Haines v. Arthur E. Lange Revocable Trust (Tremont Securities Law, State Law & Insurance Litigation)

11-3899 (L) In re: Tremont Securities Law, State Law, and Insurance Litigation UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United 3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 4 on the 25th day of October, two thousand thirteen. 5 6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, 7 SUSAN L. CARNEY, 8 CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, 9 Circuit Judges. 10 11 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 12 13 IN RE: TREMONT SECURITIES LAW, STATE 14 LAW AND INSURANCE LITIGATION 15 16 Madelyn Haines and Paul Zamrowski, 17 Appellants 18 19 -v.- 11-3899 20 11-3923 21 11-4022 22 11-4030* * 11-4030 is currently the only open case number. The other case numbers have been determined by orders filed Mar. 13, 2013 (11-3899); Apr. 24, 2012 (11-3923); and Oct. 24, 2012 (11-4022). 1 1 Arthur E. Lange Revocable Trust, 2 Arthur C. Lange, Neal J. Polan, HFM 3 Charitable Remainder Trust, Eastham 4 Capital Appreciation Fund LP, NPV 5 Positive Corp., Daniel Jackson, 6 Laborers Local Pension Plan 17, Arthur 7 M. Brainson, Yvette Finkelstein, and 8 Group Defined Pension Plan & Trust, 9 Chateau Fiduciaire S.A., Matthew L. 10 Klein Irrevocable Family Trust, 11 Harriet Rutter Klein Revocable Trust, 12 Geoffrey Rabie Credit Shelter Trust, 13 and Joanne Brenda Rabie Credit Shelter 14 Trust, 15 Plaintiff-Appellees, 16 17 and 18 19 Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance 20 Company, MassMutual Holding LLC, 21 Oppenheimer Acquisition Corp., 22 Tremont Capital Management Inc., 23 Tremont Group Holdings, Inc., Rye 24 Investment Management, Tremont 25 Partners, Inc., Tremont (Bermuda) 26 Limited, Harry Hodges, Robert 27 Schulman, Jim Mitchell, Rupert Allan, 28 Lynn O. Keeshan, Patrick Kelly, 29 Stephen Thomas Clayton, Stuart 30 Pologe, Cynthia J. Nicoll, Tremont 31 Market Neutral Fund L.P., Tremont 32 Market Neutral Fund II, L.P., Tremont 33 Market Neutral Fund Limited, Tremont 34 Opportunity Fund Limited, Tremont 35 Opportunity Fund II L.P., Tremont 36 Opportunity Fund III L.P., Tremont 37 Arbitrage Fund, L.P., Tremont 38 Arbitrage Fund-Ireland, Tremont 39 Strategic Insurance Fund, L.P., Rye 40 Select Broad Market Fund, L.P., Rye 41 Select Broad Market XL Fund, L.P., 42 Rye Select Broad Market Prime Fund, 2 1 L.P., Rye Select Broad Market 2 Insurance Fund, L.P., and Rye Select 3 Broad Market Portfolio Limited, 4 Defendant-Appellees. 5 6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 7 8 FOR APPELLANTS: VINCENT T. GRESHAM, Atlanta, Ga. 9 10 FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLEES: ANDREW J. ENTWISTLE (Arthur V. 11 Nealon and Robert N. Cappucci, 12 Entiwistle & Cappucci LLP, New 13 York, N.Y., and Reed R. Kathrein 14 and Lee M. Gordon, Hagens Berman 15 Sobol Shapiro LLP, Berkeley, 16 Cal., on the brief), Entwistle & 17 Cappucci LLP, New York, N.Y., 18 for appellees Arthur E. Lange 19 Revocable Trust, Arthur C. 20 Lange, Neal J. Polan, HFM 21 Charitable Remainder Trust, 22 Eastham Capital Appreciation 23 Fund LP, NPV Positive Corp., and 24 for the benefit of Nominal 25 Defendants, Daniel Jackson, and 26 Laborers Local Pension Plan 17. 27 28 JEFFREY M. HABER (Stephanie M. 29 Beige, on the brief), Bernstein 30 Liebhard LLP, New York, N.Y., 31 for appellees Arthur M. 32 Brainson, Yvette Finkelstein, 33 and Group Defined Pension Plan & 34 Trust. 35 36 DEMET BASAR (Daniel W. Krasner, on 37 the brief), Wolf Haldenstein 38 Adler Freeman & Herz LLP, New 39 York, N.Y., for appellees 40 Chateau Fiduciaire S.A., Matthew 41 L. Klein Irrevocable Family 42 Trust, and Harriet Rutter Klein 43 Revocable Trust. 