale is correct because
even if the claim were not moot, it would remain groundless. The Double
Jeopardy Clause protects against reprosecution for the same conduct, but does not
ordinarily prevent introduction of evidence simply because it had been used in a
prior prosecution. See United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378, 385-86 (1992).
Thus, the double-jeopardy claim is not reasonably debatable and cannot provide
the basis for a certificate of appealability.
Conclusion
Mr. Cheatham’s delay claim is moot and his double-jeopardy claim lacks
potential merit. Thus, we deny his request for a certificate of appealability and
dismiss the appeal.
Entered for the Court
Robert E. Bacharach
Circuit Judge
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