44 3 1 DAVID A. ROSENFELD, Robbins Geller 2 Rudman & Dowd LLP, Melville, 3 N.Y., for appellees Geoffrey 4 Rabie Credit Shelter Trust and 5 Joanne Brenda Rabie Credit 6 Shelter Trust. 7 8 FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEES: JOSEPH L. KOCIUBES (Carol E. Head, 9 on the brief), Bingham McCutchen 10 LLP, Boston, Mass., for 11 appellees Massachusetts Mutual 12 Life Insurance Company and 13 MassMutual Holding LLC. 14 15 DAVID A. KOTLER, Dechert LLP, 16 Princeton, N.J., for appellee 17 Oppenheimer Acquisition Corp. 18 19 SETH SCHWARTZ (Jason C. Vigna, on 20 the brief), Skadden, Arps, 21 Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, New 22 York, N.Y., for appellees 23 Tremont Capital Management Inc., 24 Tremont Group Holdings, Inc., 25 Rye Investment Management, 26 Tremont Partners, Inc., Tremont 27 (Bermuda) Limited, Harry Hodges, 28 Robert Schulman, Jim Mitchell, 29 Rupert Allan, Lynn O. Keeshan, 30 Patrick Kelly, Stephen Thomas 31 Clayton, Stuart Pologe, and 32 Cynthia J. Nicoll. 33 34 JAMIE B.W. STECHER (Ralph A. 35 Siciliano, David J. Kanfer, Zev 36 Feinstein Raben, on the brief), 37 Tannenbaum Helpern Syracuse & 38 Hirschtritt LLP, New York, N.Y., 39 for appellees Tremont Market 40 Neutral Fund L.P., Tremont 41 Market Neutral Fund II, L.P., 42 Tremont Market Neutral Fund 43 Limited, Tremont Opportunity 44 Fund Limited, Tremont 4 1 Opportunity Fund II L.P., 2 Tremont Opportunity Fund III 3 L.P., Tremont Arbitrage Fund, 4 L.P., Tremont Arbitrage Fund- 5 Ireland, Tremont Strategic 6 Insurance Fund, L.P., Rye Select 7 Broad Market Fund, L.P., Rye 8 Select Broad Market XL Fund, 9 L.P., Rye Select Broad Market 10 Prime Fund, L.P., Rye Select 11 Broad Market Insurance Fund, 12 L.P., and Rye Select Broad 13 Market Portfolio Limited. 14 15 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District 16 Court for the Southern District of New York (Griesa, J.). 17 18 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED 19 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be 20 REMANDED. 21 22 In this consolidated class action, investors in a group 23 of hedge funds that suffered losses in the Madoff Ponzi 24 scheme (plaintiffs) sue those funds, the fund managers, and 25 their controlling entities (defendants) under federal and 26 state law. The United States District Court for the 27 Southern District of New York (Griesa, J.) approved a 28 settlement and certified the settlement class over numerous 29 objections. On this appeal, objectors Madelyn Haines and 30 Paul Zamrowski challenge: the fairness of the settlement 31 terms; certification of the class; and dismissal of the 32 consolidated actions pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil 33 Procedure 23 and 23.1. They also argue that the award of 34 attorney’s fees was an abuse of discretion. We assume the 35 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the 36 procedural history, and the issues presented for review. 37 38 By this order, we return the mandate to the district 39 court for the limited purpose of deciding an issue that 40 potentially moots some of the appellate issues that we would 41 otherwise need to decide. 42 43 The Rye Funds were “single manager” funds that invested 44 all of their assets with Bernard L. Madoff Investment 5 1 Securities (“BLMIS”). The Tremont Funds were “funds of 2 funds,” investing about a quarter of their assets in the Rye 3 Funds (and the rest in unrelated investments) (collectively, 4 the “Funds”). When BLMIS imploded, the Rye Funds became 5 insolvent, and the Tremont Funds lost a quarter of their 6 assets. The plaintiffs claim that the defendants breached 7 their fiduciary duty by investing in BLMIS without 8 conducting proper due diligence, and made false and 9 misleading statements to investors about Madoff’s 10 involvement in managing the Funds’ assets. The Appellants 11 were investors in two Tremont Funds. 12 13 Settlement talks begun in November 2009 yielded a 14 Settlement Agreement in February 2011. While the settlement 15 negotiations were ongoing, the trustee of the BLMIS 16 bankruptcy estate (“Trustee”) sued many of the Settling 17 Defendants (as defined in the Settlement Agreement), seeking 18 recovery of approximately $2 billion that BLMIS had 19 transferred to the Tremont and Rye Funds prior to the 20 exposure of the Ponzi scheme. The Trustee alleged that the 21 bankruptcy estate could disallow approximately $3 billion 22 worth of customer claims filed by the Rye Funds unless the 23 estate recovered the $2 billion of alleged transfers. In 24 July 2011, this matter was settled: in exchange for 25 releasing all claims and allowing bankruptcy claims by 26 certain Rye Funds, the Settling Defendants agreed to pay $1 27 billion to the Trustee (the “Trustee Settlement”). The $1 28 billion was financed partially with cash provided by the Rye 29 and Tremont Funds. 30 31 The Appellants allege that the Trustee Settlement was 32 paid in part out of that portion of the Tremont Funds 33 (three-quarters) that was not invested in the Rye Funds–-and 34 therefore unrelated to Madoff. Although the parties dispute 35 the matter fiercely, it is clear that Haines and Zamrowski 36 together lost approximately $80,000 of their non-Madoff 37 investments in that manner. 38 39 The district court held fairness hearings regarding the 40 proposed Settlement Agreement in June and August 2011. 41 During this period, on August 4, 2011, lead counsel notified 42 the district court and the class of the Trustee Settlement. 43 On August 8, the district court found the Settlement 44 Agreement to be fair, adequate, and reasonable. The 6 1 district court issued orders dismissing the case and 2 approving attorney’s fees on August 19. In approving the 3 settlement, the district court’s order defined “Released 4 Claims” as: 5 6 known claims and Unknown Claims . . . that have 7 been asserted in the Actions, or, to the extent 8 they relate to direct or indirect investments in 9 or by the Settling Funds . . . that could have 10 been asserted in any forum by Plaintiffs, any 11 Settlement Class Member, any Settling Fund, or any 12 Individual Settling Insurance Plaintiff or any of 13 them against any of the Released Parties that 14 arise out of, or are based upon, or related to, 15 the allegations, transactions, facts, matters, or 16 occurrences, representations or omissions 17 involved, set forth, or referred to in the 18 Complaints filed in the Actions, or that relate to 19 the purchase, retention, ownership or sale of 20 limited partnership interests in or shares of the 21 Settling Funds or the Settling Funds’ investments 22 in Madoff. 23 24 (emphasis added). 25 26 Haines and Zamrowski appealed the district court’s 27 order on various grounds. On May 8, 2012, while this appeal 28 was pending, the Settling Defendants made an offer of tender 29 to the Appellants for 100% of Haines’s and Zamrowski’s share 30 of the Tremont Funds’ Rye/Madoff-related losses ($41,375, 31 and $88,510, respectively). The Appellants rejected this 32 tender by letter dated May 18. The Settling Defendants 33 moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that their offer 34 of tender rendered the appeal moot. The Appellants argue 35 that the purported offer falls short of their total losses 36 because they lost an additional $80,000 of their Tremont 37 investment when the Tremont Funds paid part of the $1 38 billion Trustee Settlement. The Lead Plaintiffs do not 39 dispute this, but argue that the Trustee Settlement is 40 unrelated to the facts underlying the class claims here, and 41 therefore not at issue. 42 43 We think it is clear that, in the consolidated cases, 44 no claim was expressly raised by the Appellants against the 7 1 Settling Defendants for the alleged $80,000 loss arising out 2 of the Trustee Settlement. The question relevant to 3 mootness is whether such a claim was released by the 4 Settlement Agreement in this case. If so, and if the 5 Appellants would be barred from recovering on that claim in 6 any future case, the additional $80,000 in losses would 7 remain at issue here, and the offer of tender would not have 8 made the Appellants whole. If, on the other hand, the claim 9 was not released, the additional $80,000 in claimed losses 10 could be litigated in a separate suit against the Settling 11 Defendants, and the offer of tender would have covered all 12 of the Appellants’ losses related to this case. The 13 governing principles of mootness are set out in the margin.1 14 15 The resolution of this dispute rests on the district 16 court’s definition of “Released Claims.” The last clause of 17 this definition is capacious–-it could be argued that a 18 claim based on the $1 billion Trustee Settlement was 19 “relate[d] to the . . . ownership . . . of limited 20 partnership interests in” the Tremont Funds. Ambiguity of a 21 contract term “is a threshold question of law for the 22 court.” Walk-In Med. Ctrs., Inc. v. Breuer Capital Corp., 23 818 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1987). The meaning of ambiguous 24 language is a question of fact. Hoyt v. Andreucci, 433 F.3d 25 320, 331 (2d Cir. 2006). The release language cited above 26 “is susceptible [to] more than one reasonable 1 Despite the Appellants’ status as objectors, the appeal would be moot if the Settling Defendants had tendered the full amount of losses–-whatever that may be–-to the Appellants. See Breneisen v. Motorola, Inc., 656 F.3d 701, 706 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[O]nce the defendant offers to satisfy the plaintiff’s entire demand, there is no dispute over which to litigate . . . because he has no remaining stake.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Appellants cite U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980), and Deposit Guarantee National Bank, Jackson, Miss. v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980), which together hold that a class action does not become moot upon offer of tender to the named plaintiff, even if class certification has been denied, because the plaintiff still has a “personal stake” in obtaining class certification on appeal. Neither case applies here because the Appellants are not class representatives. 8 1 interpretation,” and is therefore ambiguous. Walk-In Med. 2 Ctrs., 818 F.2d at 264. The district court made no explicit 3 findings as to the meaning of this ambiguous release 4 language. 5 6 Accordingly, we REMAND to the district court, pursuant 7 to the procedure outlined in United States v. Jacobson, 15 8 F.3d 19, 22 (2d Cir. 1994), for clarification as to the 9 following question: was the Appellants’ potential $80,000 10 claim arising out of the Trustee Settlement released by the 11 settlement and dismissal of this case? 12 13 A mandate shall issue forthwith remanding the case to 14 the district court, where it shall solicit briefing from the 15 parties in an expeditious manner and render a decision 16 within 60 days of the date of this order. After the 17 district court’s decision, any party to this appeal may 18 restore jurisdiction to this court within 30 days by letter 19 to the Clerk’s Office seeking review, without need for a new 20 notice of appeal. The Clerk’s Office will then set an 21 expedited briefing schedule and refer the appeal to this 22 panel. 23 24 FOR THE COURT: 25 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK 26 27 28 29 9